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Abstract 
 
State sponsorship of terrorism, where a government deliberately provides 
resources and material support to a terrorist organization, is common in the 
international system.  By conceptualizing state sponsorship as a relationship between a 
principal and agent, I develop a consistent theoretical model that explains why states 
pursue this foreign policy strategy, as well as how they rationally attempt to minimize 
the inherent risks of delegating to violent non-state actors.  I test my model by using a 
novel dataset on sponsorship behaviors that improves on the range, detail, and 
temporality of previously used measurements.  My dissertation is organized into three 
distinct papers, the first of which examines why states choose to delegate to terrorists, 
the second, which organizations they are likely to support, and the third, how they 
attempt to control these unpredictable actors. 
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Introduction 
 
Why do sponsors of terrorism choose to provide resources to violent non-state actors, and 
having done so, how do they select and control these controversial and dangerous actors?     
 Although isolated acts of terrorism have frequently been conducted by individuals, the 
greatest terrorist threats to public safety come from well-organized and well-equipped terrorist 
organizations, engaging in planned and systemic acts of political violence.  Unfortunately, the 
organizational costs of terrorism are relatively low when compared to the billions many nations 
spend annually on defense budgets, such as the expenditure on Al Qaeda's devastating 
9/11/2001 terrorist attacks, estimated at half a million dollars (Kean and Hamilton 2004).  
Terrorist organizations operate on the far extremes of the political system, however, and the 
typically illegal nature of these groups creates difficulties in acquiring the resources, training, 
and expertise necessary for coordinated, lengthy terrorism campaigns (Hoffman 2006; Kydd and 
Walter 2006).  Because of this, a greater understanding of how terrorist organizations obtain 
their operating finances and training can contribute to both the scholastic understanding of 
terrorist organizations, as well as policy formulation on how to reduce the threat of terrorism.    
 State sponsorship of terrorism can be viewed as distinct from other funding methods, 
due to the introduction of a state actor in the terrorism process.  Previous literature on state 
sponsorship of terrorism has conceptualized the relationship between the sponsor and 
organization as a principal-agent relationship, a framework originating from literature on 
government bureaucracies and other hierarchical systems (Bapat 2012; Byman and Kreps 2010).  
State sponsors will provide resources, ranging from medical supplies to training and weaponry, 
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to terrorist organizations.  In return, the sponsored organization will engage in violence in order 
to achieve policy goals desired by the state, becoming an agent for the sponsor’s interests.   
Sponsorship offers a number of possible benefits, such as weakening a target state’s military, 
diplomatic leverage, or the achievement of ideological objectives.  Although the intended 
objectives will naturally vary from case to case, it is reasonable to assume that sponsorship is 
intended to achieve specific objectives that would otherwise be costly, difficult, or impossible 
for the state to achieve without the organization’s specialized skills.  
 However, providing material support to terrorist organizations can also result in 
significant costs for states that engage in this behavior (Byman and Kreps 2010; Carter 2012; 
Conrad 2011). Terrorist organizations expressly engage in violence against civilian populations, 
and states that have been revealed to support these groups may experience normatively-driven 
international diplomatic penalties and domestic political scandals.  State sponsors will also be 
concerned with the errant behaviors of their agents, which is commonly referred to as agency 
loss or shirking.  Sponsored terrorist organizations have frequently acted in ways that directly 
contradict the interests of their principals, such as shifting the targets of terrorist attacks, 
escalating low-intensity conflicts, and publically failing important or complex operations.  In 
severe instances of agency loss, terrorist organizations have completely broken with their 
principals, including the launching of terrorist attacks directed at the sponsor state.  Given the 
potential for the negative outcomes of state sponsorship to outweigh the policy benefits of 
delegation, it is puzzling that states continue to delegate to these violent non-state actors.  
 The principal goal of my dissertation is to develop the theoretical and empirical tools 
necessary to evaluate broad patterns of sponsorship decision-making and behavior, advancing 
both the academic study of sponsorship and resultant policy-making.  I expand upon existing 
theoretical research by incorporating strategic decision-making and cost-benefit analysis to the 
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principal-agent framework.  I argue that states should balance their incentives to engage in 
terrorism sponsorship with the potential for political, diplomatic, and security costs, and engage 
in sponsorship only when their expected utility is high.  Since it is impossible to completely 
eliminate the risks of agency loss, states will also seek to control the behaviors of their agents, 
acting in ways that are similar to more conventional principal-agent relationships (Hawkings et 
al. 2006). My theoretical models contend that the broad patterns of sponsorship will reflect 
these considerations in clear and predictable ways, opening avenues for future research and 
policy consideration.  
I test these models using a novel dataset and large-N empirical tests, which allow me to 
examine broader patterns of state sponsor-terrorist organization relationships than could 
previously have been explored.  In addition to collecting a larger number of sponsorship cases, 
my dataset also varies over time, allowing for time-sensitive analyses to be conducted. The 
dataset also includes a wide variety of variables detailing the specifics of the sponsorship 
relationship, such as the type of support provided.  As the opacity of terrorist organizations and 
the covert nature of sponsorship result in innate concerns over the reliability of data on 
sponsorship patterns, I have utilized a multi-source data collection process that can assess the 
reliability of sponsorship observations.  This data, which will be publically released after the 
conclusion of this project, may also be valuable for other scholars examining state sponsorship 
of terrorism or broader sources of funding for terrorist groups.  When combined with the 
sophisticated empirical models and predictive heuristics I utilize in my dissertation, this dataset 
allows me to fully explore the broad sponsorship questions and general theoretical models I 
outline below.  
In my first paper, I ask why states are motivated to engage in sponsorship, and whether 
state sponsors strategically weigh the benefits and risks of this behavior.  In the second paper, 
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which focuses on sponsorship in the Middle East, I ask why state sponsors select the specific 
groups the sponsor, utilizing a two-stage empirical model to evaluate both the initial decision to 
engage in sponsorship and the group selection process.  In my final paper, I ask how the 
relationship between the state and the terrorist organization will affect the behaviors of 
sponsored groups.   
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Paper 1: Delegating Terror: Principal-Agent Based Decision Making in State 
Sponsorship of Terrorism 
 
 Following his successful 1969 coup d'état, Muammar Gaddafi ruled Libya for 42 
years.  During his first decades in power, the Libyan government regularly provided 
funding, training, and material resources to organizations that engaged in politically-
motivated violence against civilian populations, or terrorism.  Gaddafi's sponsorship 
decisions appear to be deliberately strategic in nature, as the target selection of 
sponsored groups frequently benefited Libyan interests (Collins 2004).  In some 
instances, terrorist groups were supported to advance Libyan regional influence and 
territorial claims, such as the Chadian Movement for Democracy and Development and 
the Islamic Legion.  In others, such as Libyan support for the Irish Republican Army and 
the Arab Commando Cells, sponsorship was intended to replace conventional attacks 
against militarily superior enemies, like the United States and United Kingdom (Hoffman 
2006).   
 Although the sponsorship of terrorist organizations allowed Gaddafi to have a 
significant influence on regional and international politics, the costs to Libya from its 
aggressive sponsorship were high.  International outrage from the United Nations, US 
military reprisals, and multilateral economic sanctions significantly weakened the Libyan 
economy, military capabilities, and reputation.  By the later decades of Gaddafi’s 
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regime, his government had almost completely discarded terrorism sponsorship as a 
foreign policy, with few if any of Libya's policy goals having been achieved.  Given the 
international costs of being labeled a terrorism sponsor, and the dubious benefits, it is 
puzzling that Gaddafi's Libya and other states have pursued this policy option so 
vigorously. 
 State sponsorship of terrorism, despite its strongly negative connotations and 
continual condemnation from international organizations, is common in the 
international system.  Over 50 nations have either explicitly or allegedly engaged in this 
behavior since 1970, ranging from United States sponsorship of the Nicaraguan Contras 
to Syrian and Iranian support for the Lebanese Hezbollah organization.  Although in 
recent years some of the most devastating terrorist organizations, such as Boko Haram 
and the Islamic State, have engaged in campaigns of violence without state sponsorship, 
external support remains a valuable source of funding and training for many terrorist 
groups (Agbiboa 2013; Byman and Kreps 2010).  If counter-terrorism policymakers wish 
to reduce the number of state-sponsored organizations, a vital first step is to 
comprehensively examine which states become sponsors and why they choose to 
engage in this behavior.  
 In this article, I examine the motivations that drive a state to sponsor terrorism 
in another country, employing large-N empirical methodology to investigate a wide 
range of dyadic relationships.  Using prior applications of the principal-agent framework 
as a foundation, I develop a model that interprets state sponsorship as a delegation of 
foreign policy objectives from the government of a state to a nonstate actor.  
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Sponsorship offers a number of strategic benefits, allowing states to influence the 
policies of others more effectively, discretely, and with lower costs than direct military 
action.  However, there are significant risks associated with pursuing this strategy, 
including international condemnation, domestic disapproval, and even reciprocal 
sponsorship of terrorism.  As Gaddafi discovered, the costs of sponsoring terrorism may 
grow to outweigh the benefits.  Because of Libya and other visible examples of state 
sponsorship's potential risks, the variations in costs and benefits should influence 
potential sponsors' decisions on whether or not to pursue this strategy.  I test this 
argument utilizing a new dataset that examines state sponsorship across all countries 
between 1970 and 2008.   
 
Previous Research 
 Although not all sponsored terrorist organizations can be considered insurgent 
groups, a wealth of literature exists on external support in civil wars (Findley and Teo 
2006; Salehyan 2010).  Political interests appear to motivate many external 
interventions, such as advancing the sponsor’s ideological interests in the region or 
weakening a rival state (Nasr 2006; Prunier 2004).  Interventions often significantly 
influence the outcomes of civil wars, with the presence of external support for rebel 
groups related to longer and more deadly conflicts (Regan 2002; Salehyan et al. 2014).  
A common explanation for rebel sponsorship is that it is a form of policy delegation, 
wherein the supporter has specific goals for the outcome of the civil war and will 
attempt to control the actions of a rebel group in order to achieve them.  
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 Although delegation to rebel groups can provide significant benefits, the risks 
associated with delegation lead Salehyan and other scholars to conceptualize state 
sponsorship of rebel organizations as a principal-agent relationship (Hawkins et al. 2006; 
Salehyan 2010).  Salehyan argues that states lose policy autonomy when they support 
insurgencies, principally due to a lack of information about the true preferences of the 
group, or agent.  This can lead to the agent engaging in undesired behaviors, such as 
indiscriminate violence against civilians or conflict escalation (Salehyan et al. 2014).  
Delegation can also result in costs outside of the sponsorship relationship, including 
retaliation by targeted states and international condemnation.     
 The principal-agent framework has also been utilized to examine state 
sponsorship of terrorist organizations.  In the article "Agents of Destruction," Byman and 
Kreps develop a principal-agent framework similar to Salehyan’s, which accounts for 
both the incentives of states to delegate policy to terrorist groups and the resulting 
agency problems (Byman and Kreps 2010).  Their model suggests that terrorist 
organizations have unique characteristics which will provide benefits to sponsors 
beyond those available from insurgent groups.  These include the clandestine nature of 
terrorist organizations, offering plausible deniability to sponsors, as well as the 
transnational and asymmetric capabilities of terrorism, which will allow sponsors to 
credibly commit to international threats regardless of conventional military strength 
(Hoffman 2006; Sandler 2010).  Byman and Kreps utilize a selection of case studies to 
support their arguments, drawing on prominent sponsorship examples in Lebanon, 
India, and Afghanistan.  Since this empirical technique cannot test broad patterns of 
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behavior, expansions to this analysis using large-N quantitative methods may offer 
additional evidence of the principal-agent framework's value.   
 Previous large-N analyses have examined state sponsorship as an independent 
variable, finding significant differences between sponsored and non-sponsored groups.  
Sponsored groups appear to be more likely to negotiate with their targets, and are also 
responsible for causing fewer average fatalities than other groups (Asal and Rethemeyer 
2008; Bapat 2006).  Similar behavioral characteristics have been found to significantly 
increase the likelihood of organizational success (Abrahms 2012).  However, some forms 
of sponsorship have been found to increase the likelihood that an organization will 
forcibly dissolve, suggesting that state sponsors strategically betray organizations that 
no longer work towards their interests (Carter 2012).  These findings strongly support 
the argument that sponsorship is policy driven, as changes in sponsored group behavior 
and resultant outcomes can be explained through external pressure to pursue 
achievable political goals.   
 The interpretation of sponsorship as not only policy driven, but strategic, is 
strengthened by previously observed links between interstate political disputes and 
terrorism.  Earlier analyses have found that an empirical connection exists between 
interstate rivalry and greater numbers of transnational terrorist attacks (Conrad 2011; 
Findley et al. 2012).  Unfortunately, the dyadic data utilized by these analyses only 
examines the total number of transnational terror attacks in a given year.  Since these 
articles cannot differentiate between attacks by sponsored and non-sponsored 
organizations, they cannot establish a clear link between government strategy and 
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terrorist behavior.  In addition to testing the validity of the principal-agent framework, 
my new data collection fills this empirical gap, enabling scholars to more accurately 
examine the strategy of state sponsorship in a variety of theoretical contexts. 
 
Defining Terrorist Organizations 
 I adopt the Global Terrorism Database definition of behaviors that constitute 
terrorism, and resultantly what constitutes a terrorist organization.  The GTD definition 
of terrorism is an intentional act of violence (or the threat of violence) by a subnational 
perpetrator, which must be carried out with a specific political, social, economic, or 
religious goal, communicate to an intended audience beyond the immediate victims of 
the attack, and deliberately target either civilians or noncombatants (LaFree and Dugan 
2007; START 2015).   
 
Defining Sponsorship 
 In the context of this article, I define state sponsorship as the deliberate 
provision of resources and material support to a nondomestic terrorist organization by a 
government institution.1  I limit my definition to material forms of support that offer 
concrete advantages for terrorist organizations, such as money, military equipment, 
nonmilitary material resources, training facilities, and safe havens.2 
                                                          
1
There exists a sizable amount of previous research on government support of domestic militias in civil 
war, many of which also engage in terrorism. This includes recent research on the incentives to delegate 
to domestic actors (Carey et al. 2015; Eck 2015) and the impact of government support on militia behavior 
(Mitchell et al. 2014; Stanton 2015).  
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 My definition excludes instances in which a state only provides nonmaterial 
support to a terrorist organization, such as diplomatic recognition.  Since this form of 
support will not directly contribute to an organization's survival, a nonmaterial 
supporter will not gain the level of control over a group's goals and behaviors that 
comes with material dependency.  The provision of nonmaterial support will also result 
in lower risks for the state, as the weaker relationship between the state and terrorist 
organization may lead to smaller reputational costs than would occur in instances of 
material support.  These differences are sufficient to suggest an analytical distinction 
between material and nonmaterial forms of support, and so I will focus exclusively on 
the former.   
 My definition also excludes instances in which a government allows domestic 
nonstate actors to provide material support to terrorist organizations.  Such passive 
sponsorship can provide significant material benefits to the group, but fundamentally 
results in a weaker relationship between a state and terrorist organization than active 
sponsorship (Byman 2006).  Since a passive sponsor merely tolerates a group’s activities, 
these states will have less influence than active sponsors, but will also face fewer risks 
from normative outrage.  The criterion of awareness by a state’s government also 
creates a significant empirical obstacle for outside observers in differentiating passive 
sponsors from states that are ignorant of terrorist fundraising or unable to effectively 
prevent terrorist activity.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
2
Although previous research (Carter 2012) has found that safe havens may contribute to a group’s 
eventual dissolution, the immediate organizational benefits of safe havens strongly suggest this form of 
support is closer in impact to material resources than nonmaterial.         
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The Principal-agent Relationship 
 The principal-agent framework has its roots in research on bureaucracies and 
firms, but in recent years has been frequently utilized in studies of international political 
institutions, such as alliances and international organizations (Eisenhardt 1989; Hawkins 
et al. 2006). The framework’s central component is the concept of delegation, in which 
one actor, the principal, enlists a second, the agent, to act in a way that serves the 
principal's interests.  
 Principal-agent relationships can easily be applied to conceptualizing state 
sponsorship of terrorist groups.  State principals will delegate to terrorist agents in order 
to achieve foreign policy objectives, such as projecting power, advancing an ideological 
agenda, or satisfying a domestic constituency (Bapat 2012).  The decision to delegate 
should be motivated by the comparative advantages of terrorist organizations over 
other methods of coercion available to the state, such as conventional military forces or 
covert intervention (Hoffman 2006; Pape 2003; Poznansky 2015).   
 All principal-agent relationships have the potential for agents to behave in ways 
that do not serve the interests of the principal, which is typically referred to as agency 
loss (Sappington 1991; Shapiro and Siegel 2007).  Although the risk of agency loss is an 
important consideration in the decision to delegate, this is not the only potential cost in 
the context of terrorism sponsorship (Byman and Kreps 2010).  State sponsors must also 
consider the negative international consequences of being identified as a supporter of 
terrorism, such as withdrawals from trade agreements, military strikes, or even 
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reciprocal support of domestic terrorists.  Sponsorship may also incur reputational costs 
from domestic audiences, due to the negative normative judgments that arise from 
violence against civilian targets.  These concerns create a clear distinction between licit 
principal-agent relationships and state sponsorship, as the potential costs associated 
with this form of delegation will be naturally higher than others.  This may explain why a 
comparatively smaller number of states choose to delegate foreign policy to terrorist 
groups compared with delegation of authority to international organizations such as the 
United Nations or the World Health Organization (Bradley and Kelley 2008).   
 
Benefits of Sponsorship 
 Since its creation in 1948, Israel has faced strong opposition from many Muslim 
majority states in the Middle East.  Despite Israel's relatively smaller size and 
population, its superior conventional military allowed it to routinely defeat its neighbors 
during the first decades of the nation's existence.  In recent years, a number of still 
hostile states, particularly Syria and Iran, have pursued nonconventional methods of 
striking at Israel, most notably through their sponsorship of anti-Israeli terrorist 
organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas (Rabil 2006).  The material support provided by 
the two states has allowed these groups to engage in continual campaigns of terrorism 
and insurgent violence, leading to often controversial counter-terrorism efforts by the 
Israeli military (el-Hokayem 2007; Findley et al. 2012).  By sponsoring terrorist groups, 
Iran and Syria have been able to demonstrate their continued opposition to Israel's 
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existence, weaken the Israeli military, and tarnish Israel's international reputation, all 
without suffering the probable high costs of direct military conflict with their opponent.  
 This example demonstrates the potential benefits states may obtain by 
delegating foreign policy goals to terrorist organizations.  However, states have 
numerous options to manipulate other states’ policies, and the empirical record 
suggests that most foreign policy disagreements are not resolved by terrorism 
sponsorship (Colaresi et al. 2007).  Terrorism sponsorship should therefore offer a 
distinct policy benefit to a state in order to justify its selection in addition to, or instead 
of, alternative mechanisms of coercion, such as diplomacy, economic sanctions, or 
military force.   
 When compared to other methods of interstate coercion, delegating to terrorist 
organizations has a number of distinct strategic advantages.  The first is the inexpensive 
nature of sponsorship, as the material expenditures necessary for supporting a terrorist 
campaign will be lower than the costs of deploying conventional military forces (Byman 
2006; Laquer1996).  States will also be able to employ terrorist organizations in 
assassinations or kidnappings, reducing the need for costly covert agencies, which are 
frequently underdeveloped in non-great power states (Carson 2016; Gleditsch and 
Høgetveit 1984). 
 Despite these lower costs, the likelihood of coercive success will not necessarily 
be diminished, as terrorism is an asymmetric method of conflict that can be successfully 
utilized by small, comparatively weak actors (Arreguin-Toft 2001; Sobek and Braithwaite 
2005).  In some circumstances, state-sponsored terrorism will be a more effective tool 
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of coercion than conventional military or covert interventions.  Unlike the limited forms 
of conventional warfare common in recent decades, terrorism directly impacts civilian 
populations, potentially pressuring the targeted state to make concessions in order to 
avoid domestic unrest (Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2003).  Terrorist organizations will 
also be more aggressive than government actors, selecting targets and utilizing tactics 
that would not be considered by risk-averse covert agencies.  This violence, coupled 
with the extremist ideology of most terrorists, has been argued to increase the 
bargaining power of sponsor states, due to the perception that only the sponsor can 
control its otherwise unrestrained agents (Bapat 2012). 
 Prior to becoming sponsors, the governments of Syria and Iran had strong 
preferences regarding Israel's foreign and domestic policies, and it was unlikely that any 
of their goals would have been achievable through diplomacy.  These paired factors 
provided incentives to engage in the risky strategy of sponsorship.  Neither Syria nor 
Iran have sponsored terrorist organizations in states with whom they enjoy historically 
friendly relationships, such as Russia, or in states with few overlapping interests, such as 
geographically distant Latin American nations.  If both political and strategic incentives 
exist, it is reasonable to assume that a state will see greater incentives to sponsor 
terrorism than if one or both are absent.   
 One type of relationship that offers both incentives is a lengthy history of 
disputes and antagonism between the potential sponsor and the target, often referred 
to as rivalry.  Rivalry has been identified as a significant motivator for interstate 
conflicts, ranging from border disputes and trade disagreements to militarized conflict 
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(Colaresi et al. 2007; Diehl and Goertz 2000).  Although the continued interactions 
between rivals will likely result in strong policy preferences, rivalry will also increase 
distrust and reduce the likelihood of cooperation.  In these circumstances, the 
incentives to rely upon violent coercive strategies in order to force specific political 
changes will increase. 
 Although a state sponsor of terrorism will avoid the high costs of direct military 
conflict, the same cannot be said for the target state, making sponsorship attractive for 
long-term rivals.  States that experience terrorist campaigns often suffer costs similar to 
those in conventional wars, such as losses to civilian populations, damage to key 
infrastructure, and weakened military capabilities (Epright 1997; Frey et al. 2007).  
These effects may be exacerbated if the terrorist organization is strengthened and 
sustained by outside support (Byman et al. 2001; Overgaard 1994).  While the military 
capabilities of the target state are drained by longer, costlier counter-terrorism 
campaigns, the sponsor's capabilities will be unaffected, adjusting the balance of power 
in its favor.  This readjustment in capabilities will offer little benefit to nonrivals, as they 
will be less likely to experience future military conflicts.  Diminishing a rival state’s 
capabilities, however, will benefit a potential sponsor, as the likelihood of future 
hostilities will be high. 
 Rival states will also be attracted to the potential efficacy of terrorism when 
compared with other forms of nonmilitarized coercion available to them.  Repeated 
hostile interactions with a rival state will harden the positions of the states relative to 
each other and reduce their overlapping interests, making nonviolent forms of coercion 
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available to other states unlikely to succeed (Drezner 1999; Miyagawa 1992; Wagner 
1988).  A foreign power controlling a well-equipped terrorist organization will gain a 
significant bargaining chip when negotiating with a hostile state, as such a group can 
cause significant disruptions to the target’s economy and political system (Conrad 
2011).   
 Although most states should benefit from weakening the capabilities of a rival, it 
is reasonable to assume that states will benefit more from the declining capabilities of a 
stronger opponent than a weaker one.  Direct conflict with a militarily powerful rival will 
be risky for a weaker state, as the probability of victory will be low and the potential 
costs of defeat will be high (Colaresi et al. 2007; Waltz 1979).  By sponsoring terrorist 
organizations to attack a strong rival, the weaker state not only gains the benefits of the 
terrorist campaign, but can also avoid the negative consequences of directly confronting 
its enemy.   
Israel's difficulties in occupying southern Lebanon while simultaneously 
combating domestic terrorism clearly illustrate the incentives of rivals to sponsor 
terrorist organizations.  Despite Israel's superior military force successfully occupying 
parts of Lebanon from 1982 to 2000, Israeli military objectives were politically 
hampered by Syrian-sponsored terrorist campaigns, both in Lebanon and within Israel 
itself.  Operating independently, it is unlikely that the Syrian military would have been 
able to forcibly dislodge Israeli troops from Lebanon.  By supplying equipment and 
resources to multiple terrorist organizations, Syria increased the costs of the Lebanese 
occupation, ultimately contributing to Israeli withdrawal (Rabil 2006).  Although many of 
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Syria's desired goals, such as the dissolution of the Israeli state, were not achieved, 
sponsorship did contribute to a foreign policy victory that might otherwise have been 
unachievable.   
Due to the strategic and political advantages of sponsoring terrorist 
organizations that target rival states, the likelihood of a state choosing this strategy 
should be significantly higher if the target state is a rival than if no such antagonism 
exists.  However, this effect will be influenced by the relative military capabilities of the 
two rivals, as the weaker state in a rivalry will have greater incentives to delegate to 
terrorist organizations than the stronger state.  Therefore, the likelihood of a rival state 
sponsoring a terrorist organization should be comparatively higher if the potential 
sponsor is weaker than its rival.  
Hypothesis 1:  If a state is both weaker than the target state and in an 
antagonistic relationship, then the likelihood of sponsorship will be higher than if 
the state is stronger than the target state and in an antagonistic relationship.   
 
Costs of Sponsorship 
 While Iran and Syria have benefited from their sponsorship of anti-Israeli 
terrorist groups, this strategy has not been costless.  State sponsorship has been utilized 
to justify a continued program of economic sanctions and diplomatic hostility from both 
regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and global powers like the United States (Byman 
2005; Rabil 2006).  The resulting international isolation has helped fuel domestic unrest 
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and dissatisfaction within both countries, including antigovernment organizations that 
are allegedly funded by targets of Syrian and Iranian sponsored terrorism.   
 The costs Iran and Syria have experienced because of their delegation to terrorist 
groups are not unique.  It is clear that state sponsorship of terrorism has the potential to 
cost the sponsor state as much or more than sponsorship's potential benefits (Byman 
and Kreps 2010; Collins 2004).  The numerous historical examples suggest that potential 
state sponsors will be aware of the risks associated with choosing to delegate.  As a 
result, I assume that only states which are confident that they will either avoid or 
minimize the costs of sponsorship should make the rational choice to engage in it, while 
less confident states will avoid this behavior entirely.  While the risk of agency loss will 
vary significantly depending upon the specific terrorist organization a state chooses to 
sponsor, states may also suffer costs that are independent from the characteristics of 
the agent, resulting instead from the decision to utilize sponsorship as a foreign policy 
strategy.   
 
International Risks of Sponsorship 
 All of the groups included in my analysis have engaged in at least one act of 
violence that targeted noncombatants.  Although there is considerable variation in 
patterns of violence committed by terrorist organizations, the deliberate killing of 
civilians frequently distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence by nonstate 
actors (Ganor 2002; Young and Findley 2011).  Studies of public opinion within and 
across countries have noted strongly negative normative opinions towards targeting 
20 
 
civilians, in contrast to the more nuanced views on nonviolent protest movements and 
insurgent groups that exclusively attack military targets (Hoffman 2006; Stephan and 
Chenoweth 2008).   
 Because of these normative reactions, states should be concerned with the 
negative reputational costs that will emerge if they are definitively identified as 
sponsors.  The inherent difficulty of monitoring terrorist behavior will prevent principals 
from moderating the actions of their agents, resulting in, with near inevitability, the 
deaths of civilians.  Particularly heinous acts of terrorism have led to international 
condemnation and economic sanctions against nations that supported the groups 
responsible, such as airline boycotts of Algeria following the 1968 El Al hijacking and Al 
Qaeda-related UN sanctioning of the Taliban regime in 2000 (Byman 2005; Ensalaco 
2008).  Prolific sponsor states such as Syria, Libya, and Iran have experienced long term 
political and economic isolation, in large part due to their roles in the targeting of 
civilian populations (Byman and Kreps 2010; Torbat 2005).  Even if such efforts are 
unsuccessful in coercing a state to abandon sponsorship, the economic and political 
isolation resulting from multilateral punishments can prove highly detrimental to its 
wealth and influence. 
 Although these economic and reputational risks reduce the incentives to engage 
in sponsorship, there are circumstances in which these normative pressures will be 
reduced or eliminated.  The history of conflict suggests that states will be more willing 
to engage in otherwise reprehensible behaviors when they have already been the 
targets of those behaviors themselves, such as the widespread use of chemical 
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weaponry during the First World War (Ellis van Courtland Moon 1984).  If a state has 
already been the target of state-sponsored terrorism, utilizing this strategy can be 
framed to both domestic and international audiences as a defensive action, necessary in 
order to "level the playing field."   
 The patterns of international condemnation towards state-sponsored terrorism 
suggest that aggressive sponsors are more likely to be punished than reciprocal 
sponsors.  The United States has a history of supporting violent opposition groups in 
countries whose attacks on US interests have led to international condemnation, such 
as Libya, Iran, and Afghanistan (Byman 2005).  In recent years, Indian defense 
policymakers have openly stated their support for reciprocal sponsorship, using 
language such as "kante se kanta nikalna (removing a thorn with a thorn)" to describe 
countering foreign terrorism with Indian-sponsored organizations (Haider and Haider 
2015).  Pakistan, a pivotal regional ally of the United States and Great Britain, has made 
allegations that this policy includes Indian support for domestic terrorist organizations in 
Balochistan that are attempting to violently separate their province (Wikileaks 2009).  
However, despite active condemnations of and antipathy towards Balochi separatist 
groups by American and British policymakers, the two states do not appear to have 
reprimanded or punished India for its alleged sponsorship (US State Department, Office 
of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2007; UK Home Office 2016).  Although this 
silence may be the result of a number of factors, Pakistan's overt sponsorship of 
multiple Indian terrorist organizations is likely to have influenced US and UK decision 
making.   If these examples are representative of larger trends, international and 
22 
 
domestic actors will be less inclined to punish the reciprocal sponsor, reducing the 
overall costs of sponsorship and increasing the likelihood that a potential sponsor will 
choose to support terrorist organizations that target the initial sponsor.   
Hypothesis 2:  If a non-sponsor state experienced state-sponsored terrorism 
perpetrated by the target state in the past year, then the likelihood of 
sponsorship will be higher.   
 
Domestic Risks of Sponsorship 
 The authoritarian al-Bashir regime in Sudan has had a lengthy history of both 
harboring terrorist organizations and directly sponsoring terrorism in regional neighbors 
such as Chad, Ethiopia, and Uganda (Carney 2005).  Sudan's history of terrorism 
sponsorship has resulted in widespread criticism and isolation from the international 
community, including economic sanctions and military strikes by the United States.  
Despite this, the al-Bashir regime has continued to both remain in power and sponsor 
terrorists, due in large part to the institutional weakness of Sudan's domestic political 
opposition (Martin 2002).   
 The durability of the al-Bashir regime demonstrates the role domestic political 
considerations have on the decision to delegate foreign policy to terrorist organizations.  
Since alleged or explicit state sponsors of terrorism range from fully developed 
democracies such as the United States to absolute monarchies like Saudi Arabia, the 
domestic concerns of sponsors will also vary widely.  However, regardless of the 
institutional system, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of governments will be 
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motivated by the desire to remain in power for the foreseeable future.  Sponsorship has 
the potential to complicate this goal, as political opponents may seek to use the 
inherent controversy of supporting terrorism to weaken the sponsoring government.   
Because of this, the ability of a government to limit information and oversight 
over its foreign policy actions will play an important role in reducing the domestic risks 
of sponsorship.  Declassified British and American documents regarding Cold War-era 
covert operations strongly suggest that policymakers were deeply concerned about the 
political ramifications of controversial decisions, and deliberately acted in ways intended 
to evade or reduce domestic oversight (Carson and Yarhi-Milo 2017; Gibbs 1995; Jones 
2004).  Extremely controversial actions, such as the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
involvement in the 1960 Democratic Republic of the Congo military coup d’état and 
British military support for Royalist forces in the 1962-1964 Yemen Civil War, appear to 
have been deliberately concealed from legislative and public oversight.  Due to the 
similarly negative normative views associated with the support of terrorism, potential 
state sponsors should have similar incentives to hide their behavior from domestic 
audiences.  However, the ability of policymakers to conceal their activities from other 
domestic actors will vary greatly, even between states that possess broadly similar 
political institutions, such as advanced democracies (Gleditsch and Høgetveit 1984).   
One indicator of a government's ability to reduce or eliminate the risk of 
domestic oversight is the level of institutional constraint on the actions of the executive.  
Many states possess institutions that enable other branches of government to monitor 
and constrain the actions of the executive (Strøm 2000).  As the executive branch of a 
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government is traditionally responsible for the implementation of foreign policy and 
domestic security, any outside checks on executive behavior have the potential to 
influence decision making in these policy areas. 
Previous research has found that higher levels of executive constraints decrease 
the likelihood of conventional conflict initiation in democracies (Reiter and Tillman 
2002).  Given the negative normative associations of sponsoring terrorism, it is also 
reasonable to assume that executive constraints will reduce the ability of states to 
sponsor, due to the increased potential for other actors to prevent sponsorship 
initiation.  Executive constraints will also increase the institutional costs policymakers 
may suffer if state-sponsorship is discovered, such as the political and legal difficulties 
for the Reagan administration following the Iran-Contra affair (Brody and Shapiro 1989).   
 The need to be accountable to other political institutions may also limit the 
executive branch's confidence in its counter-terrorism efforts.  Greater institutional 
checks and balances will, in many cases, prevent the adoption of measures that would 
improve counter-terrorism capabilities at the expense of civil rights and liberties (Li 
2005).  This will increase the risks of reciprocal state-sponsored terrorism, as a 
constrained sponsor will be unable to quickly and effectively deal with terrorist 
organizations supported by a foreign state (Allen 2008; Piazza 2008; Weeks 2008).   
 The political and security risks associated with high levels of executive 
constraints suggest that the costs of sponsorship for constrained governments will be 
significantly greater than for governments with low executive constraints.  As a result, 
25 
 
there should be a significant difference in the likelihood of sponsorship initiation 
between states with different levels of executive constraints.   
Hypothesis 3: If the executive constraints of a state's political system are weak, 
then the likelihood of sponsorship will increase.   
 
Research Design 
 The central political relationship I examine in this article is the decision by a state 
government to sponsor terrorist organizations targeting another state.  Since the 
characteristics of both states are necessary to understand this decision making process, 
I test my hypotheses using a dataset of directed country-level dyads between the years 
1970 and 2008.   
 I include all possible country-level dyadic pairs in the database, resulting in a 
total of 1,132,742 observations.  Although previous studies of state-level interactions 
and trends in terrorism have limited the sample of dyads based on political relevance, 
removing observations that are not contiguous or include a major power reduces the 
total number of positive observations of state sponsorship in my data by 49% (Findley et 
al. 2012).  This suggests, perhaps unsurprisingly, that state sponsorship of terrorism is 
not limited by the geographic and material constraints that restrict conventional military 
operations, a principal rational for excluding dyads in studies of interstate conflict 
(Lemke and Reed 2001).   
 
Dependent Variable  
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 Although previous literature has examined static patterns of state sponsorship 
within small samples of terrorist organizations, I expand upon this empirical work by 
developing a comprehensive, dynamic database of sponsorship patterns across all states 
in the international system (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Bapat 2012).  To create this 
data, I built upon four existing sources of group-level information about the financing of 
organizations that utilize terrorism.  These sources are the Non-State Actor Dataset 
(NSA) developed by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, the Terrorism Research and 
Analysis Consortium (TRAC) digital group-level profiles, the Terrorism Knowledge Base 
Terrorist Organization Profiles (archived by the University of Maryland National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), and the Big Allied 
and Dangerous (BAAD) 1.0 database, created by Asal and Rethemeyer.   
 Although each source includes a classification system that differentiates 
between whether or not a violent nonstate actor obtains support from a state, 
significant coding was necessary to account for the variance between level of 
specification, number of organizations, and temporality.  For example, the NSA database 
only examines insurgent groups, ignoring many organizations that exclusively engage in 
terrorism, but contains a large amount of information on sponsorship characteristics, 
including the time period in which a group receives support, the type of support 
received, and whether specific sponsors explicitly acknowledge their sponsorship 
behaviors.  In contrast, the qualitative TRAC profiles include a larger number of terrorist 
organizations, but most profiles do not include a temporal component or information on 
sponsor identity and support type.  Due to these coding differences, as well as possible 
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differences in available evidence, I found identification disagreements in roughly 40 
percent of the positive observations of sponsorship in my data.  To control for these 
inconsistencies, I divide sponsorship into three categories: the first in which all available 
sources unanimously agree on sponsorship classification, the second where there are 
disagreements on classification, and a third combining all observations of sponsorship.3 
 As I discussed earlier, I define sponsorship as the deliberate provision of 
resources and material support to a nondomestic terrorist organization by the 
government of a state.  Recorded instances of support which did not fit these criteria 
were excluded from my dataset, such as state diplomacy on behalf of a terrorist 
organization.   
 Using this new dataset, I created a binary variable that indicates whether or not 
the first state in a dyadic relationship began sponsoring a terrorist organization in the 
second state in a given year.  This indicator is more appropriate to use as a dependent 
variable than other measurements of sponsorship, as the central question underlying 
this analysis is why some states begin to sponsor terrorist organizations, while others do 
not.   
 
Independent Variables 
 The measurement of rivalry that I utilize is based upon Colaresi and Thompson's 
definition of strategic rivalry, in which rivalry is indicated by both competition and a 
perception of threat between dyadic pairs, rather than density of interstate disputes 
                                                          
3
 A random sample of state sponsors and sponsored terrorist organizations can be found in the Appendix.  
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(Colaresi et al. 2007; Diehl and Goertz 2000).4  By selecting a definition that explicitly 
requires hostility between the paired states, I avoid including dyads that experience 
frequent low-scale militarized interactions, such as maritime disputes, but otherwise 
enjoy productive diplomatic relationships. 
The variable used for the first hypothesis is the interaction of rivalry with the 
difference in military capabilities between dyadic pairs.5  This measurement was 
generated by subtracting the potential sponsor state's Composite Index of National 
Capability (CINC) version 4.0 score for the given year from the CINC score of the target 
state (Singer 1987; Singer et al. 1972).6  For ease of interpretation, as I predict that 
relative weakness will increase the likelihood of sponsorship, I negate this variable in my 
analysis. 
 The binary indicator for reciprocal sponsorship was generated from the same 
data as the dependent variable.  I measured whether a potential sponsor had 
experienced state-sponsored terrorism perpetrated by the target state in the years prior 
to the observation year, but had not yet sponsored a terrorist organization against the 
target.  I exclude years in which a potential sponsor no longer experienced state-
sponsored terrorism or had begun to sponsor terrorism itself from the measurement.    
                                                          
 
4
 To control for possible endogenity between sponsorship and rivalry onset, I exclude instances of rivalry 
which began the same year as sponsorship. 
 
5
 The comparison group for this variable, the difference in military capabilities between non-rival states, is 
accounted for in my models by the composite terms of the interaction. 
 
6
As a result, the converse observation for each dyadic pair will have a symmetrical value for difference in 
capabilities (for example, the reverse of a directed dyad with a score of .1 will have a score of -.1).  
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Since my conceptualization of reciprocal sponsorship involves a state responding 
to a seemingly unprovoked sponsorship campaign, a maximum of one state in any 
dyadic pair, regardless of being directed or not, can be coded under the above criteria.  
The only exceptions are instances in which both states began to sponsor terrorism 
during the same year.  My data includes three instances of simultaneity, the dyadic pairs 
of Iraq/Turkey, Ethiopia/Sudan, and the United States/Afghanistan.  In these instances, 
both relevant directed dyads are coded as reciprocal.  
 The third independent variable, which measures the institutional constraints on 
the actions of chief executives, comes from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2014). 
This variable, measured on a seven-point scale, captures limits on executive decision 
making by “accountability groups” such as legislatures, judiciaries, or the military.   
 
Control Variables 
 I include several control variables in my analyses.7  The first is a binary variable 
indicating whether an observation took place during the Cold War, which I measure as 
ending in 1991.  Previous research on state-sponsored insurgency has suggested that 
external support to rebel groups was more common during this period (Salehyan 2010).  
I also include variables that control for the geographic region of the potential 
sponsor, excluding East Asian and Oceanic states as the category of comparison.  
Previous research shows that Middle Eastern groups enjoy greater longevity than 
                                                          
7
 Model results with only control variables included and additional control variables can be found in the 
Appendix. 
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others, suggesting that sponsorship incentives may differ across regions (Blomberg et al. 
2011).8 
 Since the costs of direct military conflict should incentivize states to pursue 
nontraditional foreign policy options like state sponsorship, I control for whether the 
potential sponsor was involved in an interstate military conflict during the observation 
year, obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) Project (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). 
 I also control for whether or not a potential sponsor state has already sponsored 
a terrorist organization in a previous year.  Governments that have already engaged in 
sponsorship should be more likely to pursue this strategy than non-sponsor states, as 
the one-time risks of being labeled as a state sponsor will reduce the costs of each 
subsequent instance of sponsorship.   
 Finally, I include a variable that measures the number of years that have passed 
since a potential sponsor last initiated support for a terrorist organization in the target 
state.  States should experience fewer reputational and material costs for sponsoring 
terrorist organizations in close geographic and temporal proximity to pre-existing 
agents.  Therefore, as the number of years since a state has sponsored increases, the 
likelihood of new sponsorship initiations should decrease.      
 
Analysis and Results 
 As my dependent variable is a binary indicator of the initiation of state-
sponsored terrorism, I estimated a number of multivariate logistic regression models to 
                                                          
8
 Models that control for the geographic region of the target state and whether the two states are in the 
same geographic region can be found in the Appendix. 
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evaluate my hypotheses.  Because my data is naturally clustered by dyadic pairs, I 
employed robust standard errors to control for within-dyad effects.  
 In the three logistical regression models shown in Table 1, strategic rivalry was 
found to significantly increase the likelihood of a state providing material support to 
terrorist organizations targeting another state.  These findings support my argument 
that strategic rivalry will fundamentally alter foreign policy incentives, as rival states are 
willing to pursue a normatively frowned upon and risky foreign policy strategy.  A likely 
explanation for this is that the history of disputes and resultant distrust which 
characterize strategic rivalry prevent these states from diplomatically influencing the 
policy choices of their rivals.  Therefore, strategic rivals will be forced to rely upon 
violent methods of policy influence, increasing the potential benefits of delegating 
coercion to terrorist organizations.     
 
Table 1: Logistic Regression Results for Hypothesis 1 
Variable  
Name 
Unanimous  
Cases 
Non-Unanimous 
Cases 
All  
Cases 
Strategic Rivalry 3.75*** 
(.24) 
3.89*** 
(.32) 
3.51*** 
(.20) 
Difference in Capabilities -15.41*** 
(2.64) 
1.59 
(6.60) 
-8.49** 
(2.82) 
Rivalry*Difference 23.91*** 
(5.01) 
10.33 
(8.20) 
17.89*** 
(4.42) 
Cold War -.47* 
(.26) 
.16 
(.30) 
-.34* 
(.18) 
N. America/ W. Europe -.55 
(.43) 
-.61 
(.48) 
-.36 
(.32) 
Latin America .15 
(.37) 
-1.03** 
(.47) 
-.30 
(.28) 
Africa .42 
(.33) 
-.59* 
(.35) 
-.07 
(.24) 
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Middle East 1.22*** 
(.30) 
.01 
(.35) 
.58** 
(.23) 
E. Europe/ Central Asia -.88** 
(.40) 
-.90* 
(.51) 
-.80** 
(.33) 
Current War Involvement .90*** 
(.25) 
.07 
(.49) 
.62** 
(.22) 
Pre-existing Sponsorship 1.45*** 
(.23) 
1.80*** 
(.28) 
1.97*** 
(.21) 
Years Since Last Sponsorship -.10*** 
(.01) 
-.05** 
(.02) 
-.10*** 
(.01) 
Constant -8.40*** 
(.37) 
-9.13*** 
(.41) 
-7.86*** 
(.25) 
Number of Observations 
 
1,132,742 1,132,742 1,132,742 
Wald Chi-squared 1459.47 
 
679.34 1809.22 
Area under ROC Curve .90 .83 .89 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as coefficients, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= 
significant at .001 level 
 
  
The first hypothesis was empirically supported by two of the three models in Table 1.  
The results imply that militarily weak states are more likely to sponsor terrorist 
organizations against rival states than militarily stronger rivals, while weaker nonrival 
states are significantly less likely to engage in sponsorship than stronger nonrivals.  This 
suggests that rivalry is a crucial driver for this relationship, as without rivalry, weaker 
states will have no incentive to antagonize stronger ones.  The interaction between the 
effects of rivalry and capabilities also suggests that policymakers in rival states will be 
well aware of their opponent's military strength, and will select sponsorship when other 
forms of coercion, such as direct warfare, will be counter-productive.  In this way, the 
decision by a state to sponsor terrorism resembles one of the more common 
conceptualizations of the decision by a nonstate actor to engage in terrorism, as both 
33 
 
are tools of comparatively weak actors who are unable to accomplish their goals 
through alternative means (Hoffman 2006; Kydd and Walter 2006).  The prominent 
examples of states sponsoring terrorist organizations after multiple conventional 
defeats, such as Pakistani sponsorship in Kashmir and Syrian sponsorship of anti-Israeli 
organizations, reinforce this explanation, since these states clearly view sponsorship as a 
more productive strategy than engaging in another costly, and likely fruitless, war 
against their powerful rivals.   
 The relationship reported by the coefficients can only offer a partial insight into 
the impact of the relative capabilities of rivals on terrorism sponsorship.  The predicted 
probabilities of this effect across all instances of sponsorship, shown in Figure 1, 
indicated that the likelihood of state sponsorship did not significantly increase for rivals 
with dramatically weaker relative capabilities.  One explanation for this finding is that 
potential sponsors will consider the debilitating costs of military conflict with a 
dramatically stronger state.  This will motivate states to avoid any form of antagonism 
towards a dramatically stronger rival, including engaging in terrorism sponsorship.  
Although this observation complicates my findings, it should be noted that dyad-years 
where this disparate level of material capabilities exist were uncommon, accounting for 
less than two percent of the total observations in my analysis and three percent of 
rivalry observations.   
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Figure 1: Probability of Terrorism Sponsorship 
 
 In each of the three models in Table 2, previously being targeted by state-
sponsored terrorist organizations significantly increased the likelihood that a non-
sponsor state would reciprocate.  Since reciprocal sponsors, by definition, do not have a 
prior history of terrorism sponsorship, these results suggest that a significant shift in 
foreign policy incentives occurred after these states were targeted by state-sponsored 
terrorism.   
Although the substantive effect of reciprocity, shown in Figure 2, was consistent 
with the results in Table 2, the specific mechanism behind this shift is likely to vary 
significantly from case to case.  For some states, the threat of a foreign-funded terrorist 
organization may be sufficient to alter domestic political norms, increasing support for 
an otherwise controversial foreign policy.  Alternatively, the driving force behind this 
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change may be international, as being attacked through state-sponsored terrorism has 
the potential to reduce foreign disapproval if the state responds in kind.  Unfortunately, 
the indicator I used for reciprocity cannot capture the variation in the incentives driving 
this behavior, and few states will publicize the decision making process behind their 
delegation to foreign terrorists.  As a result, any broad conclusions or comments I am 
able to make about reciprocal sponsorship, beyond the recognition that it is an 
observable behavior, must, by necessity, remain largely speculative.   
 
Table 2: Logistic Regression Results for Hypothesis 2 
Variable  
Name 
Unanimous  
Cases 
Non-Unanimous 
Cases 
All  
Cases 
Targetedt-1 2.70*** 
(.53) 
4.08*** 
(.52) 
2.58*** 
(.34) 
Cold War -.68** 
(.29) 
-.03 
(.35) 
-.65*** 
(.19) 
N. America/ W. Europe -.22 
(.44) 
-.78 
(.49) 
-.39 
(.33) 
Latin America -.25 
(.34) 
-.92** 
(.43) 
-.49* 
(.27) 
Africa -.07 
(.30) 
-.60* 
(.33) 
-.36 
(.23) 
Middle East .89*** 
(.27) 
.28 
(.31) 
.53** 
(.21) 
E. Europe/ Central Asia -.80* 
(.45) 
-.98* 
(.53) 
-.81** 
(.33) 
Current War Involvement 1.13*** 
(.23) 
.15 
(.49) 
.78*** 
(.20) 
Pre-existing Sponsorship 2.23*** 
(.23) 
2.17*** 
(.31) 
2.52*** 
(.21) 
Years Since Last Sponsorship -.12*** 
(.01) 
-.07*** 
(.02) 
-.13*** 
(.01) 
Constant -7.68*** 
(.37) 
-8.60*** 
(.49) 
-7.23*** 
(.25) 
Number of Observations 
 
1,131,199 1,131,964 1,130,823 
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Wald Chi-squared 476.61 
 
268.76 675.97 
Area under ROC Curve .86 .80 .86 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as coefficients, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= 
significant at .001 level 
 
 
Figure 2: Probability of Reciprocal Sponsorship 
 
 In two of the three empirical models that examined the third hypothesis, shown 
in Table 3, higher levels of executive constraints decreased the likelihood that states will 
delegate foreign policy to terrorist organizations.  However, the predicted probabilities 
for this effect, shown in Figure 3, did not indicate that the change in sponsorship 
likelihood was discernible between individual values of executive constraints.  This 
finding complicates the theoretical conclusions that can be made regarding the effect of 
domestic political institutions on the sponsorship decision making process, as there is 
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only mixed support for the argument that states with lower levels of executive 
constraints will be more likely to engage in sponsorship.   
 
Table 3: Logistic Regression Results for Hypothesis 3 
Variable Name Unanimous  
Cases 
Non-Unanimous 
Cases 
All  
Cases 
Executive Constraints -.14** 
(.05) 
-.04 
(.07) 
-.10** 
(.04) 
Cold War -1.27*** 
(.35) 
-.48 
(.42) 
-1.10*** 
(.23) 
N. America/ W. Europe -.09 
(.49) 
-.82 
(.54) 
-.27 
(.36) 
Latin America -.47 
(.33) 
-.96** 
(.43) 
-.64** 
(.26) 
Africa -.65** 
(.31) 
-.94** 
(.36) 
-.88*** 
(.26) 
Middle East .40 
(.27) 
.08 
(.29) 
.19 
(.20) 
E. Europe/ Central Asia -2.44*** 
(.75) 
-1.87** 
(.73) 
-2.03*** 
(.52) 
Current War Involvement 1.03*** 
(.25) 
.35 
(.47) 
.71*** 
(.21) 
Pre-existing Sponsorship 2.06*** 
(.21) 
2.02*** 
(.28) 
2.32*** 
(.19) 
Years Since Last Sponsorship -.13*** 
(.02) 
-.09*** 
(.02) 
-.14*** 
(.01) 
Constant -6.08*** 
(.54) 
-7.55*** 
(.67) 
-5.94*** 
(.39) 
Number of Observations 
 
924,377 924,377 924,377 
Wald Chi-squared 350.51 
 
148.18 507.65 
Area under ROC Curve .86 .80 .86 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as coefficients, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= 
significant at .001 level 
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Figure 3: Probability of Terrorism Sponsorship 
 
 The results of the models in Table 4, which examined all independent variables 
simultaneously, largely confirmed the earlier findings.  One notable change is a decline 
in the consistency of Hypothesis 2.  While the effect of previously being targeted by the 
other state uniformly increased the likelihood of sponsorship in Table 2, when included 
with the other hypotheses, it was significant in only two of the three models.  These 
results imply that the domestic costs of sponsorship will have a greater impact on the 
decision making processes of potential sponsors than the international costs.  This is 
consistent with the broader literature on covert policymaking, which suggests that 
policymakers actively seek to conceal illicit behaviors from domestic audiences, but are 
comparatively unconcerned with other states’ awareness of their actions (Carson 2016; 
Gibbs 1995; Yarhi-Milo 2013).  This finding is also supported by the observation that 
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relatively few state sponsors of terrorism are openly condemned or punished by 
international actors, despite the high likelihood that their behaviors are detected by 
other members of the international community.  Therefore, while policymakers may be 
concerned about the reputational or security risks that accompany sponsorship, the 
results of the model suggest that they will be more deeply motivated by the potential 
risks to their own political survival.  
 Finally, I wish to note the consistent differences in empirical results when 
comparing the logistical regression models that exclusively examined disputed 
observations of terrorism sponsorship with those that included undisputed observations 
and all observations.  These differences, particularly in the models that examine 
Hypotheses One and Three, suggest that the incentives to engage in state-sponsored 
terrorism will vary significantly between the 84 non-unanimous and the 158 unanimous 
observations.  This variance is possibly due to identification errors by the sources I 
utilized, resulting in states which are not terrorism sponsors being falsely identified as 
non-unanimous sponsor states.  However, it is also possible that both the empirical 
results and the lack of uniform identification are the products of fundamental 
differences in state behaviors, signaling deeper divergences in incentives between these 
observations.  
 
Table 4: Logistic Regression Results for Full Model 
Variable Name Unanimous  
Cases 
Non-Unanimous 
Cases 
All  
Cases 
Strategic Rivalry 3.66*** 
(.27) 
3.65*** 
(.35) 
3.41*** 
(.22) 
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Difference in Capabilities -10.35*** 
(3.18) 
.12 
(5.99) 
-6.33** 
(3.07) 
Rivalry*Difference 17.69*** 
(4.55) 
11.35 
(7.62) 
15.15*** 
(4.41) 
Targetedt-1 .54 
(.61) 
1.71** 
(.62) 
.82* 
(.42) 
Executive Constraints -.15** 
(.06) 
-.06 
(.07) 
-.12** 
(.04) 
Cold War -.68** 
(.32) 
-.24 
(.36) 
-.55** 
(.21) 
N. America/ W. Europe -.08 
(.48) 
-.57 
(.53) 
-.08 
(.35) 
Latin America -.14 
(.40) 
-1.01** 
(.47) 
-.45 
(.30) 
Africa -.36 
(.37) 
-.85** 
(.38) 
-.51* 
(.26) 
Middle East .55* 
(.32) 
-.17 
(.34) 
.17 
(.24) 
E. Europe/ Central Asia -1.73** 
(.74) 
-1.62** 
(.69) 
-1.48** 
(.50) 
Current War Involvement .78** 
(.28) 
.15 
(.50) 
.54** 
(.24) 
Pre-existing Sponsorship 1.48*** 
(.22) 
1.68*** 
(.28) 
1.89*** 
(.20) 
Years Since Last Sponsorship -.10*** 
(.01) 
-.07*** 
(.02) 
-.10*** 
(.01) 
Constant -7.18*** 
(.57) 
-8.03*** 
(.60) 
-6.87*** 
(.37) 
Number of Observations 
 
923,039 923,736 922,722 
Wald Chi-squared 1498.69 
 
638.75 1710.14 
Area under ROC Curve .91 .84 .90 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as coefficients, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= 
significant at .001 level 
 
Predictive Heuristics 
 Since the inferences drawn from the statistical significance of empirical results 
have often been found to be insufficient for accurately predicting conflict, I assessed the 
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predictive power of my empirical results using in-sample and out-of-sample predictive 
heuristics (Ward et al. 2010).   
I first examined the in-sample predictive power of each of my models using 
Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) plots.  ROC plots illustrate the relationship 
between the rate of false positives (the number of incorrectly predicted sponsorship 
initiations divided by the total number of cases where sponsorship did not occur) and 
the rate of true positives (the number of correctly predicted initiations divided by the 
total number of cases where sponsorship did occur).  As the area under a model’s ROC 
curve increases, the ability of the model to predict instances of a state sponsorship will 
also increase, up to a maximum threshold of 1.0, where a model would perfectly predict 
sponsorship initiation.   
 Although none of my models perfectly predicted the initiation of state-
sponsored terrorism, the ROC curve statistics suggest that these models have a high 
accuracy in predicting the initiation of state-sponsored terrorism within my sample.  The 
average area under curve statistic of the above models was .86, well above the .50 
threshold which would indicate that no predictive power could be attributable to the 
model (Koubi and Böhmelt 2014; Ward et al. 2010).  The results also indicate that the 
full model, illustrated in Figure 4, offered the highest predictive power of my models, as 
the average area under curve of these models (.88) was consistently higher than in the 
less comprehensive models.  This suggests that my theoretical model, which considered 
both the benefits and costs of sponsorship, more accurately represents the decision 
making process of potential terrorism sponsors than models that exclusively examine 
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one of these factors, and will therefore be more valuable for policymakers seeking to 
predict future incidents of sponsorship.  
Figure 4: In-Sample Prediction 
  
Although ROC plots are useful in assessing the comparative predictive power of 
my theoretical model with others, they cannot provide insights into the out-of-sample 
predictive power of a model or the predictive power of a single covariate of a model.  In 
order to examine these characteristics, I performed a fourfold cross-validation exercise, 
comparing my full model with one that lacks the interactive relationship between 
interstate rivalry and military capabilities (Koubi and Böhmelt 2014; Ward et al. 2010).   
Cross-validation randomly divides the dataset used in my analysis into four 
segments, pooling three together in order to estimate a statistical model using three-
quarters of the initial dataset.  The remaining quarter is set aside as a test set, which is 
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utilized to externally assess the predictive power of the model estimated on the pooled 
subsets.  The procedure is repeated 10 times for different random partitions of the data, 
ensuring that the results are not dramatically influenced by an individual partition.9 
 Although the predictive power of the out-of-sample estimates (measured in 
terms of average area under ROC curve) was lower than the AUC value when all 
available data is used (.89 compared with .90), the results of the four-fold cross-
validation suggested that a high degree of out-of-sample predictive power exists in the 
full model.  However, there was little evidence that the statistical significance of the 
interaction between rivalry and military capabilities corresponded to an increase in 
predictive power.  A comparison of the cross-validation results, shown in Figure 5, 
demonstrated that there is no appreciable difference in predictive power between the 
two models.  This implies that, despite the strong statistical significance of Hypothesis 
One, the conditional relationship between strategic rivalry and military weakness will 
not dramatically assist policymakers in predicting future initiations of state-sponsored 
terrorism.  Given the high AUC of the cross-validation results, this finding does not 
invalidate my theoretical model, but the low predictive impact of Hypothesis One does 
suggest that the driving force of this predictive value may come from other parts of the 
model, such as the existence of a strategic rivalry independent of military strength.    
                                                          
9
 See Ward et al. (2010) for a detailed description and application of this approach.   
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Figure 5: Out of Sample Prediction: Fourfold Cross-validation 
 
Robustness 
 I conducted several tests of the robustness of my models, the results of which 
can be found in the Appendix.  The first of these tests limited the analysis to only 
politically relevant dyads, to compare the sponsorship incentives between contiguous 
and noncontiguous states.  Hypothesis 1 was supported when limiting the data to these 
dyads, while Hypotheses 2 and 3 were not.  
I also evaluated the empirical differences between sponsoring terrorist 
organizations in target states engaged in a civil war and those that were not, as the 
existing literature often treats rebel groups and terrorist organizations as theoretically 
distinct, despite frequent overlaps between the two categories.  The results suggest that 
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states are less motivated by the military capabilities of the target state or the risk of 
international disapproval when the target is not experiencing a civil conflict.  
 I also examined several alternative measurements for my independent variables.  
These included an alternative measurement of rivalry and several measurements of 
institutional constraints on the potential sponsor (Henisz 2002; Klein et al. 2006; 
Marshall et al. 2014).  These did not offer significant advantages over my existing 
measurements, and in the case of Hypothesis 3, there were similar inconsistencies 
between the effects of the regression coefficients and predicted probabilities.10 
 Finally, in order to assess the independence of the dyadic observations, I 
reproduced my theoretical model using a nondirected dyadic data structure and a 
bivariate probit statistical model.  In these simultaneous equation models, the effects of 
Hypotheses 1 and 3 were consistent with the main analysis.  However, the effect of 
being previously targeted by sponsorship, Hypothesis 2, had a reduced impact on 
likelihood of sponsorship.   
 
Conclusion 
 The decision to delegate foreign policy to terrorist organizations will be a 
complicated consideration for state actors.  The results of my empirical analysis support 
the applicability of the principal-agent model in conceptualizing state sponsorship, as 
well as shed light on the incentive structures driving sponsorship decision making 
(Byman and Kreps 2010).  As with any principal-agent relationship, my models show that 
                                                          
10
 It is interesting to note that similar inconsistencies appear across different, independently generated 
measurements of executive constraints.  
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states will be motivated to engage in sponsorship due to the potential benefits of 
delegation, in this case the coercive power of a sustained terrorist campaign in another 
state.  However, these incentives will be moderated by the distinct risks of being 
identified as a state sponsor, leading to predictable patterns in refraining from 
delegation.   
Since my analysis is the first large-N, cross-national study of the decision process 
behind delegation to terrorist organizations, there is significant room for further 
investigation on the behaviors of state sponsors.  The clandestine nature of sponsorship 
as a strategy necessitates future scholars to revise existing datasets as new information 
appears.  The often significant differences in my empirical results between uniformly 
identified cases of sponsorship and those with disagreements highlight this issue, as 
some non-unanimous cases may have been erroneously reported.  Although I believe 
that the dataset I have developed for this article will be a valuable resource for future 
research, it is important to acknowledge the often-embryonic nature of large-N studies 
of terrorism, and the clear potential for improvements to my empirical evidence. 
One difficult, but potentially insightful, empirical improvement on my existing 
analysis would be an examination of the possible differences in sponsorship incentives 
across the various forms of sponsorship included in my analysis.  As I have noted, 
material support can take many forms, from explicitly violent military equipment to 
ostensibly humanitarian food and medical supplies.  As a result, the incentives to engage 
in sponsorship, as well as the potential risks of being detected, may vary widely 
between different forms of this behavior.  Unfortunately, developing accurate 
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measurements for support type could prove difficult for future scholars.  States may 
openly acknowledge humanitarian assistance while strategically concealing more 
controversial support to the same organization.  Although I include a rough 
measurement of support type in my raw data, and give an example of how to 
operationalize this concept in the Appendix, developing a comprehensive and accurate 
measurement of support type will likely require considerable research to exhaustively 
evaluate each sponsored organization.11 
Future work can also address several lingering theoretical puzzles regarding the 
incentives of state sponsorship.  First, while my empirical results suggest that a state 
that has been targeted by state-sponsored terrorism will be more likely to respond in 
kind, my data is unable to fully explore the causal chain behind this reciprocal 
sponsorship.  The finding in the robustness checks, that sponsorship incentives differ 
between target states embroiled in domestic conflicts and those that are not, also 
warrants future consideration.  Potential sponsors may consider terrorist organizations 
active in civil conflicts as more durable, capable, and able to coordinate with larger 
insurgent organizations, all of which would increase the likelihood of successful 
delegation.  Alternatively, sponsors may perceive the governments of these states as 
weaker and less resolved, and will therefore be more likely to offer concessions.    
Researchers may also wish to utilize similar empirical methodologies to examine 
other aspects of state-sponsored terrorism using the principal-agent framework, such as 
                                                          
11
 These models, which compare military and nonmilitary support, suggest that nonmilitary sponsors are 
less concerned with the strategic benefits and international risks of sponsorship, while military sponsors 
appear to be surprisingly unthreatened by domestic risks.   
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the selection process through which states choose sponsored groups.  Finally, the data I 
present reveals a larger population of state-terrorist relationships than is normally 
discussed.  In-depth case studies of underexamined instances of sponsorship have the 
potential to uncover causal mechanisms that cannot be observed through analyses of 
broader sponsorship patterns.  
Policymakers seeking to reduce the dangers of state-sponsored terrorism should 
naturally be interested in understanding the underlying processes of this behavior.  The 
principal-agent model fundamentally interprets state sponsorship as a low-cost, but 
risky, alternative to more conventional forms of international conflict.  My results 
support this line of reasoning, as states involved in long-term conflicts against militarily 
stronger opponents will be significantly more likely to delegate to terrorists.  With this 
knowledge, policymakers can predict whether a state will consider becoming a terrorism 
sponsor, a valuable tool for dissuading other states from relying upon this dangerous 
policy.  
Unfortunately, preventing state sponsorship will likely prove to be a difficult goal 
for counter-terrorism policymakers.  The low levels of domestic political constraints 
enjoyed by many sponsors may reduce the efficacy of coercion, as they will be able to 
continue delegation regardless of unrest at home.  As was seen in the case of Libya, 
significant levels of diplomatic, economic, and even military pressure can be necessary 
to dissuade a terrorism sponsor, including multilateral cooperation with other members 
of the international community.  Policymakers should anticipate lengthy and costly 
struggles if they wish to rid the world of this dangerous form of terrorism financing.  
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Paper 2: The Best Terrorist for the Job: Selection Motivations in State Sponsorship of 
Terrorism 
 
 Antagonism between the predominantly Jewish state of Israel and its Arab 
neighbors has existed since Israel’s establishment in 1948.  Although these states were 
unable to defeat Israel over the course of several wars, many of the geopolitical 
tensions that incited these conflicts have not been satisfactorily resolved through 
diplomacy, including the political future of millions of Arabs displaced during these 
conflicts.  Due to this inability to force favorable outcomes through direct military 
pressure, since the 1960s many Arab nations have chosen the controversial strategy of 
providing military training, weaponry, and funding to pro-Palestinian terrorist and 
insurgent organizations (Bapat 2012).  
 By providing this support, Arab sponsors sustained a decades-long conflict within 
Israel, demonstrating their continued opposition to Israeli policies while avoiding the 
costs of direct military engagement.  However, the sponsorship patterns of these states 
are far from uniform or coordinated, contributing to the overall fragmentation of the 
Palestinian resistance movement (Clauset et al. 2010).  Many Arab states, such as Egypt 
and Jordan, only sponsored the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), an umbrella 
resistance group, and ceased their direct support of Palestinian terrorism following the 
Oslo Accords.  Others, like Libya and Syria, have been far less discriminate in their 
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sponsorship, supporting PLO rivals like the Abu Nidal Organization and continuing to 
sponsor radical groups after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (Byman and 
Kreps 2010; Prunckun and Mohr 1997).  If the geopolitical conflict between the Arab 
world and Israel is the sole driving force for Arab sponsorship of Palestinian terrorism, 
why do group-level sponsorship patterns differ so dramatically between individual Arab 
states?  
 Despite the fundamentally negative normative connotations surrounding acts of 
terrorism and the organizations that commit them, state sponsorship of terrorism is 
common in the Middle East.  Sponsorship offers a number of potential strategic 
benefits, allowing states to influence the policies of others more effectively, discreetly, 
and with lower costs than direct military action (Byman and Kreps 2010).  Since 1970, 
there have been ninety-four explicit or alleged instances of terrorism sponsorship 
involving Middle Eastern nations as either the sponsor or target state.  Although other 
forms of funding exist, state sponsorship is one of the most effective methods by which 
terrorist organizations can obtain the resources to perpetuate campaigns of violence 
against civilian and government targets (Agbiboa 2013).  Middle Eastern states 
frequently delegate policy to the large number of terrorist organizations active in the 
region, resulting in a disproportionate number of cases of state sponsorship.12 
In this article, I examine the characteristics that incentivize state sponsors in the 
Middle East to select specific terrorist organizations from a larger pool of groups, 
                                                          
12
 Although the dyadic relationships between the 39 states in my data represent 4 percent of global state-
level interactions, 39 percent of identifiable observations of state-sponsored terrorism occurred between 
these dyads. 
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employing large-N empirical methodology to investigate a wide range of observations.  I 
focus my analysis on the Middle East because of the importance of state sponsorship as 
a regional foreign policy tool, and the potential policy benefits that may arise from 
understanding terrorism sponsorship in the Middle Eastern context.  Since state- 
sponsored terrorism has perpetuated many of the geopolitical conflicts in the Middle 
East, reducing the number of groups benefiting from it may play an important role in 
developing resolutions to these long-running hostilities (Hoffman 2006).  In order for 
counter-terrorism policy makers to effectively predict which organizations will receive 
sponsorship, it is of critical importance to understand the process by which state 
sponsors differentiate between and select their sponsored groups.   
Using prior applications of the principal-agent framework as a foundation, I 
develop a model that interprets the selection process as a conscious effort by the 
sponsor state to choose the organization best suited to act on its behalf (Byman and 
Kreps 2010; Salehyan 2010).  A well selected agent will faithfully and effectively work to 
achieve the delegated goals of the sponsor, allowing a state to achieve otherwise 
unattainable foreign policy goals.  A poorly selected organization, however, may fail in 
its delegated tasks or actively work against the interests of its principal, resulting in a 
suboptimal outcome.  In the most extreme cases, sponsored terrorist organizations 
have attacked a sponsor state using its own resources, such as the Black September 
conflict in Jordan (Bapat 2012).  The risks associated with poor selection should 
motivate state sponsors of terrorism to strategically differentiate between groups, 
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selecting organizations that are perceived as both highly effective and highly 
controllable.  
 
Past Studies 
 Although not all sponsored terrorist organizations can be considered insurgent 
groups, a wealth of relevant literature exists on external support in civil wars (Findley 
and Teo 2006; Prunier 2004; Salehyan 2010).  State-level interventions appear to be 
largely strategic in nature, motivated by shared ethnic linkages or ideological similarities 
between the rebel group and the foreign state (Prunier 2004; Nasr 2006; Regan 2010).  
Ideological interventions during the Cold War were often driven by the geopolitical 
competition between the Soviet Union and the United States.  In later decades other 
ideologies, such as Islamism, have motivated others, including Middle Eastern states, to 
support insurgencies (Khosla 1999; Regan 1998).  Material support for rebel groups has 
the potential to significantly alter the outcomes of civil wars, increasing the duration 
and overall fatalities of conflicts (Regan 2002; Salehyan 2014).  Since states that engage 
in this behavior likely have specific policy goals they wish to attain, and will rely upon 
the rebel group to achieve them, state support of rebel groups can be conceptualized as 
a form of policy delegation.    
 Delegation to rebel groups has the potential to provide significant benefits for a 
state, such as pressuring another state to shift its policy positions, while simultaneously 
avoiding the high costs of direct inter-state conflict (Fearon 1995; Hawkins et al.2006).  
However, alongside these benefits is the fundamental risk that rebel groups will act in 
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opposition to their supporter's interests, preventing these policy goals from being 
reached.  Because of these paired incentives and risks, Salehyan (2010) and other 
scholars conceptualize state sponsorship as a principal-agent relationship.  In "The 
Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations," Salehyan argues that a state principal will be 
unable to determine the true preferences of the group, or agent, potentially resulting in 
a loss of control over policy outcomes.  Although the broader literature on principal-
agent relationships suggests that principals can exercise some control over agents 
through pre-delegation screening, contractual obligations, and monitoring of behavior, 
it is impossible to completely eliminate the risk of agency loss (Sappington 1991).  In 
cases of state support for insurgent groups, agency loss has the potential to result in 
highly undesirable outcomes, such as refusal to support sponsor-backed negotiations, 
greater levels of indiscriminate violence, and sudden conflict escalation (Popovic 2017; 
Salehyan et al. 2014).   
 The principal-agent framework has also been utilized to examine state 
sponsorship of terrorist organizations.  In "Agents of Destruction," Byman and Kreps 
(2010) develop a model that accounts for both the incentives for states to delegate 
policy to terrorist groups and the agency problems that will inevitably arise from 
delegation of authority.  Their model suggests that sponsoring terrorist organizations 
provides unique benefits for states, such as plausible deniability and asymmetric tactics 
(Hoffman 2006; Sandler 2010).  However, terrorist agents have the potential to deviate 
from their principal's interests, necessitating control mechanisms to ensure that the 
policy goals of the state are achieved.  Byman and Kreps suggest that state sponsors of 
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terrorism will be heavily dependent upon effective pre-delegation selection, as the 
closer the preferences of a state and organization prior to the relationship, the lower 
the likelihood that the organization will shirk from the principal's objectives.   
 To support their arguments, Byman and Kreps utilize a selection of case studies, 
drawing on prominent sponsorship examples in Lebanon and Syria.  While this empirical 
technique is useful, it cannot test broad patterns of behavior, suggesting that Large-N 
quantitative studies may offer additional support for the principal-agent model.  This 
form of analysis has previously been utilized to examine state sponsorship as an 
independent variable, concluding that sponsored groups are significantly more likely to 
negotiate with their targets and cause fewer average fatalities (Asal and Rethemeyer 
2008; Bapat 2006).  These findings support the argument that state sponsorship is both 
policy-driven and strategic, as they suggest that external pressure will moderate 
organizational behavior.  However, the data utilized in these analyses are unable to 
directly examine the differences between organizations that determine which obtain 
state sponsorship.  Therefore, along with providing a broader test of the principal-agent 
framework, my data collection efforts will fill this existing empirical gap, enabling 
scholars to more accurately examine state sponsorship using a variety of theoretical 
models.     
 
Defining Terrorist Organizations and Sponsorship 
 To delineate between terrorist organizations and other types of non-state actors, 
I adopt the Global Terrorism Database’s definition of behaviors that constitute 
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terrorism, and therefore what constitutes a terrorist organization.  The GTD definition of 
terrorism, taken from the introduction of the dataset by Lafree and Dugan, is an 
intentional act of violence (or the threat of violence) by a sub-national perpetrator 
(LaFree and Dugan 2007; START 2013).  This violence must be carried out with a specific 
political, social, economic, or religious goal, have an intended audience beyond the 
immediate victims of the attack, and must deliberately target either civilians or non-
combatants.  I consider any formal organization (rather than an individual or an 
unknown perpetrator) that engages in this type of behavior to be a terrorist 
organization, and therefore a potential recipient of state sponsorship.  
I define sponsorship as the government of a state providing resources and 
material support to a non-domestic terrorist organization.  This support must be the 
result of a deliberate action by a government institution.  Therefore, funding provided 
by a nation's military would be considered sponsorship, whereas a military employee 
independently donating money to an organization would not.  I limit sponsorship to only 
include material forms of support, such as money, military equipment, and non-military 
resources like food and medical equipment.  Since training facilities and safe havens 
offer concrete advantages for terrorist organizations, I also include state provision of 
these services within my definition of sponsorship.13 
 My definition excludes instances in which a state only provides non-material 
support to a terrorist organization, such as diplomatic recognition.  This is because non-
                                                          
13
Although previous research (Carter 2012) has found that safe havens may contribute to a group’s 
eventual dissolution, the immediate organizational benefits of safe havens strongly suggest this form of 
support is closer in impact to material resources than non-material. 
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material support does not offer immediate, concrete improvements to an organization's 
capabilities and survivability, unlike the forms of support included in my definition.  
Exclusively non-material support will also result in different costs and benefits for states 
than more effective, but riskier, support methods.  Since this will not directly contribute 
to an organization's survival, a non-material supporter will not gain the influence over a 
group's goals and behaviors that comes with material dependency.  However, the 
provision of non-material support will result in lower risks for the state, as the weaker 
relationship between the state and terrorist organization will lead to smaller 
reputational costs than would occur from material support.  These differences are 
sufficient to suggest an analytical distinction between material and non-material forms 
of support, and so, in this article, I will focus exclusively on the former.14 
 
The Principal-Agent Relationship 
 The principal-agent framework has its roots in research on bureaucracies and 
firms, but has recently been utilized in studies of international political institutions, such 
as alliances and international organizations (Eisenhardt 1989; Hawkins et al. 2006).  The 
central component of the framework is the concept of delegation, in which one actor, 
the principal, enlists a second, the agent, to act in a way that serves the principal's 
interests.  
                                                          
14
 My definition also excludes instances of passive sponsorship, in which a government allows domestic 
non-state actors to provide material support to terrorist organizations.  See (Byman 2006) for a detailed 
discussion of the differences between these two forms of terrorism finance.   
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 When applying the principal-agent framework to understanding state 
sponsorship of terror groups, states will have specific goals they intend to delegate, such 
as projecting power, advancing an ideological agenda, or satisfying the foreign policy 
demands of domestic constituencies (Byman and Kreps 2010).  Terrorist groups will be 
selected because of their comparative advantages over alternative methods of foreign 
influence.  These advantages will often take the form of unconventional tactics, such as 
suicide bombing and hostage taking, as well as localized knowledge and experience 
(Hoffman 2006; Pape 2003).  However, the unique characteristics of terrorist 
organizations will increase the potential costs of delegation beyond those found in more 
conventional principal-agent relationships.   
 All principal-agent relationships have the potential for agents to behave in ways 
that do not serve the interests of the principal, which is typically referred to as agency 
loss or agency slack (Byman and Kreps 2010; Eisenhardt 1989; Sappington 1991).  By 
definition, when a principal delegates a task to an agent, it relinquishes a degree of 
authority and control over the resultant outcomes.  Since the preferences of an agent 
and principal are unlikely to perfectly correspond, agents will have incentives to act in 
ways that fit their preferences more than their principals.   
 These divergences in preferences will be more pronounced when the 
characteristics of the principal and agent are fundamentally different, as is the case with 
states and terrorist organizations (Bradley and Kelley 2008; Sappington 1991).  Due to 
the comparative fragility of terrorist organizations compared to monolithic state 
apparatuses, terrorist agents may be more risk averse than their principals, resulting in 
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disagreements regarding target selection, attack type, and other strategic decisions.  
Such tensions arose in the relationship between the Syrian government and the 
Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization, due to ANO principally targeting poorly-defended 
civilian populations, rather than the hardened military and government targets Syria 
intended it to target (Byman 2005).  Alternatively, the extreme ideological positions held 
by many terrorist organizations can cause sponsored groups to act more aggressively 
than desired, escalating conflicts and making demands that contradict the more 
moderate goals of their principals (Bapat 2012; Byman and Kreps 2010).   
 To further compound the problems of agency loss in state sponsorship, several 
of the mechanisms through which principals normally control their agents will likely be 
less effective.  Terrorist organizations, due to their targeting of civilian populations, are 
often the targets of strongly negative normative judgments by both domestic and 
international actors (Collins 2004; Saleyhan et al. 2014).  Because of this, state sponsors 
of terrorism may experience negative consequences if they are identified, leading many 
states to pursue a degree of plausible deniability around their support.  Although high 
levels of secrecy and discretion may insulate state sponsors from international 
disapproval, they will also limit the ability of principals to control their agents through 
contractual authority and direct monitoring. 
 In licit principal-agent relationships, detailed contracts are frequently used as a 
mechanism through which the actions of agents are regulated, often by limiting the 
areas in which power is delegated and through the implementation of contractual 
obligations and punishments.  However, in order to create a barrier between 
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themselves and terrorist attacks, state sponsors often deliberately limit their 
instructions to their terrorist agents.  This results in less responsibility for the group's 
actions, but prevents the state from adjusting the instructions so that the group's 
behaviors will more closely correspond to the state's interests.  Similarly, routine 
monitoring and auditing of an agent's actions, which in licit principal-agent relationships 
allows the principal to correct deviations in behavior over time, is risky for state 
sponsors.  By avoiding continual direct interactions between state representatives and 
the terrorist organization, sponsors will reduce the likelihood of external detection, but 
will also reduce their ability to detect and punish agency loss.   
 Although observable instances in which these high-visibility mechanisms were 
successfully utilized to control terrorist organizations exist, they highlight the significant 
costs of direct interaction with terrorist agents.  One of the most overt relationships 
between a terrorist organization and a state sponsor has been the creation and 
continued support of the Lebanese Hezbollah group by the Iranian government.  The 
Iranian government is actively involved with Hezbollah’s training, supervision, and 
indoctrination, creating an ideal agent for Iranian interests both within Lebanon and 
elsewhere in the world.  However, because of this visibility, Iran has been the target of 
extensive multi-lateral economic sanctions, resulting in billions of dollars of lost revenue 
and contributing to extensive isolation from the international economic and diplomatic 
system (Byman 2005; Rabil 2006).  The Iranian example, as well as international 
backlash against other visible sponsors like Syria and Libya, should incentivize the 
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majority of state sponsors to pursue strategies of plausible deniability, rather than overt 
sponsorship and its resultant punishments.   
 Because of the problems arising from contractual controls and extensive 
monitoring, it is reasonable to assume that state sponsors will heavily rely upon the 
third method of preventing agency loss, screening and selection of agents.  If states are 
able to predetermine the true preferences of a potential agent prior to sponsorship, 
they should rationally select terrorist organizations that will be least likely to engage in 
shirking behavior.  Careful agent selection can reduce the risks of delegating tasks to 
groups that possess similar preferences, but lack the capabilities to successfully achieve 
them (Byman and Kreps 2010).  Although states can attempt to ascertain the 
preferences of sponsorship-seeking organizations from public statements, these may 
not accurately reflect their true preferences.  Groups that are aware of potential 
sponsorship opportunities may actively misrepresent their stated preferences, in order 
to improve their chances of being selected.  Therefore, if states will be unable to select 
groups solely based on their stated preferences, what other observable characteristics 
will influence state sponsors to select potential terrorist agents?   
 
Explaining Selection Rationales 
 I conceptualize the process by which states select sponsored terrorist 
organizations through an expected utility model, in which states weigh the probable 
benefits of sponsoring a specific organization with the potential costs of that decision.  
This model allows states to predict the outcomes of sponsorship depending upon the 
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characteristics of a potential agent, an important consideration in circumstances where 
numerous terrorist organizations are simultaneously active in a target state.  The model 
I utilize captures the three main components of the principal-agent model, the benefits 
of delegating to a terrorist organization, the probability that a specific terrorist 
organization will successfully complete the state's objectives, and the potential costs 
associated with sponsoring that particular group.   
Equation 1: Expected Utility = Benefits * probability (Success) - Costs 
 
Benefits of Sponsorship 
 During the first decades after its establishment, Israel routinely defeated 
coalitions of antagonistic neighbors using its superior military capabilities.  In recent 
years, a number of still hostile states, particularly Syria and Iran, have shifted to 
nonconventional methods of striking at Israel, most notably through sponsorship of 
anti-Israeli terrorist organizations (Rabil 2006).  Material support provided by these 
states has allowed groups like Hezbollah and Hamas to engage in lengthy campaigns of 
terrorism and insurgent violence, leading to controversial counter-terrorism efforts by 
the Israeli military (el-Hokayem 2007; Findley et al. 2012).  By sponsoring terrorist 
groups, Iran and Syria have been able to demonstrate their continued opposition to 
Israel’s existence, tarnish Israel’s international reputation, and weaken its military, all 
without suffering the probable high costs of direct military conflict.    
 This example demonstrates the potential benefits states may obtain by 
delegating foreign policy goals to terrorist organizations.  However, the empirical record 
62 
 
suggests that most interstate disagreements are not resolved through terrorism 
sponsorship (Colaresi et al. 2007).  Sponsorship should therefore offer a distinct policy 
benefit to a state in order to justify its selection in addition to, or instead of, alternative 
mechanisms of coercion, such as diplomacy, economic sanctions, or military force.  
 When compared to other methods of interstate coercion, delegating to terrorist 
organizations provides a number of distinct strategic advantages.  The first is the 
inexpensive nature of sponsorship, as the material costs of supporting a terrorist 
campaign will be lower than deploying conventional military forces (Byman 2006; 
Laqueur 1996).  States will also be able to employ terrorist organizations in 
assassinations or kidnappings, reducing the need for costly covert agencies, which are 
frequently underdeveloped in non-great power states (Carson 2016; Gleditsch and 
Høgetveit 1984). 
 The governments of Syria and Iran were incentivized to engage in the risky 
strategy of sponsorship due to their strong preferences regarding Israeli policies, and 
the low probabilities of achieving their goals through diplomacy.  Neither country has 
sponsored terrorist organizations in states with which they enjoy historically friendly 
relationships, such as Russia, or in states with few overlapping interests, such as 
geographically distant Latin American nations.  If both political and strategic incentives 
exist, it is reasonable to assume that a state will see greater incentives to sponsor 
terrorism than if one or both are absent.   
 One type of relationship that offers both incentives is a lengthy history of 
antagonistic disputes between the potential sponsor and another state, often referred 
63 
 
to as rivalry.  Rivalry has been identified as a significant motivator for interstate 
conflicts, ranging from trade disputes to militarized conflict (Colaresi et al. 2007; Diehl 
and Goertz 2000).  Although the continued interactions between rivals will likely result 
in strong policy preferences, rivalry will also increase distrust and reduce the likelihood 
of cooperation.  In these circumstances, the incentives to rely on violent coercive 
strategies will increase. 
 Although a state sponsor will avoid the high costs of direct military conflict, the 
same cannot be said for the target state, making sponsorship attractive for long-term 
rivals.  States that experience terrorist campaigns often suffer costs similar to those in 
conventional wars, which may be exacerbated if the terrorist organization is reinforced 
and sustained by external support (Epright 1997; Frey et al. 2007; Byman et al. 2001).  
While the military capabilities of the target state will be drained by costly counter-
terrorism efforts, the sponsor’s capabilities will be unaffected, adjusting the balance of 
power in its favor.  Although this readjustment will offer little benefit if the states are 
nonrivals, this shift will be highly beneficial in cases of rivalry, as the likelihood of future 
military conflict will be high.   
 Rival states will also be attracted to the potential efficacy of terrorism when 
compared with other forms of available nonmilitarized coercion.  Repeated hostile 
interactions with a rival will harden the positions of states relative to each other and 
reduce their overlapping interests, making nonviolent forms of coercion unlikely to 
succeed (Drezner 1999; Miyagawa 1992; Wagner 1988).  A state sponsor controlling a 
well-equipped terrorist organization will gain a significant bargaining chip when 
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negotiating with a rival, as such a group can cause significant disruptions to the target’s 
economy and political system (Conrad 2011).   
Israel's difficulties in occupying parts of Lebanon from 1982 to 2000 while 
simultaneously combating domestic terrorism clearly illustrate the incentives for rivals 
to sponsor terrorist organizations.  Operating conventionally, it is unlikely that the 
Syrian and Iranian militaries would have been able to forcibly dislodge Israeli troops 
from southern Lebanon.  By supplying equipment and resources to terrorist 
organizations both in Lebanon and Israel itself, these states increased the costs of the 
Lebanese occupation, ultimately contributing to Israeli withdrawal (Rabil 2006).  
Although many of their desired goals were not achieved, sponsorship did contribute to a 
foreign policy victory that might otherwise have been unachievable.  Due to the 
strategic and political advantages of sponsoring terrorist organizations that target rival 
states, the likelihood of a state choosing this strategy should be significantly higher if the 
target state is a rival than if no such antagonism exists.    
Hypothesis 1:  If a state is in an antagonistic relationship with the target state, 
then the likelihood of sponsorship will be higher.   
 
Probability of Organizational Success 
 Although the potential benefits of delegation will motivate states to pursue 
sponsorship, the likelihood of the state achieving its desired goals will be dependent 
upon the success of the sponsored organization.  Terrorism is frequently described as a 
strategy for the desperate, as groups which have little power or influence in a society 
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will turn towards violence in the attempt to force desired policies to be enacted.  
Because of the limited resources of these groups when compared with the vast 
capabilities of most states, terrorist organizations are often unsuccessful at 
accomplishing their goals (Abrahms 2006; Kydd and Walter 2006).   
 An unsuccessful terrorist agent is highly undesirable for a state sponsor, as the 
state will spend the costs of funding the organization while gaining little to no resulting 
policy benefits.  Because of this risk, state sponsors should be highly motivated to 
distinguish between capable and non-capable groups, selecting only those organizations 
that will be most likely to succeed.  However, group capability will be difficult for state 
sponsors to confidently determine, not only because of the incentives for sponsor-
seeking organizations to portray themselves as formidable, but also due to fundamental 
difficulties in accurately predicting the outcomes of terrorist campaigns.  State sponsors 
should therefore be motivated to search for difficult to mimic organizational 
characteristics that signal the inherent capabilities of potential sponsored organizations.   
 Although terrorist organizations have incentives to inflate or conceal many 
organizational characteristics, such as membership or financial resources, their 
ideological identities are likely to be accurately presented to the outside world.  Since 
the objective of terrorism is to achieve an ideological goal, ideology will naturally be 
communicated through manifestos, publicized demands, and target selection (Hoffman 
2006; Paletz and Tawney 1992).  Group ideology will also serve as an indicator of the 
depth and breadth of domestic support that an organization may possess, as specific 
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ideological identities will naturally appeal to broader or narrower constituencies (Piazza 
2009).   
 My definition of sponsorship necessitates that a state will provide some form of 
material support, such as weaponry, medical equipment, or training.  However, a 
foreign actor will be unable to provide all of the resources necessary for a group to 
function (Byman 2006).  Recruits, informants, and networks of both active and passive 
supporters will not only play a significant role in organizational success, but will also be 
difficult, if not impossible, for a foreign sponsor to supply.  Previous research has 
suggested that these resources are integral to group longevity, positive public opinion, 
and eventual success, particularly in situations where terrorist organizations also engage 
in insurgencies (della Porta 1995; Townshend 1995).  If state principals are interested in 
selecting terrorist agents with the greatest likelihood of success, they will be motivated 
to sponsor terrorist organizations that naturally possess a broad domestic constituency, 
such as ethnic-nationalist groups.    
 Ethnically motivated conflicts are common throughout the Middle East, 
emerging from the geopolitical system that developed during European colonization and 
the highly centralized, authoritarian state apparatuses common in many post-colonial 
states (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Wimmer 1997).  Many disenfranchised ethnic minorities 
in the Middle East, such as Palestinian Arabs, the Sahrawi in Morocco, and the Kurds in 
Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, have turned to terrorism in hopes of securing political autonomy 
or independence.  State sponsorship of ethnic terrorist organizations is also common, 
ranging from overt support of ethnic kin, such as the pan-Arab support for Palestinian 
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organizations prior to the Oslo Accords, to covert sponsorship by great powers to 
weaken antagonist states, such as the United States’ sponsorship of the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan in Iraq.  
 Ethnically-based terrorist and insurgent groups have significant human resource 
advantages when compared to organizations without ethnic ideological characteristics.  
Ethnic identities are often described as more effective tools for mobilization than 
exclusively political affiliations, with policy preferences being generated by cultural 
histories and psychological grievances as much as rational self-interest (Connor 1994; 
Fearon and Laitin 2000).  Terrorist organizations that recruit along ethnic lines are 
therefore likely to benefit from pre-existing familial and social relationships within co-
ethnic populations (Gubler and Selway 2012; Horowitz 1985).  These will provide ethnic 
groups with pre-existing networks that will enable them to mobilize supporters, spread 
and obtain information, and recruit new members.  These resources will endow newly-
formed ethnic organizations with stronger capabilities than non-ethnic counterparts, 
and the ability to continuously replenish these resources likely contributes to 
observations of greater ethnic organizational longevity (Blomberg et al. 2011; Fearon 
2004; Phillips 2014). 
Ethnic networks also improve a group's ability to withstand counter-terrorism, as 
government repression against co-ethnics may backfire, engendering sympathy and 
support for the group within the ethnic community (Byman 1998).  Counter-terrorism 
against an ethnic organization will likely involve increased scrutiny and police presence 
near ethnic enclaves.  These efforts will negatively impact the lives of co-ethnic 
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neighbors, increasing distrust of the government within that ethnic community.  If 
counter-terrorism efforts are particularly indiscriminate, support for the goals and 
operations of the ethnic organization may increase, particularly if the group claims that 
the government is inherently antagonist towards members of the ethnic group.  As a 
result, direct counter-terrorism against an ethnic organization can be counter-
productive, creating grievances that will fuel the organization’s membership and 
community support.    
 Ethnic terrorist organizations may also possess homeland territories, geographic 
regions where ethnic kin are the principal inhabitants.  By providing an area where the 
group can openly operate and recruit, ethnically-dominant geographic regions will 
insulate group members from government reprisals and improve the group's ability to 
engage in asymmetric warfare (Weidmann 2009).  Homelands will also allow ethnic 
organizations opportunities to regroup and reconstitute themselves after experiencing 
significant defeats or setbacks, contributing to the greater longevity of ethnic terrorist 
organizations, such as the Irish Republic Army and the Kurdistan Workers Party (Gunter 
1988; Hoffman 2006).  
 Ethnically-based conflicts are also linked to significant increases in the duration 
of civil wars and insurgent violence (Fearon 2004; Metternich 2011).  By providing ethnic 
terrorist organizations with material resources, sponsor states may deliberately be 
attempting to spark a larger-scale, ethnically-motivated civil war.  A lengthy conflict, 
maintained by external support, may dramatically destabilize the target state, 
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weakening its international capabilities and increasing the likelihood that the sponsor 
will achieve its intended foreign policy goals (Regan 2002).    
 These human resource advantages will be naturally possessed by many ethnic 
groups, but will be difficult, if not impossible, to provide to other organizations.  
Although past terrorist campaigns show that an ethnic identity is not an automatic 
indicator of success, the inherent strategic advantages ethnic groups may possess 
should lead to the perception that ethnic agents will be more successful and desirable.  
As a result, state sponsors should select ethnically-identifying terrorist organizations at 
an observably higher rate than non-ethnic groups.15 
Hypothesis 2:  If a terrorist organization identifies itself as an ethnically based 
group, then its likelihood of being sponsored will increase.   
 
Costs of Sponsorship 
 Independent of the probability of organizational success, variations in the 
potential costs incurred by agency loss should lead state sponsors to strategically 
differentiate between potential terrorist agents.  Although group-independent 
sponsorship risks do exist, such as international political or economic reprisals, the 
likelihood that a specific agent will engage in shirking behavior will depend upon the 
characteristics of the group (Byman and Kreps 2010).  Since agency loss may significantly 
                                                          
15
 Although I argue in Hypothesis 2 that ideological similarities such as a shared ethnicity between the 
sponsor and organization will increase the likelihood of selection, the effect of ethnicity should be 
independent from ethnic similarity.  Potential sponsors will benefit from the increased probability of 
organizational success regardless of whether or not they are ethnic kin.       
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reduce the likelihood that a sponsor will achieve its goals, states should have strong 
incentives to select groups that appear to be least likely to engage in shirking behaviors.   
 An ideal indicator for a potential agent with a low risk of shirking would be 
identical policy preferences with the sponsor state.  Since the principal and agent would 
share the same goals, the group would have few incentives to deviate from the state's 
interests.  However, given the incentives for sponsorship-seeking organizations to 
appear ideologically similar to potential principals, there may be fundamental 
information asymmetries about the true preferences of prospective agents.  A state 
comparing the stated policy agenda of a terrorist organization with its own foreign 
policy goals will therefore be unable to comfortably determine the actual goals of the 
group.   
 One method by which sponsors can ascertain the underlying preferences of an 
organization is by observing similarities between the underlying ideologies of the 
organization and the state’s government.  Although multiple terrorist organizations may 
appear to share policy goals with a potential sponsor, it is significantly more likely that 
these preferences will be genuine if the organization possesses a similar political 
ideology.  Many terrorist groups have ideological identities and policy agendas that are 
similar, albeit often more extreme, to those of states (Kellen 1990; Shughart 2006).  For 
example, a Communist government will likely approve of a foreign Marxist terrorist 
organization's intent to institute greater state control over industry, due to the shared 
economic and political beliefs of these two actors.  In contrast, a non-Marxist 
organization might share similar views on issues such as American influence, but would 
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likely disagree with a Communist sponsor on economic and political objectives.  Since 
similar ideologies should, in most circumstances, result in similar policy preferences, a 
state sponsor should be less concerned with agency loss when sponsoring ideologically 
matched organizations.   
 An example of the closeness of state-sponsor preferences influencing the 
resultant level of agency loss can be seen in the relationships between the Shiite 
Hezbollah organization and its two sponsors, Iran and Syria (Byman and Kreps 2010).  
Iran and Syria share a number of geopolitical interests, such as countering Israeli military 
power and reducing American regional influence, and have often collaborated with each 
other, including co-sponsorship of Hezbollah (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 1997).  The 
Iranian government shares a Shiite Islamist ideology with Hezbollah, whereas the Syrian 
Ba'athist government is distinctly secular and nationalist.  Due to Hezbollah and Iran’s 
shared ideology, the organization regularly sends pledges of religious loyalty to the 
Iranian Supreme Leaders, along with frequent requests for decision making and 
guidance (Byman 2005).  This relationship has contributed to Hezbollah's actions closely 
corresponding to Iran's interests, even extending into attacks on Iranian political exiles 
with little importance to Hezbollah's interests in Lebanon.  In contrast, despite the 
Syrian government's continued support of the Hezbollah organization, there is little 
ideological common ground between the two organizations.  This has led to violent 
confrontation between Syria and Hezbollah during the 1980s, and a significant reduction 
in the level of Hezbollah's material dependence upon Syria (el-Hokayyem 2007).  
Although Syria has ultimately maintained its support of Hezbollah, the Shiite 
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organization's closer relationship with Iran suggests that ideological identity has played 
an important role in the respective ability of these principals to control their shared 
agent.   
 As with ethnic identity, the ideology of an organization should be easily 
observable by prospective sponsors, as it will be expressed through public statements 
and demands.  Although ideological identifiers will not directly provide information 
about a group’s true preferences, they may shed light on possible similarities and 
differences between the goals of the two actors.  Since state sponsors interested in 
minimizing agency loss will actively select organizations whose preferences are most 
likely to align with theirs, the likelihood of state sponsors selecting ideologically similar 
terrorist organizations should be significantly higher than non-ideologically similar 
groups.   
Hypothesis 3:  If a terrorist organization possesses an ideology similar to a 
sponsor state's government, then its likelihood of being sponsored will increase.   
 The risks of agency loss can also be reduced by institutionally constraining an 
agent’s autonomy and behavior (Grant and Keohane 2005; Sappington 1991).  Although 
principals traditionally rely upon detailed formal contracts to constrain their agents, 
deniability-minded state sponsors of terrorism will be loath to create the evidence that 
such agreements would require.  Because of this, state sponsors should strategically 
select organizations whose range of available actions are naturally constrained, resulting 
in a minimization of the risks of agency loss without relying upon risky formal contracts.  
One organizational characteristic that will signal the natural constraints of a terrorist 
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organization is whether that organization is already receiving resources from another 
state (Spiller 1990; Whitford 2005). 
 For many terrorist organizations, acquiring multiple state sponsors will be highly 
advantageous for long term survival.  A single state may be unable or unwilling to 
provide all of the material resources and training necessary for the group to survive and 
carry out a sustained terrorist campaign.  Additional sponsors will reduce the potential 
for the group to be operationally crippled if a sponsor withdraws its support, as 
subsequent resource deficiencies may be mitigated by the others (Carter 2012).  This 
flexibility will naturally reduce an organization's dependency on any one state, reducing 
the risk that the group will be significantly weakened by losing a sponsor, and allowing it 
to disobey a sponsor's orders and instructions if they do not align with its preferences.  
In some circumstances, the policy goals of one sponsor will be in direct opposition to the 
policy goals of another, forcing the group to shirk the interests of at least one of its 
principals (Popovic 2017; Saleyhan 2012). 
Although it is possible that the preferences of multiple principals will perfectly 
align, it is probable that most states will view the presence of other sponsors as 
dangerous to their own interests.  In extreme circumstances, state sponsors may have 
actively hostile relationships with each other, as in the case of the Iraqi Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan, which simultaneously began receiving support from the United States, 
Iran, Syria, and Libya in 1981.  It seems unlikely that the US shared similar preferences 
and goals with these states, and would presumably have refrained from sponsoring the 
PUK if it had been aware of their involvement (Gunter 1996).  Even in instances where 
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the relationships between potential and pre-existing sponsors are cordial, the increased 
likelihood of agency loss will create greater risks associated with sponsorship.  As a 
result, sponsors should naturally attempt to avoid simultaneous sponsorship by only 
selecting groups with whom they will have an exclusive relationship.   
Hypothesis 4a:  If a terrorist organization is currently being sponsored by at least 
one other state, then its likelihood of being sponsored will decrease.   
The presence of information asymmetries regarding the involvement of other 
states should play a significant role in explaining observations of simultaneous 
sponsorship.  Unlike ideological or ethnic identities, terrorist organizations will not have 
strong incentives to broadcast the presence of state sponsorship.  The incentives for 
plausible deniability will also lead many states to disguise their delegation to terrorist 
organizations, creating obstacles for prospective sponsors to accurately determine the 
presence of other principals.   
However, as the duration of sponsorship increases, visible indicators of support, 
such as proprietary weapons technology, should also increase, improving the ability of 
prospective sponsors to detect another state’s involvement.  Even in instances where 
sponsorship is overt, longer durations of pre-existing sponsorship will increase the 
group’s dependency on that sponsor, as the operations of the organization will become 
increasingly reliant upon the materials given by that state.  This will create further 
disincentives for prospective sponsors to select these groups, as the group will be 
unlikely to follow the directives of a state that contradict the interests of the dominant 
sponsor.  Therefore, as the period of time in which one or more states have been 
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sponsoring an organization increases, the likelihood that other states will sponsor that 
organization should significantly decrease.   
Hypothesis 4b:  If the number of years that a terrorist organization was 
sponsored by at least one other state increases, then its likelihood of being 
sponsored will decrease.   
 
Research Design 
In this article, I examine the process by which state sponsors of terrorism select 
the agents they will sponsor from a larger pool of organizations that are active in a 
target country.  Since the characteristics of all three actors are necessary to understand 
this decision making process, I test my hypotheses using an unbalanced panel dataset of 
directed country-level dyads (Bennett and Stam 2000; Saideman et al. 2002).  As states 
often sponsor multiple terrorist organizations in a target country, I do not eliminate 
dyadic pairs after the first instance of sponsorship, although terrorist organizations that 
are selected by the sponsor state are excluded in subsequent years.   
In each cross-sectional panel, I include all groups that the Global Terrorism 
Database reports were active in the target state during the year when sponsorship 
began (Lafree and Dugan 2007; START 2015).16  This results in a dataset where each 
observation simultaneously represents an individual terrorist organization, a target 
state, and a potential sponsor state.  Although the high level of missing data in the GTD 
                                                          
16
 In instances where the GTD divides deeply politically interconnected regions into two categories, such 
as the United Kingdom and North Ireland or Israel and the Gaza Strip/West Bank, I include groups active in 
both regions.   
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likely results in an under-reporting of the total number of active organizations or 
attributable attacks, I assume that state sponsors will be inclined to support 
organizations that are determinably active in a target state, minimizing the impact of 
hypothetically active, but non-recognized, organizations in my analysis (Arva and Bieler 
2014). 
Although the principal theoretical focus of this article is to explain the agent 
selection process, my theoretical and empirical model also considers the initial decision 
by a state to become a terrorism sponsor.  Despite the capability of many states to 
provide material support to terrorist organizations, the empirical record strongly 
suggests that few actual observations of sponsorship exist compared to the larger pool 
of potential sponsors.  Since it is likely that there are numerous instances where a state 
could benefit from delegating to a terrorist organization, but makes a conscious decision 
to refrain, examining only those states in which state sponsorship is observed would 
result in a selection bias problem.  In order to account for this empirical issue, I utilize a 
censored probit model with sample selection.  This model censors observations where 
sponsorship does not occur, while accounting for the factors that, in my first paper, 
were found to influence the initial decision process to engage in or refrain from 
sponsorship (Butler 1996; Puhani 2000).   
My sample consists of 39 states between the years 1970 and 2008, including the 
22 nations that existed during this time period in the Middle East and North Africa.  
Since the complex network of conflicts between Middle Eastern states frequently 
entangle nations outside of the region, I include 17 non-Middle Eastern states in my 
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analysis.  These include the five dominant global powers of the latter half of the 
20thcentury, as these states have extensive political and economic interests in the 
Middle East and have a history of involvement in regional conflicts such as the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq War, and the ongoing Syrian Civil War.17  I also include the 
twelve countries that share a geographic border with a Middle Eastern state, as these 
states often have deep cultural, historical, and political interrelations with neighboring 
Middle Eastern states.18  Including these major power states and neighboring countries 
into my analysis improves the overall political relevance of my sample, as these states 
are collectively more likely to be involved in regional politics and sponsor Middle 
Eastern terrorist organizations.  By using these criteria, I exclude only one observation of 
state sponsorship of a Middle Eastern terrorist organization, the North Korean 
sponsorship of the Polisario Front in Morocco from 1976 to 1987. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 Although previous literature has examined static patterns of state sponsorship 
within small samples of terrorist organizations, I expand upon this empirical work by 
developing a comprehensive, dynamic database of sponsorship patterns across all states 
in the international system (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Bapat 2012).  To create this 
data, I built upon four existing sources of group-level information about the financing of 
organizations that utilize terrorism.  These sources are the Non-State Actor Dataset 
                                                          
17
 France, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union/Russia, and the United States. 
 
18
 Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan.  
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(NSA) developed by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, the Terrorism Research and 
Analysis Consortium (TRAC) digital group-level profiles, the Terrorism Knowledge Base 
Terrorist Organization Profiles (archived by the University of Maryland National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), and the Big Allied 
and Dangerous (BAAD) 1.0 database, created by Asal and Rethemeyer.   
 Each of these sources includes a classification system that differentiates 
between whether or not a violent non-state actor obtains support from a state, 
although significant coding was necessary to account for the variance between each 
source's level of specification, number of organizations, and temporality.  For example, 
the NSA database only examines insurgent groups, omitting many organizations that 
exclusively engage in terrorism, but contains a large amount of information on 
sponsorship characteristics, including the time period in which a group receives support, 
the type of support received, and whether specific sponsors explicitly acknowledge their 
sponsorship behaviors.  In contrast, the qualitative TRAC profiles include a larger 
number of terrorist organizations, but frequently do not include a temporal component 
or information on sponsor identity and support type.  Due to these differences in coding 
procedures, in addition to possible differences in evidence gathered by the databases, I 
found disagreements in identification for roughly forty percent of the positive 
observations of sponsorship in my data.   
 The definition of sponsorship I utilize in this article is the deliberate provision of 
resources and material support to a non-domestic terrorist organization by the 
government of a state.  Observations of state sponsorship of terrorism which did not fit 
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these criteria were naturally excluded from my dataset.  This includes instances of 
support that did not provide material benefits, such as a state engaging in diplomacy on 
behalf of the terrorist organization, as well as observations in which there was 
insufficient information regarding the identity of the sponsor state.   
 Using this new dataset, I created a binary variable that indicates whether or not 
a state selected a terrorist organization that was active in the target state during a year 
when sponsorship initiation had been identified.  Of the 39 states included in the 
analysis, 17 supported a total of 56 terrorist organizations, resulting in 94 discrete 
instances of sponsorship initiation.  Including all of these groups, regardless of 
characteristics such as organizational size or lethality, is of critical importance to 
answering the central question underlying this analysis, what characteristics will impact 
the likelihood of an organization receiving sponsorship.  The data I have collected can 
also be utilized to construct a variety of other measurements related to sponsorship, 
such as the duration of time a state sponsors a given organization, or the total number 
of organizations a state has sponsored.  The summary statistics for the dependent 
variable, as well as those of the independent variables and controls I will discuss below, 
can be seen in Table 5.  
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  
Name 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Number of 
Observations 
Sponsored 
Group 
 
.001315 .042376 0 1 71,484 
Ethnic 
Organization 
 
.459477 .4983586 0 1 72,354 
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Similar Ideology 
 
.1574066 .3641862 0 1 72,354 
Prior 
Sponsorship 
 
.1772259 .3818624 0 1 72,354 
Duration of 
Sponsorship  
1.898264 5.222243 0 38 72,354 
Number of  
Attackst-1 
4.286066 17.49659 0 316 72,354 
Number of  
Attackst 
5.820701 18.35754 1  316 72,354 
Cold War 
 
.5495371 .4975434 0 1 74,308 
Number of 
Groups 
5.960718 6.118511 0 25 74,308 
Breadth of 
Goals 
.1874175 .3902498 0 1 55,299 
Criminal 
Organization 
.1667661 .3727703 0 1 55,299 
Selection Model      
State 
Sponsorship 
 
.0043562 .065858 0 1 98,480 
Strategic Rivalry 
 
.0451634 . 0369212 0 1 98,480 
Difference in 
Capabilities 
.0136319 .0588073 -.198308 .198308 98,480 
Executive 
Constraints 
2.816257 2.003096 1 7 96,623 
% of 
Mountainous 
Terrain (Target) 
20.8036 21.36733 0 71.3 98,175 
Pop. of Target 
(millions) 
67.12154 141.9199 .119246 1324.655 98,480 
GDP per capita 
of Target 
8107.502 9756.641 60.47566 82990.07 98,167 
Polity Score of 
Target 
12.08728 7.585895 0 20 98,480 
No Active 
Groups 
.2652924 .441491 0 1 98,480 
 
Independent Variables 
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 The measurement of rivalry that I utilize is based upon Colaresi and Thompson's 
definition of strategic rivalry, in which rivalry is indicated by both competition and a 
perception of threat between dyadic pairs, rather than density of interstate disputes 
(Colaresi and Thompson 2002; Diehl and Goertz 2000).19  By selecting a definition that 
explicitly requires hostility between the states, I avoid including dyads that experience 
frequent low-scale militarized interactions, such as maritime disputes, but otherwise 
enjoy productive diplomatic relationships. 
 I generated my indicator of a group’s ethnic identity from the Terrorism 
Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC) digital group-level profiles, which categorizes 
terrorist organizations across a wide variety of ideological positions.  Although TRAC 
profiles a large number of groups, the depth of information varies widely from case to 
case.  To increase the reliability of the variable, I cross-referenced TRAC’s ethnic-
nationalist coding with the BAAD1 dataset, which includes a variable that also codes for 
whether a group’s ideology contains an ethno-nationalist component (Asal and 
Rethemeyer 2008).20  225 of the 877 terrorist organizations in my dataset possess an 
ethnic identity, although these organizations appear to have greater longevity than non-
ethnic groups, and therefore account for 46% of the group-level observations.   
 To generate the measurement of ideological similarity, I compared the ideology 
of the terrorist organization, obtained from the TRAC group profiles, and the 
                                                          
19
 To control for possible endogenity between sponsorship and rivalry onset, I exclude instances of rivalry 
which began the same year as sponsorship.    
 
20
 I found that the TRAC and BAAD1 ethnic identifications are identical for all but one organization, the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.  Based on public statements and manifestos, I decided to 
conform to the TRAC designation, coding the PFLP an ethnic group (Bloom 2004; Laqueur and Rubin 
2001). 
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descriptions of governing party ideology in the Political Handbook of the World, an 
annual encyclopedia of states and non-governmental organizations (Banks et al. 1975-
2008).  I used the information included in these profiles to code for descriptive 
keywords pertaining to the ideological identity of the organization or government.  For 
example, in 1992, the Iranian government was coded as Centrist and Islamic (Shi’ite), 
while Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami-yi Aghanistan, an Afghani terrorist organization, was 
coded as Ethnic (Hazara) and Islamic (Shi’ite).  Since the two actors possessed one or 
more shared ideological identities, I coded them as ideologically similar.  As terrorist 
organizations are often narrower in ideological focus than governments, cases where a 
group’s ideology could reasonably fit within a government’s were coded as similar.  For 
example, I coded Palestinian ethnic-nationalist organizations as ideologically similar to 
pan-Arabism governments, since the Palestinian ethnic group can be considered a sub-
set of the broader Arab population.  Roughly 15% of active groups were coded as 
ideologically similar to potential sponsor states. 
 I generated both the binary indicator for prior sponsorship and the count of the 
number of years a terrorist organization has been continuously sponsored from the 
same original data as the dependent variable.21  In both of these variables, the 
sponsorship initiation year of a previously unsponsored terrorist organization was set at 
zero.  Given the secretive nature of the relationship between a sponsor and terrorist 
organization, it is unreasonable to assume that other states will be able to accurately 
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 If two or more states sponsored the organization for different lengths of time, the longer duration was 
used. 
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determine whether a sponsorship relationship has begun in the initial months of the 
relationship.   
 
Control Variables 
In order to account for possible sources of variation that are not directly related 
to a principal’s selection process, I include several control variables in my analyses.22  
The first is a binary variable indicating whether the year of the dyadic relationship took 
place during the Cold War, which I measure as ending with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991.  Previous research on state-sponsored insurgency has suggested that 
external support to rebel groups was more common during this period, as the global 
rivalry between capitalist and communist states led to conflict delegation to proxy 
groups (Byman et al. 2001; Salehyan 2010).  I include this variable to control for the 
systemic differences in international conflict between these periods, and determine if 
the decline in competition between these ideologies influenced patterns in sponsorship.   
The second control measures the number of years an organization had been 
active prior to the observation year.  This variable is intended to control for 
organizational factors tied to the longevity of terrorist groups, such as tactical variation, 
organizational expertise, and group size (Abrahms 2012; Blomberg et al. 2011).  
Although longer-lived terrorist organizations are likely to be more durable and dominant 
within the target state, they are also likely to be less organizationally flexible and willing 
                                                          
22
 Model results with only control variables included and additional control variables can be found in the 
supplementary files.   
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to adapt (Horowitz 2010; Young and Dugan 2014).23  This will create contradictory 
incentives for state sponsors, as older organizations will be inherently more likely to 
succeed at delegated tasks, but they may also resist the directives of the state, 
increasing the likelihood of agency loss.  I measure group longevity by the number of 
years since the organization first conducted an attack, based on event data from the 
Global Terrorism Database. 
I also include two estimates of the lethality of the terrorist organization, the 
number of attacks that the group had committed in the previous year and the 
observation year.  These variables account for the differences in the pre-sponsorship 
capabilities of groups, as well as how visible the group’s activities will be to both 
sponsors and counter-terrorism efforts.  As with the previous control, I obtain the 
variables from the GTD.24 
 I also include a variable that controls for the breadth of terrorist goals, 
distinguishing between groups with narrow organizational objectives and those with 
broad, expansive goals.  Utilizing an analysis of group-level characteristics by the RAND 
Corporation, I divided terrorist organizations into two distinct categories (Jones and 
Libicki 2008).  The first category includes organizations with narrower goals, such as 
maintaining the status quo, enacting policy changes, or demanding territorial changes.  
Conceding to these goals would be comparatively low cost for a state, whereas groups 
with broader goals, such as regime change, the overthrow of multiple regimes, and 
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 The maximum organizational longevity in my data is 38 years, while the mean longevity is 4.6 years.  
 
24
 The maximum number of observed attacks was 316 for both controls, while the mean number of 
attacks was slightly lower (4.3) in the previous year than the observation year (5.8). 
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global societal revolution, would threaten the fundamental existence of the 
government.  Groups with narrow organizational goals should be viewed differently by 
potential sponsors than groups with broad goals, as broad organizational goals should 
engender a more aggressive and non-conciliatory attitude from the target state.25 
Finally, I include an indicator for whether an organization engages in economic 
criminal activities in addition to terrorism, such as drug-trafficking and piracy.  I utilized 
the TRAC group profiles to determine whether an organization possessed this 
characteristic, coding a group as an economic criminal organization if it engaged in 
transnational criminal activities, narco-terrorism, or warlordism.26  Organizations with 
these characteristics should be distinct from other terrorist groups, but it is theoretically 
unclear whether these differences will result in greater incentives for states to delegate 
policy to them.  For-profit criminal activities have the potential to significantly increase 
an organization’s probability of success, as the revenue can be utilized to purchase 
additional supplies and attract new members to the organization (Piazza 2011).  
However, this revenue will result in a greater degree of economic independence for the 
organization, reducing the sponsor’s financial control over the agent’s activities 
(Weinstein 2007).  These organizations will also have incentives to act in ways that 
further the group’s economic interests but disobey the sponsor’s wishes, increasing the 
risk of agency loss.  Because of these considerations, states will likely view economic 
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 The majority of organizations (80%) in the dataset were observed to have narrow goals. 
 
26
 Roughly 16% of organizations in the dataset engaged in these activities, making them a clear minority in 
the Middle East. 
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criminal terrorist organizations differently than other groups, but it is unclear whether 
they will be incentivized to select them.   
Along with the first hypothesis, I include several control variables in the selection 
model to account for the state-level variations in the incentives to engage in 
sponsorship, derived from previous theoretical and empirical work on terrorism 
sponsorship (Berkowitz 2017; Byman and Kreps 2010).  The first of these is difference in 
military capabilities, as weaker states may be incentivized to pursue alternatives to 
direct military action such as sponsorship.27  To represent domestic political 
considerations regarding sponsorship, I include a measurement of executive constraints, 
as states with fewer constraints should be able to more readily pursue this normatively 
controversial behavior.  The remaining variables control for relevant characteristics of 
the target state and the time period.   
 
Analysis and Results  
 As the dependent variable of my principal equation is a binary indicator of the 
initiation of state-sponsored terrorism, I estimated a number of multivariate censored 
probit regression models to evaluate my hypotheses.  Since my data is naturally 
clustered by dyadic pairs, I employ robust standard errors to control for within-dyad 
effects.  
 In the censored probit models shown in Table 6, all four of my hypotheses were 
consistently supported across all five models.  In the selection model, states were 
                                                          
27
 For ease of interpretation, I negate this variable in my analysis. 
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significantly more likely to make the initial decision to engage in sponsorship if they and 
the target state were engaged in a strategic rivalry.  Once the initial decision to engage 
in sponsorship is made, organizations with ethnic identities were found to be 
significantly more likely to be chosen by state sponsors than non-ethnic groups, as were 
groups that shared at least one ideological characteristic with the potential sponsor 
state.  Organizations that had been previously sponsored by a state were found to be 
significantly less likely to be sponsored, although the static indicator of prior 
sponsorship ceased to be statistically distinguishable from zero when the number of 
years a group had been continuously sponsored by a state was included in the model.  
These findings support my argument that state sponsors will selectively differentiate 
between terrorist agents based on organizational characteristics, sponsoring those that 
possess greater likelihood of organizational success and lower likelihoods of agency loss. 
Table 6: Results of Censored Probit Regressions 
Variable Name Model One Model Two  Model 
Three 
Model Four Complete 
Model 
Ethnic 
Organization 
(H2) 
.499** 
(.174) 
   .557** 
(.188) 
Similar Ideology 
(H3) 
 .457** 
(.162) 
  .427** 
(.171) 
Prior  
Sponsorship 
(H4a) 
  -.500* 
(.268) 
 .144 
(.366) 
Duration of 
Sponsorship 
(H4b) 
   -.162** 
(.062) 
-.218** 
(.104) 
Number of  
Attackst-1 
-.121** 
(.052) 
-.121** 
(.051) 
-.127** 
(.054) 
-.177** 
(.073) 
 
Number of  
Attackst 
.025*** 
(.008) 
.025*** 
(.008) 
.026*** 
(.007) 
.035*** 
(.010) 
.017*** 
(.005) 
Cold War -.022 .140 .096 .075 .090 
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(.187) (.183) (.189) (.190) (.186) 
Number of 
Groups 
-.134*** 
(.026) 
-.133*** 
(.024) 
-.136*** 
(.024) 
-.133*** 
(.024) 
-.132*** 
(.026) 
Breadth of Goals .443* 
(.237) 
.209 
(.231) 
.361 
(.232) 
.365 
(.242) 
.362 
(.248) 
Criminal 
Organization 
.147 
(.245) 
.430* 
(.226) 
.355 
(.228) 
.366 
(.234) 
.043 
(.246) 
Constant .100 
(.513) 
-.175 
(.482) 
.447 
(.494) 
.453 
(.504) 
-.391 
(.514) 
Selection Model      
Strategic  
Rivalry (H1) 
1.041*** 
(.052) 
1.042*** 
(.052) 
1.041*** 
(.052) 
1.041*** 
(.052) 
1.042*** 
(.052) 
Difference in 
Capabilities 
-1.978*** 
(.601) 
-1.993*** 
(.600) 
-1.978*** 
(.602) 
-1.980*** 
(.602) 
-1.994*** 
(.599) 
Executive 
 Constraints 
-.071*** 
(.011) 
-.071*** 
(.011) 
-.071*** 
(.011) 
-.071*** 
(.011) 
-.071*** 
(.011) 
Cold War .253*** 
(.041) 
.253*** 
(.041) 
.253*** 
(.041) 
.253*** 
(.041) 
.253*** 
(.041) 
% of 
Mountainous 
Terrain (Target) 
.003** 
(.001) 
.003** 
(.001) 
.003** 
(.001) 
.003** 
(.001) 
.003** 
(.001) 
Population  
(Target) 
-.002*** 
(.001) 
-.002*** 
(.001) 
-.003*** 
(.001) 
-.002*** 
(.001) 
-.002*** 
(.001) 
GDP per Capita  
(Target) 
-.00002*** 
(.00001) 
-.00002*** 
(.00001) 
-
.00002*** 
(.00001) 
-.00002*** 
(.00001) 
-.00002*** 
(.00001) 
Polity Score  
(Target) 
.005 
(.004) 
.005 
(.004) 
.005 
(.004) 
.005 
(.004) 
.005 
(.004) 
No Groups  -4.912*** 
(.048) 
-4.418*** 
(.048) 
-4.740*** 
(.048) 
-4.740*** 
(.048) 
-4.418*** 
(.047) 
Constant -2.527*** 
(.076) 
-2.530*** 
(.077) 
-2.526*** 
(.076) 
-2.527*** 
(.076) 
-2.530*** 
(.076) 
Number of 
Observations 
95,976 95,976 95,976 95,976 95,976 
Number of 
Uncensored 
Observations 
381 381 381 381 381 
Wald Chi2 43.06 49.55 50.64 50.41 52.37 
Dependent Variables indicate the group-level initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as 
coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 
level ***= significant at .001 level  
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The results of the complete model show that the effect of possessing an ethnic 
identity on likelihood of sponsorship selection appears to be independent of the 
comparable effect of ideological similarity.  This was a potential empirical concern, as 
the ethnic basis of many political conflicts in the Middle East has resulted in states and 
terrorist organizations sharing ideologies that are ethnic in nature, such as pan-Arabism.  
This overlap had the potential to muddy the theoretical waters between the costs and 
benefits of sponsorship, as the significance of ethnicity could have been a tangential 
result of state principals minimizing sponsorship risks by selecting ethnically similar 
agents.  Although ideological similarity does reinforce the marginal effect of ethnic 
identity on sponsorship selection, increasing the likelihood of selection by roughly 
twelve percent, the complete model suggests that even states that are not ethnically 
similar are still more likely to sponsor ethnic organizations than non-ethnic groups.  
These findings reinforce my argument that ethnic groups possess distinct strategic 
advantages that will incentivize states to select them.   
 The consistently negative and significant effect of pre-existing sponsorship, when 
considered alongside the positive effect of ideological similarity, strongly suggests that 
state sponsors will consider the potential for agency loss when selecting terrorist 
agents.  The dynamic nature of the dominant sub-hypothesis, duration of prior 
sponsorship, implies that states will consider groups that have been sponsored for brief 
periods of time differently than groups with lengthier histories of active sponsorship.  
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether this observation results from the perception that 
longer durations of sponsorship increase an organization’s dependence on the initial 
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sponsor or the result of time delays in the discovery of prior sponsorship.  Given the 
highly clandestine nature of state sponsorship, it is unlikely that sufficient records of 
pre-sponsorship deliberations will emerge to conclusively resolve this theoretical 
uncertainty.  However, future research on state sponsorship may offer empirical insight 
into this issue, particularly if duration of sponsorship is found to have a significant effect 
on the likelihood of agency loss.   
 The results of the sample selection model were uniform across all five models 
shown in Table 2.  As expected, higher levels of executive constraints decreased the 
likelihood that a state would make the initial decision to engage in sponsorship.  In 
contrast, the expected effect of difference in material capabilities was consistently 
negative and significant, suggested that weaker Middle Eastern states were less 
incentivized to engage in sponsorship than stronger states.  
 The impact of my state-level and group-level control variables on the likelihood 
of a terrorist organization being sponsored were mixed.  The number of organizations 
active in the target state had a consistently negative and significant effect, and greater 
number of attacks by an organization in the prior and current year respectively 
decreased and increased sponsorship likelihood.  However, the number of prior attacks 
by an organization, whether the panel year took place during the Cold War, the breadth 
of ideological goals, and whether the organization engaged in criminal behavior were 
consistently non-significant.   
 Although it is unsurprising that greater numbers of active terrorist organizations 
reduce the likelihood that individual groups will be sponsored, the empirical results for 
91 
 
the other control variables suggest several intriguing findings about state sponsorship in 
the Middle East.  The first is that states appear unconcerned about the potential 
consequences of sponsoring terrorist organizations with broad agendas, which have 
been shown to engage in higher fatality, less discriminate acts of terrorism (Jones and 
Libicki 2008; Piazza 2009).  This suggests that some Middle Eastern sponsors will refrain 
from selecting these organizations, due to the potential for operational overreach or 
controversy, while others may value their destructive potential, selecting them in order 
to disrupt or destabilize the target state.   
The seeming indifference of potential sponsors towards criminal behavior 
implies that states may lack detailed information about the criminal history of potential 
agents.  This suggests that information asymmetry may play a greater role in state 
decision making than is apparent elsewhere in the model.  This is supported by the 
difference in effect between past and current group behaviors, as states may be unable 
to find accurate information about prior activities, and will therefore place greater 
importance on presently observable attack patterns.    
It would be possible to improve my organizational characteristic variables by 
developing time varying measurements for breadth of organizational goals and 
participation in criminal behavior.  While the general ideology of a terrorist organization 
should remain consistent over time, specific organizational goals may fluctuate as the 
group evolves, potentially altering the impact of breadth of goals on selection likelihood 
(Asal and Reythemer 2008; Jones and Libicki 2008).  Although the consistently non-
significant effect of criminal activities on the likelihood of sponsorship may result from 
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principal-agent information asymmetries, an alternative explanation is that my models 
cannot determine when organizations begin engaging in these behaviors.  Including a 
time-varying indicator for this characteristic would resolve this uncertainty, as future 
research would be able to differentiate between groups that commenced criminal 
behavior before or after they were considered for sponsorship.  
 Following the example of recent studies that have employed sample selection 
models, I derived mean marginal effects from my models, shown in Table 7 (Marcum 
and Brown 2016; Vance and Ritter 2014).  The directionality and significance levels of 
the marginal effects are largely consistent with the results in Table 2, and there are 
several observations that reinforce my analytical claims.28  First, the inclusion of both 
the dynamic and static measurements of prior sponsorship results in a sizable increase 
in the marginal impact of the dynamic variable.  When considered alongside the lack of 
significance of the static variable, this reinforces my supposition that variations in 
sponsorship duration impact the decision making process.  Second, the relatively similar 
marginal effect of ethnic group identity and ideological similarity suggests that sponsors’ 
group selection processes will be equally motivated by the potential benefits and risks 
of delegating to a specific group.  Since significant differences between the observed 
effects of these two variables would suggest that states place greater value in either the 
costs or benefits of sponsorship, the similarity between them reinforces the paired 
incentives driving my theoretical model.  
                                                          
28
 Perplexingly, the inclusion of number of attacks in the prior year, despite not significantly changing the 
results in the probit model, dramatically altered the mean marginal effects in Model 5.  Since this control 
was not of theoretical significance, I omitted it in model 5.  A model with this control is included in the 
supplementary files.   
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Table 7: Mean Marginal Effect Estimates 
Variable Name Model One Model Two  Model 
Three 
Model Four Complete 
Model 
Ethnic 
Organization 
.088** 
(.033) 
   .105** 
(.042) 
Similar Ideology  
 
.078** 
(.032) 
  .081** 
(.033) 
Prior 
Sponsorship 
 
  -.083* 
(.045) 
 .027 
(.067) 
Duration of 
Sponsorship 
   -.016** 
(.007) 
-.041** 
(.013) 
Number of  
Attackst-1 
-.021*** 
(.006) 
-.021*** 
(.006) 
-.021*** 
(.005) 
-.017*** 
(.005) 
 
Number of  
Attackst 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.003** 
(.001) 
.003** 
(.001) 
Cold War .008 
(.031) 
.023 
(.029) 
.021 
(.029) 
.010 
(.017) 
.016 
(.033) 
Number of 
Groups 
-.024*** 
(.007) 
-.023*** 
(.008) 
-.023** 
(.007) 
-.013* 
(.007) 
-.025*** 
(.007) 
Breadth of Goals .078* 
(.047) 
.036 
(.041) 
.060 
(.043) 
.035 
(.032) 
.068 
(.049) 
Criminal 
Organization 
.026 
(.043) 
.074* 
(.039) 
.059 
(.039) 
.035 
(.027) 
.008 
(.046) 
Strategic Rivalry 
 
.0001*** 
(.00001) 
.0001*** 
(.00002) 
.0001*** 
(.00002) 
.0001*** 
(.0002) 
.0001*** 
(.00003) 
Results are mean marginal effects, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level. 
**= significant at .05 level. ***= significant at .001 level.  
 
Robustness 
I conducted several tests of the robustness of my models, the results of which 
can be found in the supplementary files.  The first of these limited the positive 
observations of sponsorship to unanimously identified observations, dropping 
observations that were disputed by my sources.  The results of this analysis were 
consistent with the main findings, although the effect of prior sponsorship on likelihood 
of selection was greater in instances of unanimous identification. 
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 I also examined several alternative measurements of my independent variables.  
These included a measurement of ideological similarity disaggregated into perfect and 
partial correspondence between the sponsor and organization.  The results suggest that 
perfectly corresponding terrorist groups are more likely to receive sponsorship than 
partially corresponding, further supporting my finding that sponsors have incentives to 
select groups with similar ideological beliefs and goals.  
I also assessed adjustments to Hypothesis 4a, expanding the range of prior 
sponsorship by one and two years, and examined whether prior sponsorship by 
countries sanctioned by the United States influenced the group selection process.  
These tests did not offer significant improvements on the existing binary indicator, and 
did not alter the impact of Hypothesis 4b, which continued to offer greater explanatory 
power than the binary alternatives.    
 I also included several additional control variables to the model.  These consisted 
of whether a group was listed as a rebel organization in the NSA dataset, a rough 
measurement of group size aggregated from RAND and BAAD, a binary indicator for 
older versus younger organizations, and an indicator of whether a terrorist organization 
was the only active group in a dyad.  None of these additional controls significantly 
altered the main theoretical findings of the analysis.   
Finally, to assess the differences between Middle Eastern states and the relevant 
non-Middle Eastern dyads included in my analysis, I ran models that limited the range of 
dyads to the 22 Middle Eastern states.  I did not find any significant differences between 
these results and the findings in my main analysis.   
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Conclusion 
 State sponsors of terrorism will be faced with a complex decision making process 
when selecting the individual organizations they intend to support.  The results of my 
empirical analysis support the principal-agent model’s utility in conceptualizing state 
sponsorship, as well as the importance of both state-level and group-level 
characteristics in explaining sponsorship decision making (Byman and Kreps 2010).  My 
models show that Middle Eastern sponsors will be aware of the innate differences 
between potential terrorist agents, and appear to strategically sponsor organizations 
based on these characteristics.  The results also suggest a consistent utility maximization 
in sponsorship decision making, as states will take into account both the probability of 
organizational success and the likelihood of agency loss.   
 Since my analysis is the first large-N, cross-national study of the decision making 
process by which state-sponsored terrorist organizations are selected, there is 
significant room for further research.  The frequently clandestine nature of terrorism in 
general and state sponsorship in particular necessitates future scholars to revise existing 
datasets as new information appears.  Although I believe that the dataset I have 
developed for this article will be a valuable resource for future research, it is important 
to acknowledge the often-embryonic nature of large-N studies of terrorism, and the 
clear potential for improvements to my empirical evidence.   
 Future work can also address lingering theoretical questions regarding state 
sponsorship of terrorism that are not conclusively answered in my analysis.  One of 
these questions is the applicability of the principal-agent framework and utility model I 
96 
 
present in this article to observations of sponsorship outside of the Middle East.  
Although state sponsorship is a disproportionately regional foreign policy tool, material 
support for terrorist groups is not confined to this geographic area.  Over half of the 
occurrences of state sponsorship in my broader dataset involve countries outside of the 
Middle East, including pressing contemporary cases such as Pakistani support for 
terrorism in India and reciprocal sponsorship between countries in the Horn of Africa.   
It may also be profitable to consider the potential impact of differences between 
ethnic groups on the likelihood of selection.  Although my analysis indicates that 
terrorist organizations with an ethnic identity are, on a whole, more likely to be 
sponsored than non-ethnic groups, variations in ethnic groupness, such as group size, its 
share of domestic political power, and its history of past conflict, have been found to 
influence the likelihood of an ethnic population engaging in violence against the state 
(Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009).  Since these characteristics may also 
influence a sponsor’s perception of organizational capabilities, future research on the 
differences between ethnic organizations can potentially improve our understanding of 
the relationship between ethnicity and sponsorship. 
Researchers may also wish to employ similar empirical methodologies and 
theoretical models to examine other aspects of state-sponsored terrorism, such as 
state-terrorist dynamics during the period of sponsorship.  Finally, my analysis points 
towards, but cannot definitively prove, an active consideration of terrorist 
organizational characteristics by state sponsors of terrorism.  If a record of a state 
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sponsor’s internal deliberations exists and can be obtained, the resulting case study 
analysis would offer considerable support for my theoretical model.   
 Reducing the number of state-sponsored terrorist organizations in the Middle 
East is an important step in reducing the large number of violent conflicts in the region.  
As a result, policymakers should naturally be interested in understanding why specific 
terrorist organizations receive sponsorship while others do not.  The principal-agent 
model conceptualizes the agent selection process as a comparison between the positive 
and negative characteristics of potential agents, with the intention of selecting the one 
best suited to the principal’s needs.  My analysis supports this line of reasoning, as state 
sponsors select terrorist organizations based on both the likelihood of success and the 
potential for costly shirking behavior.   
 Although policymakers can use this knowledge to predict which terrorist 
organizations are most likely to receive sponsorship from particular Middle Eastern 
states, it may be difficult to translate this information into effective counter-terrorism 
policy.  As the long-running hostilities between Israel and the Arab world demonstrate, 
state sponsors often have strong domestic incentives to continue supporting terrorist 
organizations, regardless of international pressures.  When combined with the strategic 
selection of effective and low-risk terrorist agents, the incentives to refrain from 
sponsorship further diminish.  Although the potential global benefits of reducing 
sponsorship in the Middle East are vast, policymakers should anticipate lengthy and 
complex struggles to achieve this end, and be prepared for a high risk of failure.   
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Paper 3: Success or Shirking in Terror: Control Mechanisms in State Sponsorship of 
Terrorism 
 
 Since 1970, the Syrian government has provided financial support, military 
equipment and training, and safe haven to multiple anti-Israeli terrorist organizations, 
such as the Abu Nidal Organization, Hezbollah, and the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine.  Collectively, terrorist attacks by these groups have been responsible for 
the deaths of hundreds of Israeli citizens, and have prompted repeated international 
condemnation against Syrian support.  Despite this, Syria has continued to engage in 
sponsorship, in large part due to its inability to resolve long-standing geopolitical 
disputes, such as the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights region, through 
conventional military force (Bapat 2011; Byman 2005).  By delegating to terrorist 
organizations, Syria has been able to continue its opposition to Israel’s domestic and 
regional policy interests while simultaneously avoiding the negative ramifications of 
direct conflict.  This strategy has been partially successful, forcing Israel to engage in 
costly and unpopular counter-terrorism campaigns and contributing to a number of 
limited policy victories, such as the 1999 withdrawal of the Israeli military from southern 
Lebanon (Kaye 2002).  
However, the history of Syrian sponsorship points to a pattern of continual 
friction and conflict between the Syrian government and the terrorist groups it 
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supports.  Sponsored groups have damaged Syrian interests in a variety of ways, ranging 
from operational disobedience to outright violence, while Syria has responded by 
reducing support, arresting organization leaders, and expelling groups from Syrian 
territory (Byman and Kreps 2010).  These tensions, as well as similar conflicts in other 
state sponsorship relationships, likely developed from divergences in the underlying 
preferences of terrorist organizations and their sponsors.   
 If state sponsorship of terrorism is conceptualized as a relationship between a 
principal and agent, the behaviors of the sponsored organization that are undesired by 
the sponsor can collectively be referred to as agency loss or shirking (Fama 1980; 
Sappington 1991; Strøm 2000).  The potential for agents to act in ways undesired by 
their principals is a fundamental risk of principal-agent relationships, as delegating 
authority to another actor naturally results in the potential for that actor to abuse that 
authority.  In conventional principal-agent relationships, agency loss is commonly 
regarded as the principal source of inefficiency between the two actors, and principals 
generally seek to minimize agency loss through contractual limitations and monitoring.  
Although previous scholars have examined state support for violent non-state actors as 
a principal-agent relationship, agency loss has been understudied in the existing 
literature on terrorism sponsorship (Byman and Kreps 2010; Salehyan et al. 2014).  
Outside of a small selection of case studies, there has been little in-depth exploration of 
the behaviors of sponsored organizations, and scholars currently lack the necessary 
measurements to assess broad patterns of agency loss.  
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 In this paper, I fill in this empirical gap by developing general measurements for 
both agent success and agency loss in state sponsorship of terrorism, based on prior 
theoretical arguments and constructed using the observable behaviors of sponsored 
groups.  I then test the influence of sponsor-organization relationship characteristics on 
the likelihood of observing these behaviors across time, using large-N data to examine a 
wide range of sponsorship observations.  I find that conventional methods of minimizing 
agency loss, when applied to the context of state sponsorship relationships, significantly 
decrease the occurrence of shirking behaviors while simultaneously increasing the 
group’s attack behaviors.  These findings offer insight into the complex relationship 
between state sponsors of terrorism and their agents, and should enable scholars and 
policy analysts to better evaluate the behaviors of sponsored organizations and assess 
the strength of sponsorship relationships.   
 
Prior Studies 
 There is a sizable literature examining cases where an agent does not behave in 
ways previously agreed upon with the principal, or agency loss, in the context of 
traditional principal-agent relations such as government bureaucracies and corporations 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Grant and Keohane 2005).  However, it is only recently that the 
principal-agent framework has been applied to state support of violent non-state actors, 
and so understandably the literature addressing agency loss within this context has only 
begun to be developed.  In "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse," Salehyan, 
Sirosky, and Wood examine agency loss behaviors of sponsored insurgent groups across 
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a wide range of state-sponsored rebel groups (Salehyan et al. 2014).  Unfortunately, the 
definition of agency loss utilized by Salehyan et al., violence against civilians, is 
unsuitable when considering agency loss in the context of sponsored terrorists.  
Terrorist organizations often strategically choose to engage in violence against civilian 
populations, and this behavior has been suggested to increase an organization’s media 
attention, credibility, and ability to extract concessions (Conrad and Greene 2015; 
Thomas 2014; Wood 2010).  As a result, it is unclear whether civilian violence will be 
considered agency loss by sponsors, and some states may choose to support terrorist 
organizations expressly because of their greater ability and expertise in attacking civilian 
populations (Byman 2005). 
 Byman and Kreps’ "Agents of Destruction" applies a similar principal-agent 
framework directly to terrorist organizations, and specifically outlines a number of ways 
in which terrorist agents can act for or against the interests of their principals (Byman 
and Kreps 2010).  The benefits of sponsorship include projecting force to conventionally 
inaccessible areas, credibly demonstrating the state’s ability to harm militarily superior 
rivals, and strengthening ideologically-similar non-state actors.  The behaviors they 
describe as agency loss in this context are the organization attacking a broader array of 
targets, engaging in economic, rather than political, terrorism, pursuing violence 
apolitically, repeated mistakes or errors in operations, engaging in unauthorized attacks 
that escalate conflicts, the unauthorized spoiling of peace negotiations, and encouraging 
terrorism or domestic unrest within the sponsor's own country.   
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 Byman and Kreps’ categorization does not directly address whether agency loss 
will be visible to outside observers, and a number of forms of agency loss require 
complete information regarding a state sponsor’s preferences.  Given the incentives of 
principals in illicit relationships to hide their involvement with their agents, theoretical 
distinctions between observable and non-observable agency loss are needed in order to 
develop a useful general measurement in the context of terrorism sponsorship.  
Without such a definition, it will be both theoretically and empirically difficult to make 
general observations about tensions between state sponsors and terrorists, which will in 
turn limit the ability of scholars and policymakers to exploit these divisions. 
 
Defining Agency Loss 
 As in traditional principal-agent relationships, agency loss in state sponsorship of 
terrorism should be defined as actions by the sponsored agent that deviate from the 
preferences of the state.  Previous scholars have enumerated a number of potential 
agency loss behaviors that are in line with both the theoretical literature on agency loss 
as well as the empirical record on state sponsorship, such as falsely claiming attacks, 
shifting attack patterns towards less-desirable targets, engaging in exclusively economic 
forms of terrorism, escalating conflicts, and launching terrorist attacks against the 
sponsor state itself (Bapat 2011; Byman and Kreps 2010).29 
                                                          
29
Byman and Kreps expand the traditional definition of agency loss to include inadvertent organizational 
failures, such as unsuccessfully executing an attack.  This broadening is uncommon in the larger literature, 
as the preferences of an inept, yet sincere, agent do not necessarily diverge from the principal, as they 
will continue to share the same goals and preferences (Sappington 1991).  Although a history of continual 
failings will undoubtedly result in tensions, there are clear theoretical differences between this failure and 
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However, there are significant differences in the preferences of state sponsors of 
terrorism when compared with typical principals, which creates uncertainty regarding 
the status of some organizational behaviors as shirking.  These divergences result from 
the incentives for a state sponsor to disguise its support of violent and often illegal 
terrorist organizations, particularly from the international community.  The ramifications 
of state sponsorship being discovered are frequently negative, including heightened 
diplomatic tensions, economic sanctions, and even military action.  States such as Iran 
and Syria have experienced significant economic downturns following the imposition of 
sponsorship-related sanctions by Western states, which in turn have fueled domestic 
political dissatisfaction (Byman 2005; Torbat 2005).  Other states with overt links to 
terrorist organizations have experienced even costlier international punishments, such 
as United States-led military strikes against Libya and Afghanistan following high profile 
attacks by terrorist groups supported by their governments (Prunckun and Mohr 1997; 
Wright 2006).  To create plausible deniability of their actions and reduce the likelihood 
of costly reprisals, many states conceal their sponsorship of terrorist groups, and utilize 
limited communication, informal agreements, and intermediaries to create barriers 
between themselves and their agents.  This dramatically contrasts with traditional 
principals such as the bureaucracies and corporations, as public awareness of a 
relationship, alongside formal contracts that delineate principal expectations and 
possible violations, are considered integral methods of reducing agency loss.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
agency loss behaviors I discuss in this section.  Therefore, I restrict my definition of agency loss to only 
include purposive actions taken by sponsored organizations.     
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Controlling Sponsored Organizations  
 Since agency loss is a possibility in all principal-agent relationships, there has 
been significant theoretical thought on how principals can control their agents in order 
to both ensure success and reduce shirking.  The traditional literature on principal-agent 
relationships identifies three distinct methods of control: careful selection of potential 
agents to eliminate those with high shirking tendencies, the implementation of 
contractual obligations or restrictions that restrain the agent's behaviors, and the 
monitoring of agents (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Sappington 1991).  Selection, the 
focus of the second chapter of my dissertation, occurs prior to the beginning of a 
principal-agent relationship, and may involve a large pool of prospective agents.  As a 
result, the selection process is distinct from contractual obligations and monitoring, as 
the state actor will seek to control entry into the support relationship, rather than 
control the behaviors of organizations after the relationship has begun.  Because of 
these differences, as well as the inherently post-selection nature of sponsorship 
outcomes, in this chapter I focus exclusively on contractual controls and monitoring.   
 
Contracts in State Sponsorship 
 Contracts are an integral component of conventional principal-agent 
relationships, as they provide a direct and verifiable method of structuring the 
expectations surrounding the delegation of authority and resultant compensation 
(Binderkrantz and Christensen 2009; Hawkinset al. 2006).  Formal contracts are typically 
agreed upon at the start of the relationship, codifying the interactions between a 
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principal and agent before the relationship truly begins.  Contracts will offer principals 
the ability to structure the incentives of their agents, institutionalizing both the rewards 
for good service as well as the punishments for disobedience.  Since not all contracts are 
identical to each other, different contractual arrangements will result in different risks 
and forms of agency loss, even in otherwise similar principal-agent relationships.  
Therefore, the specific contractual agreements between a state and a terrorist 
organization will influence the level of agency loss in a given relationship.   
 There exist strong incentives for state sponsors of terrorism to create an 
atmosphere of plausible deniability around their actions, resulting in comparatively few 
formalized contracts or publicly available agreements between states and organizations.  
Unlike corporations or bureaucracies, where the existence of a formal contract likely 
offers legal protections and guarantees to the principal, public acknowledgement of a 
state sponsoring a terrorist group will likely result in negative consequences, such as 
U.N. sanctions and criminal indictments against political leaders.  Even states which are 
widely known to sponsor terrorist organizations, such as Iran, do not publicly disclose 
the specific arrangements of their support, if not for plausible deniability then to 
maintain a degree of secrecy regarding future operations.   
 As a result, it is unfeasible to utilize formal agreements between state principals 
and terrorist agents to compare the characteristics of these relationships.  However, this 
does not mean that the details of these relationships are entirely opaque to outside 
observers.  Previous research on externally sponsored insurgent groups suggests that 
the visible characteristics of a sponsorship relationship will alter the level of observed 
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agency loss (Salehyan et al. 2014).  Although this information will be unable to capture 
all variation between different contracts, observably different sponsorship relationships 
will alter the value of the relationship, including the costs to the agent in the event of 
sponsorship termination.  An arrangement which can be ended with little cost to the 
terrorist organization will result in the group having fewer reservations against acting 
against the sponsor's interests, increasing the likelihood of agency loss.  Conversely, a 
sponsor that is indispensable to the survival of a group will create significant operational 
problems if it is angered and withdraws its support, disincentivizing a group to engage in 
shirking behavior.  Therefore, by theoretically modeling how these observable 
characteristics will alter the incentives of terrorist organizations, the effect of different 
contractual agreements on the likelihood of agency loss can be assessed, despite the 
limitations in available information.   
 
Sponsorship Exclusivity 
 One of the most basic characteristics of the association between a state sponsor 
and terrorist organization is the level of exclusivity in the relationship.  Many state 
sponsors choose to support multiple terrorist organizations, spending additional 
resources in order to achieve goals such as increasing the likelihood of policy success or 
achieving greater control over the direction of a multi-actor insurgency (Byman and 
Kreps 2010). Terrorist groups also experience multiple principal-agent relationships 
simultaneously, with organizations frequently being sponsored by two or more states, 
such as the sponsorship of the Eritrean Liberation Front in the 1970s by Syria, Iraq, and 
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Russia (Saleyhan et al. 2014).  Other groups, such as the Nicaraguan-sponsored 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, are supported by a single state actor, 
resulting in an exclusive relationship between the state and the organization.   
 Sponsorship exclusivity puts significant pressure on a terrorist organization to act 
in accordance with the sponsor's interests, as without the state, the terrorist 
organization will lack a source of external support.  Since sponsorship is often the source 
of otherwise unobtainable resources, a terrorist organization with only one sponsor may 
face serious operational difficulties or even dissolution if the state chooses to end the 
relationship (Carter 2012; Phillips 2014).  Even in instances where an exclusively 
supported organization could locate a replacement sponsor, the period of uncertainty 
and financial difficulty between these relationships will motivate groups to avoid 
sponsorship loss.  As a result, terrorist groups with solitary sponsorship relationships will 
have greater incentives to act in accordance with the preferences of their sponsor than 
terrorist groups with multiple sponsors, reducing the level of observed agency loss.  
Groups with multiple sponsors will have the potential to possess overlapping support 
systems, in which specific resources are provided by more than one state (Saleyhan 
2010).  This means that multiple-sponsor organizations will experience comparatively 
lower hardship if a state exits the relationship than single sponsor groups, as departing 
resources can be replaced by those from another principal.  When tensions between 
China and Vietnam, co-sponsors of the Communist Party of Thailand, caused the 
Vietnamese government to withhold supplies from their mutual agent, records suggest 
that the organization was able to replace these resources with Chinese assistance 
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(Wedel 1981). This insurance will allow the sponsored terrorist organization to exert 
greater independence from specific principals and greater flexibility in operations, 
resulting in a higher level of observed agency loss and a lower level of observed agent 
success.   
 Not all multiple-sponsor relationships are identical, however, and variations in 
the number of sponsors groups have will likely influence the likelihood of observing 
agency loss.  Groups such as the Justice and Equality Movement, which received 
external support from only two states during the civil war in the Sudanese Darfur region, 
should have considerably less operational independence than groups like the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army, which during the earlier Second Sudanese Civil War received 
support from a total of six states.30  Each additional sponsor carries with it the possibility 
of redundant provision of resources, decreasing the reliance of the agent on each 
individual principal.  Increasing the number of sponsor states will also diminish the 
probability that all sponsors have similar preferences, a situation which would mitigate 
the security advantages of multiple sponsorships.  As the number of state sponsors 
increases, the percentage of preferences shared by all sponsors should diminish, as each 
additional sponsor will have a distinct, potentially non-overlapping set of interests and 
goals.  Therefore, as the total number of state sponsors increases, the incentives for a 
terrorist organization to engage in agency loss will increase proportionally.   
Hypothesis 1A:  As the number of state sponsors increases, the level of agency 
loss will increase.  
                                                          
30
 The JEM received support from Eritrea and Chad, while the SPLA received various levels of material 
support from Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Zimbabwe.   
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Hypothesis 1B: As the number of state sponsors increases, the level of agent 
success will decrease.    
 
Variations in Support 
 A second characteristic of the sponsor-organization relationship is the type of 
resources provided by the state actor.  Within the context of the principal-agent model, 
support is functionally equivalent to the monetary compensation given by traditional 
employers, as the terrorist group will receive these resources in exchange for acts of 
terrorism that advance the state's policy goals and interests.  It can be assumed that 
most, if not all, forms of sponsor support will be beneficial to the recipient, as otherwise 
the organization will have little motivation to serve as the sponsor’s agent.  However, 
some resources provided by states, such as military equipment and supplies, will be 
more highly valued by terrorist organizations, resulting a greater level of control over 
the behavior of sponsored groups.   
 Although some terrorist organizations increase their political influence through 
service provision or negotiations, terrorism as a strategy is principally based upon 
achieving goals through force, and most terrorist groups are fundamentally based 
around armed violence (Flanigan 2008; Kydd and Walter 2006).  Unlike other resources, 
such as medical supplies or food, military support will directly impact the ability of 
sponsored organizations to engage in acts of violence, their principal coercive strategy.  
Military support to rebel groups, unlike economic resources, has also been shown to 
play a significant role in increasing the duration of civil wars (Collier et al. 2004; Regan 
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2002).  These findings suggest that military resources will play an important role in 
increasing the longevity of violent non-state actors, as conflict termination in these 
cases will likely involve the destruction of the rebel organization.   
 As a result, sponsored terrorist organizations that receive military support should 
therefore be more successful that those which do not, utilizing these resources to 
conduct larger and more sophisticated terrorist campaigns, compete with other non-
state actors, and withstand government counter-terrorism efforts.  This should 
consequentially increase the dependence of the group on the sponsor state, as any 
reduction in military support will result in a similar reduction in the capabilities of the 
organization.  Since agency loss, if detected, may be punished by the principal, militarily-
supported organizations face greater costs associated with disobeying their sponsors 
than organizations that do not receive military support.  In order to maintain resources 
that have become vital to their continued survival, these groups should be more likely to 
act in accordance with the wishes of their sponsors, resulting in lower levels of observed 
agency loss and higher levels of observed agent success.  
Hypothesis 2A:  If an organization receives military support from a state sponsor, 
then the level of agency loss will decrease. 
Hypothesis 2B: If an organization receives military support from a state sponsor, 
then the level of agent success will increase.   
 
Monitoring 
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 Although the purpose of contracts is to structure the incentives of agents in ways 
that make shirking behavior unattractive, no system of institutional control is flawless, 
and agency loss has the potential to occur in all principal-agent relationships.  As a 
result, most principals spend resources to monitor their agent's behavior, in hopes of 
discouraging agents to deviate from their interests as well as to detect and punish these 
behaviors before the damage dealt by them increases in severity.  In legitimate 
corporations and bureaucracies, monitoring can take many forms, ranging from security 
cameras and internet monitoring software to large-scale institutionalized bureaucracies, 
such as the United States' General Accounting Office and Inspectors General (Light 
1993; Wholey and Hatry 1992).   
 Since the structure of the sponsorship relationship differs greatly from typical 
principal-agent relationships, many of the monitoring techniques utilized in corporations 
or bureaucracies will be unavailable to state sponsors.  In many instances, there will be 
little face-to-face interaction between state actors and a sponsored terrorist group, 
meaning that most sponsors will rely upon indirect monitoring to detect agency loss 
(Salehyan 2010).   
The simplest, and therefore most likely, form of indirect monitoring is through 
the observation of the attack behaviors of sponsored organizations, followed by 
responding to instances where these actions conflict with the state's interests.  Since 
terrorism is invariably a public act, this is a low cost form of monitoring, as media or 
intelligence reports on the characteristics of attacks will likely be sufficient to determine 
if the agent's actions correspond to the state's preferences.  However, indirect 
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monitoring is inherently reactive, as the sponsor will be unable to observe an agent's 
intentions prior to an attack.  If a state exclusively relies on this strategy, the resulting 
operational freedom may encourage dissatisfied terrorist organizations to engage in 
agency loss, as there will be little likelihood that a state will anticipate and react to 
shirking behavior before an organization benefits from its actions.   
 State sponsors can alternatively rely on active supervision and monitoring, which 
provides proactive control over terrorist agents but requires greater expenditures of 
resources, and incurs greater risks, for the principal.  By mandating regular interactions 
between state actors and members of a sponsored organization, sponsors will be better 
able to control attack behaviors, as well as determine whether an agent is preparing to 
engage in agency loss.  Since changes in organizational attack strategies and target 
selection are unlikely to occur instantaneously, regular observers will be able to detect 
these behavioral shifts over time, as well as whether they represent agency loss 
(Horowitz 2010; Kydd and Walter 2006).  Because of this, the presence of monitors 
should put constraints on the group's behaviors, as the higher likelihood of detection 
will result in fewer viable options for unpunished shirking.  However, the costs of direct 
monitoring will be high, as the state will be required to deploy numerous trained and 
reliable observers in situations with high probability of violence.  Constant involvement 
by the state will also increase the likelihood that the sponsorship relationship is 
discovered, increasing the risk of international disapproval and reaction (Salehyan 
2010).  Because of these concerns, direct monitoring should be less commonly utilized 
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as a control technique, regardless of the potential benefits from reduction in agency loss 
experience by states willing to pay these costs.  
 The clandestine nature of sponsorship relationships will result in significant 
difficulties in assessing whether states utilize direct monitoring as an agent control 
strategy.  Past instances where discovery of sponsorship has led to domestic or 
international ramifications, such as Iran-Contra scandal or the 1992 U.N. sanctions 
against Libya, should incentivize states to disguise their involvement with foreign 
terrorist organizations (Brody and Shapiro 1989; Collins 2004).  Even in cases where 
state sponsors have incentives to publicly acknowledge their support of terrorist 
organizations, such as the continuing Pakistani support for Kashmiri separatists, 
operational security concerns should lead government officials to avoid direct mention 
of embedded military advisors or government personnel (Carter 2012; Bapat 2012).  
Fortunately, one form of direct monitoring, locating terrorist bases of operation within a 
state's territorial boundaries, is difficult to hide completely from outside observers, 
resulting in measurable sources of data on this behavior.   
 Although access to physical facilities will have significant benefits for a 
sponsored organization, bases of operation also enable sponsors to directly monitor and 
control their agents, influencing ideological stances as well as attack behaviors.  Since 
training and refuge within a sponsor state will increase the capabilities and expertise of 
an organization while simultaneously providing otherwise unavailable medical and 
housing services, terrorist agents will have strong incentives to accept this support 
(Byman 2005).  However, states will also be able to utilize this proximity to determine 
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whether or not an organization intends to engage in shirking behavior and punish 
agents if it occurs.  Furthermore, physically sheltering a terrorist agent within the 
sponsor's territory will offer significant control over the organization's movement and 
activities, including sensitive information which can, in cases of extreme agency loss, be 
provided to the group's rivals and opponents (Carter 2012).   
State actors will also be able to utilize domestic bases to indoctrinate 
organization members in the state's ideological positions, shifting the preferences of the 
organization closer to that of the state.  An example of this can be seen in the strong 
ideological and policy similarities between the Lebanese Hezbollah organization and Iran 
(Byman 2005; Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 1997).  In addition to their shared Shi’ite 
religious identity, the connections between the two actors have been strengthened by 
the regular training of Hezbollah members in Iran, including theological training in 
Shi’ite Hawza and military training with Iranian intelligence agencies and the 
paramilitary Iranian Republican Guard (el Husseini 2010; Norton 2007).  This relationship 
has led to significant coordination between Hezbollah and Iran, with Hezbollah leaders 
frequently requesting advice and guidance from Iranian religious and political 
authorities.   
The closer ideological connections developed from direct interactions, when 
combined with greater opportunities for sponsors to monitor their behaviors, should 
naturally incentivize sponsored terrorist organizations with a physical presence in the 
sponsor state to act in accordance with the interests of their principals.  As a result, 
groups that have bases of operation within the territorial boundaries of their sponsor 
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should have significantly lower levels of observed agency loss, and greater levels of 
observed agent success, than organizations that do not possess this physical proximity.   
Hypothesis 3A:  If an organization has bases of operation within the territorial 
boundaries of the state sponsor, then the level of agency loss will decrease.   
Hypothesis 3B: If an organization has bases of operation within the territorial 
boundaries of the state sponsor, then the level of agent success will increase.  
 
Research Design 
 The central political relationship I examine in this paper is how the behaviors of 
state-sponsored terrorist organizations are influenced by the relationship between the 
organization and its sponsor. Since these behaviors can vary significantly over time, I 
test my hypotheses using an annual cross-sectional time series dataset of global 
sponsorship relationships between the years 1970 and 2013.  This results in a dataset 
where each observation represents a state sponsor and a sponsored terrorist 
organization in an individual year.  
 In the context of this paper, I define state sponsorship as deliberate provision of 
resources and material support to a non-domestic terrorist organization by a 
government institution.  This includes the provision of money, military equipment, 
nonmilitary material resources, training facilities, and safe havens.  My definition 
excludes nonmaterial forms of support, such as diplomatic recognition, and instances of 
passive sponsorship, in which a government allows domestic non-state actors to provide 
material support to foreign terrorist organizations (Byman 2006).   
116 
 
I examine 238 instances of sponsorship in the dataset, which results in a total of 
2,451 organization-state-year observations.  As a number of terrorist organizations in 
this dataset are sponsored by multiple states, the dataset examines 138 distinct terrorist 
organizations and 61 state sponsors of terrorism.31  The data for this analysis was 
obtained from a recently introduced dataset on patterns of state sponsorship of 
terrorism, which offers a more dynamic, broader range of sponsorship observations 
than previous analyses (Berkowitz 2017). 
 
Measuring Agency Loss 
Because of sponsors' incentives to disguise their involvement, outside observers 
will experience a greater degree of uncertainty when assessing the political objectives of 
a state sponsor of terrorism than other types of principals.  While some behaviors can 
be considered agency loss in any instance of sponsorship, others will require credible, 
and potentially unavailable, information regarding a sponsor's preferences.  The 
behaviors that most clearly qualify as agency loss are those that involve the terrorist 
organization acting in an overtly non-political fashion or directly opposing the interests 
of the sponsor.  State sponsors can be assumed to support terrorist organizations in 
order to achieve some political goal, meaning that a group that acts apolitically, such as 
conducting terrorism for purely economic goals or attacking random targets, will be 
acting in opposition to the state's interests.  Similarly, it is unlikely that any state will 
desire a terrorist organization to attack its citizens or members of its own government 
                                                          
31
To provide examples of these relationships, a randomized selection of cases is included in the Appendix. 
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and military.  If these behaviors are observed, it is probable that tensions have 
developed between the two actors.    
 Other organizational behaviors can only be uncertainly categorized as agency 
loss, as there is at least a limited potential for them to serve the interests of a sponsor 
state.  Actions such as shifting the targets of attacks, escalating low-level conflicts, or 
spoiling peace negotiations all have the potential to be in opposition to the interests of 
the sponsor state.  Documentation suggests that Syria initially supported the Abu Nidal 
Organization with the expectation the group would principally attack Israeli soldiers, 
damaging Israel’s military capabilities (Byman 2005).  When the organization chose to 
exclusively target Israeli civilian populations, tensions rose between ANO and the Syrian 
government, eventually leading to sponsorship termination.   
In other circumstances, supporting a terrorist organization that targets civilian 
populations may in fact be the intended goal of the sponsor state, and so this behavior 
would be within the range of acceptable behavior by a group.  Similarly, it is possible for 
a sponsor to deliberately instruct a group to sabotage peace negotiations or escalate a 
pre-existing conflict, complicating whether these behaviors can be conclusively 
identified as agency loss.  Without sufficient knowledge of a sponsor’s preferences, any 
behavior that has at least a minimal potential to politically benefit a state cannot 
uniformly qualify as agency loss.  While there are extensive case studies outlining the 
motivations of some state sponsors, particularly Syria and Iran, many other instances of 
sponsorship have not been the subjects of extensive research, resulting in incomplete 
118 
 
records of empirically verifiable state preferences (Hoffman 2006; Byman and Kreps 
2012).   
Because of this inherent uncertainty, there are a limited number of 
organizational behaviors that can be universally interpreted as shirking.  Fortunately, a 
number of these characteristics, including conducting acts of terrorism against the 
sponsor’s own territory and population, can be empirically obtained through existing 
event databases, such as the Global Terrorism Database (Enders et al. 2011; LaFree and 
Dugan 2007).   
Care must be taken, however, to consider the target of terrorist attacks that 
occur within the sponsor state.  It is reasonable to assume that terrorist attacks aimed 
at the sponsor's government, military, or civilian population will be viewed as agency 
loss, as the group would be directly harming its principal.  However, attacking other 
targets with the sponsor's territory, such as foreign diplomats or anti-government 
insurgent organizations, are more likely to be accepted, and could be among the tasks 
delegated to the organization.  An example of this can be seen in by the targeting 
patterns of the Iranian and Syrian-sponsored Hezbollah organization.  Although 
Hezbollah has reportedly engaged in acts of terrorism within the territory borders of 
these states, the targets of these events suggest that these attacks were not in 
opposition to the sponsor’s preferences, and may have been directed by the states 
themselves.32 
                                                          
32
 These include 1991 grenade attacks against the British, Italian, and Turkish embassies in Tehran, as well 
as numerous attacks against civilian supporters of anti-Syrian rebel groups since 2013 (Lafree and Dugan, 
2007).  
119 
 
Other behaviors that can be assumed to consistently meet the definition of 
agency loss, such as acts of violence that in no way fulfill the group’s political agenda, 
will be significantly more difficult to observe.  An ideal method of measuring this 
behavior would be to assess the percentage of recorded attacks which do not fit within 
the context of a group's stated political agenda, resulting in a measurement of the 
distance between an organization's stated objectives and its behavior.  The agenda of a 
sponsored organization should be a reasonable approximation of the policy goals of 
their sponsor, as sponsorship should only occur if a group is capable of acting on the 
state’s behalf.  Unfortunately, the current academic literature on terrorist behavior does 
not include a published, generalized measurement of the correspondence between 
demands and behaviors.  Although such a measurement is theoretically possible, the 
research necessary to build such a detailed, comprehensive indicator is outside the 
scope of this project. 
It is possible, however, to capture an element of this form of agency loss by 
examining the percentage of terrorist attacks perpetrated by a sponsored organization 
that occur outside of the territorial boundaries of the group’s principal target.  Most 
terrorist organizations will principally or exclusively target a specific nation or group of 
nations, and it is reasonable to assume that states will delegate to specific groups in 
order to influence of the policies of these states.  As the percentage of a group’s attacks 
that are not directed at the target increases, the organization’s attack behaviors will no 
longer correspond to its, or the sponsors, political goals.  Continuing the example of 
Syria and the Abu Nidal Organization, tensions with the ostensibly anti-Israeli group 
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increased as the group conducted attacks in countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, and Italy 
(Byman and Kreps 2010; Rabil 2006).  Although this indicator does not capture 
divergences in specific policy preferences, it does evaluate the degree to which an 
organization has expanded beyond its intended targets, a behavior that should be of 
deep concern to policy-motivated state sponsors.   
 
Dependent Variables 
 Since the control mechanisms states use to reduce agency loss in terrorist 
organizations should also create incentives for sponsored groups to work towards the 
sponsor’s goals, I examine the factors that influence both agency loss and agent success.  
As such, I test my hypotheses using two distinct dependent variables.  Both of these 
variables were developed from event data on terrorist attacks obtained from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), which allowed me to determine the location and time of an 
attack, the identity of the perpetrator group, and the targets of the attack (Lafree and 
Dugan 2007).33 
 The measurement of agency loss I utilize in this paper, the percentage of attacks 
by the sponsored organization occurring outside of the state target of the organization, 
was obtained by dividing the number of GTD events attributable to the group in a given 
year by the number of these events that occurred outside of the target state.  In cases 
where the terrorist organization had multiple targets (such as Hezbollah, which is 
recorded as targeting Israel, Lebanon, and Western Democracies), all were considered 
                                                          
33
 Summary statistics for these and other variables can be found in the Appendix.  
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the target state.  It is possible that some extra-target attacks, such as the assassination 
of the target state’s ambassadors or visiting political leaders, will be detrimental to the 
target state.  Since this type of attack would not be considered agency loss, I did not 
include attacks where the reported target was a representative of a foreign government 
in my percentage of extra-target attacks.   
 Although this variable captures one aspect of agency loss in state-sponsored 
terrorism, I was unable to conclusively examine several alternative indicators of agency 
loss using available statistical data.  The first, transitioning from politically-motivated 
acts of terrorism to purely economic violence, was impossible to conclusively determine 
without detailed information on internal organizational decision making.  Although the 
current iteration of the GTD does include information on whether a monetary ransom 
had been demanded in events where hostages were taken, this does not exclude an 
economic and political demand being issued simultaneously.  This issue of simultaneity 
also complicates reports of terrorist organizations engaging in criminal activities such as 
human trafficking and narcotics production (Sanderson 2004).  While these activities 
may indicate that a terrorist organization is becoming economically independent, 
without information on the true preferences of both terrorist agents and state principal, 
it is entirely possible these behaviors have a political goal that is approved by sponsors.  
 In contrast, GTD event data does provide sufficient information to record 
instances where state-sponsored terrorist organizations committed acts of terrorism in 
the territory of their sponsors.  I utilized this data to construct a series of binary 
variables indicating whether or not a terrorist organization conducted attacks in a 
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sponsor state in a given year.  Unfortunately, the low frequency of these events 
prevents accurate statistical inferences from being drawn from these variables (King and 
Zeng 2001).  Prior to controlling for the type of target, only 56 of 2451 observation 
years, or 2.28 percent, contain instances where a sponsored group engages in terrorism 
in the sponsor state.  This number declines significantly when limiting this variable to 
targets that the sponsor will consistently view as agency loss, such as the sponsor’s 
military or infrastructure.  As a result, I do not examine this form of agency loss in my 
main analysis, although I briefly discuss possible models and results in the robustness 
section of this paper.  
 In contrast to indicators of agency loss, broad measurements of whether 
sponsored groups are behaving in ways desired by the state, or agent success, are 
relatively straightforward to identify and operationalize.  Although the specific policy 
objectives state sponsors will wish to accomplish will vary significantly from case to 
case, it can be reasonably assumed that all sponsors will approve of behaviors that 
weaken the capabilities and resolve of the target state.  Therefore, the measurement of 
agent success I utilize in this paper is the number of terrorist attacks committed by the 
sponsored group in a given year.  Although other characteristics, such as group 
longevity, have been utilized by previous scholars to measure organizational success, 
merely continuing to exist may not represent an adequate return on the investment 
made by the sponsor state (Blomberg et. al 2011; Phillips 2014; Young and Dugan 2014).  
Instead, state sponsors should expect successful agents to regularly engage in acts of 
terrorism, thereby justifying the resources expended to supply them with training and 
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equipment.  As a result, groups that experience greater contractual obligations and 
monitoring by their sponsors should be motivated to conduct greater numbers of 
attacks per year when compared with groups without these behavioral controls.   
 
Independent Variables 
 The variable used for the first hypothesis, the number of additional states 
sponsoring the terrorist organization in the observation year, was constructed from the 
cross-sectional dataset that forms the core of my analysis.  Of the 138 terrorist 
organizations in the dataset, 93 were sponsored by a single state for at least one year, 
accounting for roughly 25% of the overall data.   
 As with previous research examining variations in the types of resources 
provided to violent non-state actors by states, I utilize a binary indicator to measure the 
provision of military support, my second hypothesis (Salehyan et al. 2014).  Although 
contracts are typically explicit regarding the amount and schedule of payment, the illicit 
and secretive nature of terrorism sponsorship means that there is relatively little 
available information on the size, schedule, or specifics of the resources provided by 
state sponsors (Byman and Kreps 2010).  This variable was developed from the same 
dataset on sponsorship patterns discussed earlier, which contains an indicator of the 
types of support provided by state sponsors, divided into unidentified support, political 
support, financial support, base of operations, and military support.  These categories 
are not ordered, and with the exception of unidentified support, multiple forms of 
support could be provided to a single organization.  For the purposes of this analysis, the 
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four other forms of support were collapsed into a single comparison category, non-
military support.   
 This dataset was also utilized to construct the third independent variable, which 
measures the presence of a base of operation in the sponsor state.  This variable 
includes all recorded instance of a group maintaining a physical presence in the state, 
including training camps and safe havens.  In the main analysis, I excluded cases where 
the terrorist organization also possessed a base of operations in the target state.  This is 
due to the fundamentally weaker monitoring capabilities of sponsor states in these 
circumstances, as groups will be able to train and strategize away from the controlling 
influence of the state. I discuss and examine several alternative constructions of this 
variable in the robustness section of this paper.  
 
Control Variables 
 I include several control variables in my analysis.34  The first is a binary variable 
indicating whether the sponsor state and target state in the observation share a 
geographic border.  Geographic adjacency has the potential to reduce the costs 
monitoring and controlling sponsored groups, thereby increasing the likelihood that the 
agent will act in accordance with the state’s objectives.  However, adjacency may also 
increase the risks of coordinating with sponsored groups, as the target state will be 
better able to observe and retaliate against neighboring states.  
                                                          
34
 Model results with only control variables included can be found in the Appendix.  
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 I also control for the number of years that the relationship between the sponsor 
state and terrorist organization has existed, as the length of the relationship may impact 
coordination and conflict between these two actors.  The longest duration of 
sponsorship in my data is 43 years, while the average length of sponsorship is 
approximately 9.5 years. 
 I include an indicator for the estimated number of connections the sponsored 
organization has with other terrorist organizations, or the size of the terrorist group’s 
network.  A large inter-group network has the potential to reduce an organization’s 
dependence on its sponsor, as the group can obtain resources and training from allied 
terrorist organizations (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008).  This variable was obtained from 
the Big Armed Allied and Dangerous Version 2 (BAAD2) group profiles, which offer a 
time-varying measurement of network size for a large number of groups active between 
1998 and 2012 (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015).  Although the resulting variable cannot 
account for all terrorist organizations or years in my dataset, it does offer a 
comparatively broad, dynamic measurement of network size. 
I also include a variable that controls for the breadth of terrorist goals, 
distinguishing between groups with narrow organizational objectives and those with 
broad, expansive goals.  Utilizing an analysis of group-level characteristics by the RAND 
Corporation, I divided terrorist organizations into two distinct categories (Jones and 
Libicki 2008).  The first category includes organizations with narrower goals, such as 
maintaining the status quo, enacting policy changes, or demanding territorial changes, 
whereas broad goals include regime change, the overthrow of multiple regimes, and 
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global societal revolution.  Groups with narrow organizational goals may be viewed as 
easier to control than groups with expansive agendas, as broad goals could result in 
deviations from the sponsor’s own policy agenda.35 
 Since compatibility in beliefs and values has been suggested to play a major role 
in predicting occurrences of sponsorship, I include a binary variable that indicates 
whether the sponsor and terrorist organization possess similar ideologies (Byman and 
Kreps 2010). I constructed this variable by comparing the ideology of the terrorist 
organization, obtained from the TRAC group profiles, and the descriptions of governing 
party ideology in the Political Handbook of the World, an annual encyclopedia of states 
and non-governmental organizations (Banks et al. 1975-2008).36 
 I also include a variable that controls for the number of other terrorist 
organizations the state sponsor has simultaneously provided resources to during as the 
observation year.  As the number of terrorist organizations sponsored by a state 
increases, the resulting experience in managing these actors should result in an 
increased ability to monitor and control their behaviors.  However, the state’s 
monitoring capabilities may also be stretched thin across multiple groups, creating 
opportunities for shirking.      
 Finally, I include a variable indicating whether or not there is evidence that the 
state sponsor had a role in the creation of the terrorist organization.  State-created 
                                                          
35
Roughly 70% of the observation-years in my dataset contain groups with narrow goals, suggesting these 
groups are more commonly sponsored. 
 
36
 The sponsor and terrorist organization were coded as ideological similar if they shared one or more 
ideological identities.  For example, in 1992 the Iranian government was coded as Centrist and Islamic 
(Shi’ite), while Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami-yi Aghanistan, an Afghani terrorist organization sponsored by Iran, 
was coded as Ethnic (Hazara) and Islamic (Shi’ite).   
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groups should naturally be more committed to the goals of the state, and are likely to 
have higher levels of built-in controls, resulting in significantly lower observed levels of 
agency loss.  However, the credibility of reports of state creation vary widely, as there 
are political motivations for some sponsors to hide their involvement in the origination 
of terrorist organizations, as well as for the targets of terrorist campaigns to falsely 
accuse state sponsors of creating, rather than co-opting, groups.  While some cases are 
well documented, such as the Iranian involvement in the creation of Hezbollah or the 
Libyan formation of the Islamic Legion, others, such as the alleged role of Iran in the 
creation of the Guardsmen of Islam or Israel in the formation of the Sons of the South, 
are not (Larémont 2013).  As such, I view this data, gathered from the sources utilized to 
code the initial indicators of sponsorship, as less accurate than other indicators of the 
control states will have on their sponsored groups.   
 
Analysis 
 Since my dependent variables measure different forms of terrorist behavior, I 
utilize two distinct cross-sectional time series regression models to evaluate my 
hypotheses.  As my measurement of agency loss is a decimalized percentage, I 
estimated these models using a random effects linear model, the results of which can be 
seen in Table 8.  My indicator for group success is a numerical count, and so I estimated 
these models using a random effects Poisson model, the results of which can be seen in 
Table 2.  Because my data is naturally clustered, I employed robust standard errors to 
control for within-panel effects.   
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Table 8: Linear Regression Results for Agency Loss 
Variable Name Hypothesis 
1A 
Hypothesis 2A Hypothesis 3A Complete 
Model 
Number of 
Additional 
Sponsors (H1A) 
.010* 
(.006) 
  .011* 
(.006) 
Military Support 
(H2A) 
 -.011 
(.025) 
 -.008 
(.026) 
Base in Sponsor 
State 
(H3A) 
  .097* 
(.054) 
.098* 
(.053) 
Adjacency -.034 
(.021) 
-.034* 
(.020) 
-.035* 
(.021) 
-.032 
(.020) 
Years Sponsored -.002 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.001) 
Group Network 
Size 
-.006 
(.006) 
-.007 
(.006) 
-.007 
(.006) 
-.006 
(.006) 
Broad 
Organizational 
Goals 
-.045* 
(.024) 
-.039* 
(.022) 
-.038* 
(.022) 
-.045* 
(.024) 
Ideological 
Similarity 
.042** 
(.019) 
.041** 
(.020) 
.037* 
(.020) 
.037* 
(.020) 
Number of 
Additional 
Sponsorships 
.002 
(.004) 
.002 
(.004) 
.002 
(.004) 
.002 
(.004) 
State Created .001 
(.037) 
-.011 
(.038) 
-.017 
(.037) 
-.008 
(.038) 
Constant .086** 
(.028) 
.111** 
(.038) 
.101*** 
(.030) 
.086** 
(.036) 
Number of 
Observations 
2,451 2,451 2,451 2,451 
Wald Chi2 13.82 13.42 15.50 16.66 
Dependent Variable is decimalized percentage of non-diplomatic attacks occurring outside of the target 
country or countries. *= significant at .10 level. **= significant at .05 level. ***= significant at .001 level.  
  
The first hypothesis was consistently supported in the models I examined.  
Greater numbers of state sponsors were found to significantly increase the percentage 
of non-diplomatic attacks conducted by the organization outside of the target state, 
while simultaneously decreasing the total number of observed attacks.  These findings 
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support the argument that additional state sponsors will incrementally reduce the 
dependency of a terrorist organization on any one principal, resulting in organizations 
that are no longer constrained by the wishes of a single state.  It should be noted that 
many organizations with large numbers of sponsors, such as the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, were 
participants in long-running, multifaceted intrastate conflicts.  Although foreign support 
for rebel groups has frequently been noted as an important factor in influencing the 
outcomes of civil wars, this finding suggests that a preponderance of sponsors may 
exacerbate these conflicts, as non-state actors who receive support from multiple states 
will have significantly fewer restraints on their behavior (Regan 2010).   
Table 9: Poisson Regression Results for Agent Success 
Variable Name Hypothesis 
1B 
Hypothesis 2B Hypothesis 3B Complete 
Model 
Number of 
Additional 
Sponsors (H1B) 
-.325*** 
(.097) 
  -.325*** 
(.096) 
Military Support 
(H2B) 
 1.242*** 
(.357) 
 1.216*** 
(.300) 
Base in Sponsor 
State 
(H3B) 
  -2.703*** 
(.318) 
-1.872*** 
(.454) 
Adjacency 1.089** 
(.530) 
.191 
(.262) 
.223 
(.197) 
.999* 
(.454) 
Years Sponsored -.002 
(.010) 
.001 
(.010) 
.001 
(.010) 
-.002 
(.010) 
Group Network 
Size 
.188* 
(.096) 
.190* 
(.097) 
.190* 
(.098) 
.187* 
(.096) 
Broad 
Organizational 
Goals 
1.171** 
(.468) 
.618** 
(.278) 
.382 
(.306) 
1.250** 
(.415) 
Ideological 
Similarity 
.294 
(.392) 
.290 
(.378) 
.288 
(.380) 
.298 
(.391) 
Number of .092* .093* .093* .093* 
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Additional 
Sponsorships 
(.052) (.053) (.053) (.052) 
State Created -1.383** 
(.627) 
-.876** 
(.445) 
-.870 
(.547) 
-1.245** 
(.470) 
Constant 2.121*** 
(.377) 
1.120** 
(.422) 
2.138*** 
(.347) 
1.243*** 
(.388) 
Number of 
Observations 
2,451 2,451 2,451 2,451 
Wald Chi2 291.73 580.27 455.03 387.18 
Dependent Variable is total number of annual terrorist attacks. *= significant at .10 level. **= significant 
at .05 level. ***= significant at .001 level.  
 
 Unlike the first hypothesis, the second hypothesis was only partially supported 
by my empirical analysis.  Although external military support increased the number of 
terrorist attacks conducted by a sponsored organization, it did not have a significant 
effect on the percentage of attacks that occurred outside of the target state.  This 
finding suggests that the provision of military resources will increase the capabilities of a 
sponsored terrorist organization, but will do little to control the behaviors of sponsored 
groups.  This should be particularly concerning for counter-terrorism policy makers 
seeking to combat state-sponsored groups, as there appears to be few disincentives for 
states to provide military equipment to terrorist organizations.   
 One caveat to this observation, and an avenue for future research, is the 
generalized nature of my indicator of military support.  Military support to terrorist 
organizations varies widely between cases, ranging from small arms to ballistic missiles 
(Byman 2005; Gasiorowski 2007).  The ability of terrorist organizations to find 
alternative sources of military equipment will naturally vary depending upon the 
availability, complexity, and cost of the equipment being provided.  Consequentially, an 
organization’s dependence on its sponsor will vary, with more difficult to replace 
131 
 
military equipment leading to greater dependence and lower levels of observed agency 
loss.  Unfortunately, the available information on support type does not offer sufficient 
detail to differentiate between distinct forms of military support.  This limitation could 
be addressed in future research, although given the opacity of many sponsorship 
relations, compiling the necessary information on support types may prove difficult.   
 Unfortunately, the theoretical predictions outlined in my third hypothesis were 
consistently contradicted by the results of my empirical analysis.  Instead of enabling a 
sponsor state to monitor and control the behaviors of the sponsored organization, the 
provision of bases of operation exclusively located in the sponsor state resulted in 
increased levels of agency loss and decreased levels of organizational success.  On the 
surface, these results suggest that bases of operation are not being utilized by state 
sponsors as a monitoring tool, or that this method of monitoring is ineffective at 
controlling terrorist behavior, both of which would be in contrast to previous literature 
on the impact and value of safe havens (Bapat 2007; Carter 2012).  
It is also possible that agents located outside of the target state are utilized in 
different ways by their sponsors, resulting in a consistent shift in the patterns of 
observed behavior.  The nature, cost, and complexity of terrorist attacks varies widely, 
and state sponsors may seek to utilize trained agents more selectively than other, less 
monitored, organizations.  These groups may be employed to conduct small numbers of 
sensitive, higher profile attacks, such as assassinations, bombings, and hostage taking.  
Organizations based in the sponsor state may also be better equipped for transnational 
terrorism than other agents, incentivizing sponsors to utilize these organizations for 
132 
 
attacks that are outside of the target state, but still impact the target, such as the 
infamous “Munich Massacre” of Israeli athletes in 1972.37  If this is the case, the 
expected behaviors of these organizations will be the opposite of groups not based in 
the sponsor state, with successful agents conducting smaller numbers of non-target 
attacks.  Although this argument explains the otherwise surprising results of my 
empirical model, it also suggests that there may be other unexpected variations in 
desired group behaviors.  This may complicate counter-terrorism policies designed to 
exploit tensions within sponsorship relations, as generalized measurements may 
indicate disagreement where none, in fact, exists.   
 The empirical results of several control variables strengthen my conclusions 
regarding the role of contractual obligations and monitoring on constraining terrorist 
organization behavior.  Geographic proximity between the target and state sponsor, 
which should improve the sponsor’s monitoring capabilities, was shown to have the 
expected effect on group behavior, decreasing agency loss and increasing level of 
success in a number of empirical models.  The size of a sponsored organizations 
network, a proxy for the resources available to a group outside of sponsorship, was 
similar in effect to the provision of military support, with larger networks increasing the 
level of organizational success while having a non-significant effect on agency loss.  This 
further supports the conclusion that greater resources will improve organizational 
capabilities but will not influence a group’s proclivity towards shirking, although as with 
                                                          
37
 Due to the coding of target type in the GTD, it is difficult to accurately identify the nationality of non-US 
victims of terrorism.     
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military support, it is possible that this result is an artifact of the limited specificity of 
available measurements.  
 An unexpected finding was the consistently negative and significant influence of 
an organization being created by the state on the level of observed attacks.  When 
considered alongside the third hypothesis, this offers further support to the argument 
that closely monitored and controlled groups may be utilized for small numbers of 
complex, selective acts of terrorism, rather than expansive campaigns.38 
 
Marginal Effects 
 In order to assess the substantive effects of my empirical models on the 
predicted level of agency loss and agent success, I calculated mean marginal effects for 
my variables.  Although the results of these calculations, seen in Figures 6 and 7 below, 
are largely congruous with the reported coefficients, a number of marginal effects 
offered additional insights into the behaviors of sponsored groups.   
 Both increasing number of additional sponsors and being based exclusively in the 
sponsor state increased the predicted level of agency loss and decreased the predicted 
level of agent success.  However, in both models, the marginal effect of being based in 
the sponsor state was significantly greater than the effect of a single-state increase in 
the number of additional sponsors.  Although the maximum cumulative effect of 
additional sponsors was similar to the effect of bases in the sponsor state, the average 
number of sponsors, 1.8, was significantly lower than the maximum of 8.  This suggests 
                                                          
38
 The similar effect of these variables is strengthened when considering the higher than average 
correlation between the two (.202), as shown in the Appendix.  
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that the effect of multiple sponsors on agent behavior may be noticeable only in a small 
subset of cases.  Unfortunately, recent trends in foreign support for terrorist 
organizations in countries such as Syria and Yemen suggest that cases of multiple 
sponsorship may become more common in the near future, likely contributing to 
greater unpredictability in the behaviors of sponsored groups.   
Figure 6: Average Marginal Effects – Agency Loss 
 
 It is also notable that the largest reduction in predicted levels of agency loss 
occurred in cases where sponsored organizations possessed broad goals and objectives, 
such as social revolutions or regime change.  This effect, when paired with a similar 
increase in predicted level of organizational success, suggests that groups with broad 
goals will be more effective agents than those with narrower objectives, such as 
territorial or policy change.  A possible explanation for this is that groups with narrow 
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objectives are more likely to achieve a compromise with their opponents than terrorist 
organizations with broader, zero-sum goals, therefore reducing their long-term 
dependence on foreign actors (Abrahms 2012; Kydd and Walter 2006).  If this is the 
case, counter-terrorism policy makers may be able to employ political tools, such as 
peace negotiations, to deliberately weaken the relationship between a state sponsor 
and an organization with narrow goals. 
Figure 7: Average Marginal Effects – Agent Success 
 
Robustness 
 I conducted several tests of the robustness of my models, the results of which 
can be found in the Appendix.  I first excluded single-year panels from my analysis, to 
control for the potential differences between short-lived terrorist organizations or 
sponsorship relationships and those of longer duration.  After removing these 43 panels, 
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there was no significant change in the empirical results when compared to the main 
analysis.   
 I also examined several alternative measurements of my agency loss dependent 
variable.  These included two alternative specifications of my existing variable, the 
percentage of non-diplomatic terrorist attacks committed by the sponsored 
organization that were conducted outside of the target state.  Since state sponsors 
could also benefit from extra-target terrorist attacks if they are directed against states 
that are hostile to the sponsor, I tested a variable that excluded attacks against the 
sponsor’s strategic rivals, rather than excluded attacks against diplomatic targets 
(Colaresi et al. 2007).  This model, as well as another that excluded both rivals and 
diplomatic targets, offered no significant empirical advantage over the main analysis.   
 I also evaluated the efficacy of replacing my existing measurement of agency loss 
with a binary indicator signifying whether a sponsored terrorist organization conducted 
acts of terrorism within the territorial boundaries of its sponsor.  As discussed earlier in 
this paper, observations of this behavior were extremely rare in my dataset, and so I 
utilized both a cross-sectional time series logistic regression model and a rare events 
logistic regression model (King and Zeng 2001).  Unfortunately, the low number of 
positive observations resulted in both models omitting variables, reporting concavity 
issues, and producing high standard errors.  With the exception of the control variables 
for geographic adjacency and the number of other terrorist organizations the state 
sponsor is supporting, none of the variables in these models were statistically 
distinguishable from zero.  
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 I also examined several alternative measurements for my independent variables.  
These included a binary variable indicating whether or not a terrorist organization 
possessed more than one sponsor, replacing the more dynamic variable used to assess 
Hypothesis 1.  This variable did not have a significant effect on group behaviors, 
suggesting that the influence of multiple sponsors varies significantly between different 
numbers of additional sponsors.  I also examined two alternative measurements of my 
third hypothesis, a variable that examined cases where sponsored organizations had 
bases in both the sponsor and target states, and another examining all cases in which a 
sponsor provided the group with a base of operations.  The results of these variables 
were either non-significant or weaker in effect than the variable used in the main 
analysis, which suggests there is an empirical value in examining instances where 
sponsors are the exclusive provider of bases of operation.   
 Finally, I examined several alternative specifications of control variables in my 
analysis.  These included a measurement of the total number of years that a group had 
been active, which replaced the number of years a group had been sponsored, as the 
overall longevity of an organization might play a more significant role in encouraging 
agency loss than the length of the sponsorship relationship.  I also included an 
independently generated alternative to the existing network size variable I utilized in 
the main analysis (Horowitz 2010).  In both cases, the results were not significantly 
different from the control variables used in the main analysis.   
 
Conclusion 
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 The relationship a sponsored terrorist organization has with its sponsor has the 
potential to dramatically influence the group’s behaviors.  The results of my analysis 
suggest that state sponsors will seek to monitor and control sponsored groups in ways 
reminiscent of more conventional principal-agent relationships.  As with all principal-
agent relationships, state sponsorship balances the potential benefits of delegating 
goals to another actor with the inherent risks of agency loss and shirking.  These 
concerns will be exacerbated by the potentially hazardous ramifications of sponsoring 
terrorism, along with the violent and extreme nature of terrorist organizations.   
 As my analysis is the first large-N, time-varying study of agency loss and agent 
success in the context of terrorism sponsorship, there are numerous avenues for future 
investigation on the relationships between states and sponsored groups.  There is a 
fundamental difficulty in accurately and conclusively assessing sponsorship patterns and 
the behaviors of terrorist organizations.  As a result, the data I utilized in this study, 
while a valuable resource for future research, is ultimately a stepping stone in a longer 
path of empirically assessing state sponsorship.  
 One difficult, but potentially valuable, avenue of empirical research would be the 
development of more nuanced indicators of the support provided to terrorist 
organizations.  Although my data examines broad patterns of support, such as whether 
an organization received financial or military resources, it does not measure variations 
within specific support types, such as dollar amounts or types of military resources.  
Future research using such indicators would be necessary to address several lingering 
theoretical puzzles raised by my analysis, such as why military support did not decrease 
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the reported level of agency loss and the counter-intuitive impact of bases of operation 
in the sponsor state.  Although constructing more precise indicators of support type 
would enable scholars to address these questions, the opacity of sponsorship 
relationships may create insurmountable barriers to acquiring the necessary 
information.   
 Researchers may also wish to utilize principal-agent models and large-N 
empirical methodologies to examine other aspects of state-sponsored terrorism, such as 
the termination of the sponsorship relationship and the nature of the post-sponsorship 
relationship.  State sponsors who are dissatisfied with the performance of their agents 
may choose to abandon sponsorship, while terrorist organizations may elect to decline 
future support due to onerous demands or ideological shifts.  The post-sponsorship 
relationship will be complex and potentially hostile, with a clear potential for violence 
between the two actors, such as 1991 conflict between India and the LTTE, a former 
sponsored group, which culminated in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi (Byman and 
Kreps 2010).  
 Other aspects of the relationship between state sponsors and terrorist 
organizations would be more appropriately examined using alternative empirical 
techniques, such as in-depth case study analysis.  These include several indicators of 
agency loss that I found were unable to be adequately assessed using large-N data, such 
as a group’s involvement in criminal enterprises and cases where groups conducted 
terrorist attacks within the sponsor state.  Although case study analyses of terrorist 
organizations targeting their sponsors have been conducted in the past, the data I 
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collected for this analysis uncovered a number of previously unexplored occurrences of 
this behavior, such as the Red Army Faction and the South Sudan Liberation Army. 
 The results of my analysis offer several valuable findings for policymakers 
seeking to weaken or eliminate state-sponsored terrorist organizations.  The principal-
agent model fundamentally assumes that no relationship between a state principal and 
terrorist agent will be perfectly harmonious, and as a result, sponsors will consistently 
seek to control their agent’s behaviors.  My findings are consistent with this argument, 
as variations in sponsorship exclusivity, support type, and monitoring capabilities have 
significant, and predictable, effects on agent behaviors.  When combined with careful 
observation of sponsored groups, awareness of these patterns may be valuable for 
policymakers, allowing them to target the weak links binding terrorism sponsors and 
their agents.   
 Unfortunately, state sponsors are also able to weigh the costs and benefits of 
different control mechanisms, and terrorism sponsorship will likely continue to be a 
danger to international security.  Despite international condemnation against prominent 
state sponsors like Syria, and well-known instances of tensions and conflict within 
sponsorship relationships, many nations continue to rely on terrorism sponsorship as a 
tool of foreign policy.  Reducing state sponsorship of terrorism is an important part of 
the broader effort to solve the threat of terrorist violence, as terrorist organizations 
would lose an invaluable source of funding and equipment.  Unfortunately, lowering 
sponsorship to manageable levels will require considerable international cooperation, 
and is likely to be an arduous and prolonged struggle.   
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Conclusion 
 
 State sponsorship is one of the most effective ways for terrorist organizations to 
gain the resources necessary to carry out deadly acts of political violence, and as such, it 
poses a significant threat to international security.  Understanding why states choose to 
engage in this behavior is essential to placing sponsorship within the broader context of 
coercive foreign policy and to develop policy tools that will reduce its prevalence.  
Similarly, examining which terrorist organizations receive sponsorship, and how this 
funding influences their behaviors, are necessary to understanding, and eventually 
countering, groups that rely upon sponsorship.  To develop and assess concrete answers 
to these and related questions, scholars and policymakers must be able to examine 
broad trends in sponsorship patterns and behaviors.   
 In this dissertation, I examined three distinct but interconnected questions on 
state sponsorship of terrorism, using principal-agent analysis as my underlying 
theoretical framework.  I also developed a new dataset on state sponsorship behaviors 
that will enable scholars to examine dynamic patterns of sponsorship across a wider 
range of cases, and with greater detail, than pre-existing measurements.  Although the 
principal-agent framework has been used by other scholars to examine external support 
of terrorist organizations, my dissertation both theoretically and empirically improves 
upon the state of this literature (Bapat 2012; Byman and Kreps 2010).   
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In my first paper, I examined the decision making process through which states 
choose or do not choose to engage in sponsorship.39  My results suggest that states are 
strategically motivated to engage in sponsorship, delegating to terrorists in situations 
where the potential benefits are high, such as weakening a militarily stronger rival, and 
the potential reputational and political costs are low.  My second paper builds upon the 
first by examining both the initial decision to engage the sponsorship and the 
subsequent process by which sponsors select terrorist agents.  The results of this paper, 
which was regionally focused on sponsorship in the Middle East, suggest that the 
strategic motivations of state sponsors continue through the selection process, as states 
are more likely to sponsor groups with characteristics that signal greater probabilities of 
organizational success and lower risks of disobedience.  The desire by sponsors to 
control the actions of sponsored groups is the principal focus of my third paper, which 
examined the behaviors of sponsored groups.  The results of this analysis suggest that 
variations in the relationship between a state sponsor and terrorist group, such as 
sponsorship exclusivity and support type, significantly influence the observation of both 
agent success and agency loss.  
 When considered together, the three papers that constitute my dissertation 
point towards a number of intriguing conclusions about state sponsorship of terrorism.  
The strongest, and perhaps most important, theoretical conclusion that can be drawn 
from my research is that terrorism sponsorship appears to be a strategic decision that is 
carefully and deliberately made by states.  Instead of impulsively providing 
                                                          
39
 This section of my dissertation has been recently published in International Interactions.   
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indiscriminate resources to multiple terrorist organizations targeting a wide variety of 
states, my findings consistently suggest that states are calculated in their sponsorship 
decisions.  Sponsors appear to be as motivated by the potential risks of sponsorship, 
ranging from international disapproval to agency loss, as they are by the potential 
benefits, such as securing policy concessions.   
 As a result, sponsorship behaviors take on clear and observable patterns, which 
are valuable for both the scholastic study of sponsorship as a behavior and policies 
aimed at combating terrorism sponsorship.  Much of the pre-existing literature on 
terrorism sponsorship has been focused on a small number of well-known cases, such as 
Libyan sponsorship under Qaddafi, Iranian and Syrian support for Hezbollah, and 
Pakistani support for Kashmiri separatist groups (Byman 2005; el-Hokayem 2007).  
However, my investigations of sponsorship highlight the fact that this behavior is 
widespread throughout the international system, with over 50 nations having pursued 
sponsorship since 1970.  This suggests that there is considerable value in utilizing large-
N methodologies to investigate sponsorship, as there are a sizable number of 
underexplored sponsorship observations.  In achieve this goal, throughout my 
dissertation I have developed or fine-tuned general definitions for sponsorship 
phenomena, as well as theoretically consistent expectations about sponsorship.  These 
theoretical instruments were used to constructing testable hypotheses about 
sponsorship patterns, which, when employed alongside the appropriate empirical tools, 
allowed connections to be made across a wide range of sponsorship cases.    
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 In the empirical sections of my dissertation, I emphasized both the development 
of accurate and replicable data on sponsorship patterns and the utilization of 
appropriate empirical tools to assess my theoretical claims.  The difficulties of 
conducting accurate statistical investigations of terrorist organizations have long been 
discussed in the academic discourse on the subject (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Enders 
et al. 2011; Lafree and Dugan 2007).  Although the data that I gathered and analyzed 
during my dissertation has the same vulnerabilities as other terrorism data, I have taken 
steps to ensure the reliability and replicability of my dataset.  These include the use of 
four independent data sources to construct my principal indicator of sponsorship and 
secondary variables, which allows me to examine the inter-source reliability of my data.  
I also plan to release a digital version of my data in the months following the completion 
of my dissertation, accompanied by a document that discusses my data sources and 
coding system.  This resource will allow other scholars to freely assess the reliability of 
my analyses, as well as use my dataset for future research projects.  When combined 
with the sophisticated empirical techniques I utilized in my dissertation, including 
predictive heuristics, two-stage models, and cross-sectional time series regressions, I 
believe that my analyses of sponsorship behaviors represent a considerable 
advancement in statistical examinations of terrorism sponsorship, as well as a 
benchmark for future studies to reach and hopefully surpass.   
 Future scholarship on state sponsorship of terrorism is a necessity in order to 
deepen our understanding of sponsorship, both as a foreign policy instrument for states 
and a source of funding for terrorist organizations.  While this dissertation examines 
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several important questions regarding state sponsorship, there are a number of 
lingering questions that I was unable to address in the format of the dissertation, as well 
as new avenues for research that have been raised by my results.  One of the most 
promising areas of research available to future scholars is the analysis of sponsorship 
termination.  This topic is a natural extension of my dissertation, as the majority of 
sponsorship relationships in my analysis eventually ended.  It is reasonable to assume 
that many of the phenomena I examined, from the goals of sponsorship to the behavior 
of sponsored groups, may play a role in the cessation of sponsorship.  The dynamic, 
time-varying nature of the data I developed for this dissertation is also well suited to 
analyzing termination.   
 One of the most intriguing findings in my first paper was that being previously 
targeted by a state sponsor played a significant role in motivating states to respond via 
sponsorship.  However, I was unable to conclusively determine whether reciprocal 
sponsors were motivated by domestic or international considerations.  Perhaps more 
than any other form of sponsorship, reciprocal sponsorship feeds into a costly and 
dangerous cycle of conflict, hostilities, and reprisals between states in the international 
system.  As a result, fully exploring the causal mechanisms behind this retaliatory 
behavior may prove to be an important step towards reducing the death and violence 
caused by sponsorship.   
Another possible expansion would be an examination of the group selection 
process for state sponsors outside of the Middle East region.  Due to time constraints 
and the empirical complexities of developing a two-stage data structure, I chose to limit 
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my analysis of selection incentives to the geographic region with the greater number of 
cases of sponsorship.  However, this does not mean that sponsorship patterns within 
the Middle East perfectly resemble those outside it, or that studying selection incentive 
in other regions where sponsorship is common, such as Africa or East Asia, would be 
unprofitable.  State sponsorship is a global phenomenon, and understanding how it 
functions across a range of environments and situations will be crucial to successfully 
reducing its prevalence.   
This consideration also contributes to an empirically-driven recommendation for 
future research, namely the continued use of small-N case studies to analyze certain 
sponsorship phenomenon.  Although large-N studies such as those in my dissertation 
are invaluable for examining broad trends in state sponsorship, there are a number of 
potential areas of research where this methodology would be unfeasible or 
inappropriate.  Intra-governmental debates over the merits of engaging in sponsorship, 
for example, would offer considerable insight into the political and bureaucratic 
influences on sponsorship decisions, but would require access to confidential 
documents or individual-level interviews.  In other cases, such as an examination of 
instances in which a sponsored organization conducts acts of terrorism within a sponsor 
state, the number of positive observations of this behavior is sufficiently low that 
individual analyses would offer significantly greater explanatory power than broad 
studies.   
Finally, future scholars can extend the breadth of the analyses I conducted in this 
dissertation by examining trends in external support across all types of violent non-state 
147 
 
actors.  Due to the importance of terrorism as both as a domestic and international 
security issue, as well as empirical constraints in data collection, I limited my analysis to 
violent actors who adopted terrorism as a coercive strategy.  However, terrorist 
organizations are not the only type of non-state actor that receives material resources 
from foreign states, and previous studies have also utilized the principal-agent model 
and large-N empirical methodologies to examine state support of insurgent groups 
(Regan 2002; Salehyan 2010; Salehyan et al. 2014).  A research project that examined 
state support across all violent non-state actors, while empirically daunting, would allow 
scholars to explore otherwise unanswerable questions regarding state delegation to 
non-state actors, such as whether states choose to exclusively support one type of actor 
and whether different types of violent agents behave in fundamentally different ways.    
Although the principal focus of my dissertation is improving the academic 
understanding of state sponsorship of terrorism, my findings may also be useful for 
state actors seeking to counter sponsored organizations.  Therefore, there are several 
broad observations regarding my investigations of sponsorship that I believe may be of 
interest to policy makers. 
The first is to carefully consider the objectives and interests of the sponsor state.  
The results of my analyses suggest that sponsors not only have specific goals they wish 
to achieve through sponsorship, but these objectives will also influence the type of 
support they provide and the actions they intend the groups to perform.  A state 
sponsor seeking to weaken the resolve of a civilian population will provide different 
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types of support, and expect different types of violence, than a sponsor that intends for 
the group to damage the target state’s military apparatus.    
A second observation is that counter-terrorism policy makers should be mindful 
that state sponsorship is a more common foreign policy strategy than is typically 
assumed, and a wide variety of terrorist organizations may receive state resources.  
Although efforts to combat state sponsorship, such as U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism 
list, are typically targeted at “rogue states” such as Iran or North Korea, many nations, 
including the United States and other western democracies, have supported or continue 
to support groups that engage in terrorism.  The beneficiaries of support will vary widely 
in ideology and group composition.  Communist, Islamist, right-wing, and ethnic-
nationalist organizations may all receive resources from states, and sponsored groups 
may be small, informal organizations that conduct a limited number of attacks or large 
hierarchical groups that are simultaneously engaged in civil conflict.  Although certain 
strategic or organizational characteristics may be more common among sponsored 
groups, it is erroneous, and potentially dangerous, to assume that all state-sponsored 
terrorist organizations will be identical.       
Fortunately, state-sponsored terrorist organizations do possess a common trait, 
the involvement of a state actor in group decision making, which has the potential to 
provide otherwise unavailable counter-terrorism options.  Unlike terrorist organizations, 
all states possess institutions that are integrated into the global economic and political 
system.  This enables policymakers to employ counter-terrorism options that target the 
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clear interests of a state, such as diplomatic pressure or economic sanctions, rather than 
the more nebulous and difficult to determine interests of a terrorist organization. 
In cases where the relationship between a state and organization are weak, these 
disruptions may be sufficient to create tensions between the two actors, leading to 
agency loss or sponsorship termination.  In instances where the sponsor dominates the 
group, external pressure may reduce the threat posed by the organization, as the 
sponsor would prefer to restrain the organization in order to avoid international costs.    
 State sponsorship of terrorist organizations represents a clear threat to 
international security, as the resources provided by states to these groups will likely 
result in larger numbers of more sophisticated and violent terrorist attacks.  Unlike 
other forms of terrorist financing, sponsorship offers terrorist organizations access to 
the formidable resources states possess, but requires them to surrender part of their 
independence to the policy interests of another actor.  In this dissertation, I have 
presented three papers that pose foundational questions on state sponsorship, 
developed consistent theoretical models that explain the behaviors of state sponsors 
and sponsored groups, and presented a new dataset that can be used to explore these 
and other topics related to sponsorship.  It is my intention that these findings will serve 
both scholars who seek to understand sponsorship and other forms of terrorist 
financing, as well as policymakers who use academic research to create more effective 
counter-terrorism policies.  Although state sponsorship is a formidable problem for 
international security, I believe that the danger it poses can be managed with sufficient 
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understanding and coordination, resulting in greater levels of peace and security for 
people throughout the world.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Paper 1: Delegating Terror: Principal-Agent Based Decision Making in State 
Sponsorship of Terrorism 
 
Appendix Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Variable Name 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum  
 
Maximum 
Number of 
Observations 
Unanimous 
Sponsorship Initiation 
.000140
4 
.0118468 0 1 1,132,742 
Non-Unanimous 
Sponsorship Initiation 
.000073
3 
.0085597 0 1 1,132,742 
Total Sponsorship 
Initiation 
.000211
9 
.0145544 0 1 1,132,742 
Strategic Rivalry .003128
7 
.0558472 0 1 1,132,742 
Difference in 
Capabilities  
0 .0263491 -.198578 .198578 1,132,742 
Unanimous Target of  
Sponsorshipt-1 
.000894
6 
.0298969 0 1 1,131,199 
Non-unanimous 
Target of 
Sponsorshipt-1 
.000561 .0236782 0 1 1,131,964 
Total Target of  
Sponsorshipt-1 
.001369
8 
.0369855 0 1 1,130,823 
Executive Constraints 4.19429
6 
2.334311 1 7 924,377 
Cold War .463574
2 
.4986716 0 1 1,132,742 
N. America/ W. 
Europe 
.107454
3 
.3096901 0 1 1,132,742 
Latin America .182578
2 
.3863205 0 1 1,132,742 
Africa .262275
1 
.4398716 0 1 1,132,742 
Middle East .211989
1 
.4087174 0 1 1,132,742 
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E. Europe/ Central 
Asia 
.143353 .3504327 0 1 1,132,742 
Current War 
Involvement 
.018911
6 
.1362131 0 1 1,132,742 
Unanimous Pre-
existing Sponsorship 
.177248
7 
.3818792 0 1 1,132,742 
Non-Unanimous Pre-
existing Sponsorship 
.138623
8 
.3455537 0 1 1,132,742 
Total Pre-existing 
Sponsorship 
.240397
2 
.4273249 0 1 1,132,742 
Unanimous Years 
Since Last 
Sponsorship 
19.4257
8 
11.1246 1 39 1,132,742 
Non-Unanimous 
Years Since Last 
Sponsorship 
19.4065
3 
11.12027 1 39 1,132,742 
Total Years Since Last 
Sponsorship 
19.3815
2 
11.12122 1 39 1,132,742 
 
Appendix Table 2 Random Sample of Sponsored Terrorist Organizations 
 
Group Name  Sponsor 
States 
Target State Starting Year Identification 
Abu Nidal 
Organization 
Syria; Libya;  
Iraq 
Israel 1976 Unanimous 
Zimbabwe African 
Nationalist Union 
(ZANU) 
USSR; Cuba; 
China 
Rhodesia 
 
1978 Unanimous 
Supreme Council for 
Islamic Revolution in 
Iraq (SCIRI) 
Iran Iraq 1992 Unanimous 
People's Liberation 
Army (India) 
Bangladesh; 
Pakistan 
India 1984 Non-
Unanimous 
Dev Sol Syria; Greece 
 
Turkey 1991 Unanimous 
Shanti Bahini - Peace 
Force 
India 
 
Bangladesh 1986 Unanimous 
Jundallah United States 
 
Iran 2006 Non-
Unanimous 
Turkish Islamic Jihad Iran 
 
Turkey 1991 Unanimous 
Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA) 
Sudan Uganda 1994 Unanimous 
Dnestr Republic Russia Moldova 1992 Unanimous 
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Separatists  
Mozambique National 
Resistance Movement 
Rhodesia; 
South Africa; 
Kenya 
Mozambique 
 
1979 Unanimous 
Revolutionary 
Organization of 
Socialist Muslims 
Syria; Libya;  
Iraq 
United 
Kingdom 
1984 Unanimous 
Moro National 
Liberation Front 
(MNLF) 
Libya; 
Malaysia; Iran 
Philippines 
 
1975 Unanimous 
African National 
Congress (South 
Africa) 
USSR South Africa 1981 Unanimous 
Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM) 
Libya; Iran  
 
Indonesia 
 
1977 Non-
Unanimous 
 
Appendix Table 3 Predicted Probabilities for Hypothesis 1 
 
 Rivalry = 1  
Difference in 
Capabilities = 
.19  
Rivalry = 1 
Difference in 
Capabilities = -.19 
 
 
Change 
Upper 
Bounds/Lower 
Bounds 
Likelihood  of 
Sponsorship 
.02 .0012 .0187 0.0015/ 
-0.0390 
 
Appendix Table 4 Models without Independent Variables 
 
Variable Name Unanimous Non-unanimous Total 
Cold War 
 
-.70** 
(.29) 
-.04 
(.35) 
-.69*** 
(.20) 
N. America/ W. 
Europe 
-.23 
(.44) 
-.78 
(.49) 
-.38** 
(.33) 
Latin America -.24 
(.34) 
 -.91** 
(.43) 
-.49* 
(.27) 
Africa 
 
.01 
(.30) 
-.60* 
(.33) 
-.36 
(.23) 
Middle East 
 
-.94*** 
(.27) 
.31 
(.31) 
-.56** 
(.21) 
E. Europe/ Central 
Asia 
-.81* 
(.45) 
-1.01* 
(.53) 
-.85** 
(.34) 
Current War 
Involvement 
1.13*** 
(.23) 
.21 
(.48) 
.79*** 
(.20) 
Pre-existing 
Sponsorship 
2.23*** 
(.23) 
2.17*** 
(.31) 
2.57*** 
(.21) 
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Years Since Last 
Sponsorship 
-.12*** 
(.01) 
-.07*** 
(.02) 
-.13*** 
(.01) 
Constant -7.68*** 
(.37) 
-8.61*** 
(.48) 
-7.19*** 
(.26) 
Number of 
Observations 
1,132,742 1,132,742 1,132,742 
Wald Chi-squared 398.97 175.47 565.77 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as coefficients, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= 
significant at .001 level  
 
Appendix Table 5 Models with Politically Relevant Observations Only 
 
Variable Name Unanimous  
Cases 
Non-Unanimous 
Cases 
All  
Cases 
Strategic Rivalry 2.15*** 
(.373) 
2.65*** 
(.58) 
2.20*** 
(.31) 
Difference in Capabilities -7.53** 
(2.38) 
.60 
(2.99) 
-2.89 
(1.91) 
Rivalry*Difference 21.48*** 
(6.44) 
12.92* 
(7.31) 
16.62** 
(5.44) 
Targetedt-1 -.35 
(.82) 
1.62** 
(.82) 
-.04 
(.56) 
Executive Constraints .09 
(.08) 
.06 
(.12) 
.09 
(.07) 
Cold War -.01 
(.49) 
.02 
(.62) 
-.01 
(.31) 
N. America/ W. Europe -1.55** 
(.56) 
-1.04 
(.65) 
-1.10** 
(.43) 
Latin America -.69 
(.76) 
Omitted -1.51** 
(.69) 
Africa .27 
(.60) 
-.67 
(.68) 
-.04 
(.43) 
Middle East 1.53** 
(.58) 
-.40 
(.63) 
.69 
(.42) 
E. Europe/ Central Asia -.59 
(.82) 
-1.00 
(.87) 
-.68 
(.57) 
Current War Involvement .30 
(.44) 
-.82 
(1.03) 
-.11 
(.41) 
Pre-existing Sponsorship .59** 
(.27) 
1.03** 
(.48) 
1.38*** 
(.29) 
Years Since Last Sponsorship -.06** 
(.02) 
-.06** 
(.03) 
-.08*** 
(.01) 
Constant -7.12*** -7.17*** -6.66*** 
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(.92) (1.05) (.56) 
Number of Observations 
 
80,368 73,252 80,311 
Wald Chi-squared 479.15 
 
174.10 481.86 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship. Only dyads that are contiguous or 
contain a great power are included.  Results are listed as coefficients, with robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= significant at .001 level 
 
Appendix Table 6 Alternative Measurements for Hypothesis 1  
 
Variable Name Unanimous Non-Unanimous Total 
Enduring Rivalry 3.58*** 
(.25) 
3.73*** 
(.30) 
3.30*** 
(.20) 
Difference in Capabilities -16.45*** 
(2.49) 
1.25 
(6.78) 
-9.56*** 
(2.73) 
Rivalry*Difference 19.61*** 
(2.98) 
3.90 
(7.00) 
14.16*** 
(2.98) 
Cold War 
 
-.67** 
(.27) 
.06 
(.33) 
-.60** 
(.19) 
N. America/ W. Europe -.60 
(.44) 
-.65 
(.48) 
-.41 
(.32) 
Latin America .37 
(.37) 
-.75* 
(.44) 
-.09 
(.28) 
Africa 
 
.65** 
(.33) 
-.40 
(.35) 
.14 
(.24) 
Middle East 
 
1.47*** 
(.30) 
.36 
(.31) 
.83*** 
(.22) 
E. Europe/ Central Asia -.91** 
(.40) 
-.84 
(.52) 
-.83** 
(.33) 
Current War Involvement .98*** 
(.25) 
.18 
(.48) 
.67** 
(.21) 
Pre-existing Sponsorship 1.55*** 
(.23) 
1.89*** 
(.30) 
2.06*** 
(.21) 
Years Since Last 
Sponsorship 
-.10*** 
(.01) 
-.06** 
(.02) 
-.11*** 
(.01) 
Constant -8.29*** 
(.38) 
-8.98*** 
(.47) 
-7.67*** 
(.26) 
Number of Observations 1,132,742 1,132,742 1,132,742 
Wald Chi-squared 1253.85 551.28 1444.83 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as coefficients, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= 
significant at .001 level 
 
Appendix Table 7 Alternative Measurements for Hypothesis 3 (Government Type) 
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 Hypothesis 3 (Democracy Score) Hypothesis 3 (Broad Govt. Type) 
Variable Name Unanimou
s 
Non-
unanimou
s 
Total Unanimous Non-
Unanimous 
Total 
Institutionalize
d Democracy 
-.07** 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.04) 
-.04* 
(.03) 
   
Authoritarian    .43 
(.28) 
-.11 
(.32) 
.23 
(.22) 
Semi-
Democratic 
   -.19 
(.46) 
.01 
(.48) 
-.12 
(.34) 
Cold War 
 
-1.25*** 
(.34) 
.45 
(.41) 
-1.06*** 
(.23) 
1.26*** 
(.34) 
.43 
(.41) 
1.06*** 
(.23) 
N. America/ W. 
Europe 
-.001 
(.51) 
-.91 
(.56) 
-.27 
(.38) 
-.26 
(.51) 
-.99* 
(.55) 
-.45 
(.37) 
Latin America -.37 
(.34) 
-.95** 
(.43) 
-.59** 
(.27) 
-.40 
(.34) 
-.95** 
(.43) 
-.61** 
(.27) 
Africa 
 
-.63** 
(.31) 
-.90** 
(.36) 
-.87*** 
(.26) 
-.62** 
(.231) 
-.86** 
(.36) 
-.85*** 
(.26) 
Middle East 
 
-.50* 
(.27) 
-.13 
(.29) 
.27** 
(.20) 
.50* 
(.27) 
-.17 
(.29) 
.29 
(.20) 
E. Europe/ 
Central Asia 
-2.40*** 
(.74) 
-1.88** 
(.73) 
-2.01*** 
(.52) 
-2.45*** 
(.75) 
-1.89** 
(.73) 
-2.04*** 
(.52) 
Current War 
Involvement 
1.01*** 
(.25) 
.35 
(.47) 
.70*** 
(.21) 
1.01*** 
(.25) 
.36 
(.47) 
.70*** 
(.22) 
Pre-existing 
Sponsorship 
2.07*** 
(.21) 
2.03*** 
(.28) 
2.33*** 
(.19) 
2.08*** 
(.21) 
2.04*** 
(.28) 
2.33*** 
(.19) 
Years Since 
Last 
Sponsorship 
-.13*** 
(.02) 
-.09*** 
(.02) 
-.14*** 
(.01) 
-.14*** 
(.02) 
-.09*** 
(.02) 
-.14*** 
(.01) 
Constant -6.41*** 
(.50) 
-7.70*** 
(.61) 
-6.21*** 
(.35) 
-6.83*** 
(.56) 
-7.67*** 
(.62) 
-6.45*** 
(.38) 
Number of 
Observations 
924,377 924,377 924,377 924,377 924,377 924,377 
Wald Chi-
squared 
345.82 142.56 498.38 344.44 151.95 501.54 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as coefficients, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= 
significant at .001 level  
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Appendix Table 8 Alternative Measurements for Hypothesis 3 (Alternative Executive 
Constraints) 
 
 Executive Constraints (Three-Point 
Scale) 
Executive Constraints (POLCON) 
Variable Name Unanimou
s  
 
Non-
Unanimous 
All  
 
Unanimou
s  
 
Non-
Unanimou
s 
All  
Cases 
Executive 
Constraints  
(Three-Point Scale) 
-.36** 
(.14) 
-.16 
(.18) 
-.29** 
(.12) 
   
Executive 
Constraints 
(POLCON) 
   -1.85** 
(.63) 
-.83 
(.70) 
-1.32** 
(.49) 
Cold War -1.24*** 
(.35) 
49 
(.42) 
-1.09*** 
(.23) 
-1.15*** 
(.32) 
-.49 
(.39) 
-1.08*** 
(.37) 
N. America/ W. 
Europe 
-.13 
(.48) 
-78 
(.54) 
-.27 
(.36) 
.10 
(.34) 
-.65 
(.56) 
-.18 
(.27) 
Latin America 
 
-.46 
(.34) 
-.96** 
(.43) 
-.64** 
(.26) 
-.31 
(.34) 
-.90** 
(.44) 
-.59** 
(.27) 
Africa 
 
-.62** 
(.31) 
-.95** 
(.36) 
-.85*** 
(.25) 
-.53* 
(.30) 
-.92** 
(.36) 
-.87*** 
(.26) 
Middle East 
 
.44 
(.27) 
.07 
(.29) 
.21 
(.20) 
.54** 
(.26) 
.08 
(.30) 
.21 
(.20) 
E. Europe/ Central 
Asia 
-2.42*** 
(.75) 
-1.86** 
(.73) 
-2.02*** 
(.52) 
-2.05** 
(.66) 
-1.33** 
(.62) 
-1.64*** 
(.44) 
Current War 
Involvement 
1.04*** 
(.25) 
.37 
(.47) 
.73*** 
(.21) 
1.07*** 
(.23) 
.18 
(.47) 
.72*** 
(.20) 
Pre-existing 
Sponsorship 
2.07*** 
(.21) 
2.02*** 
(.28) 
2.33*** 
(.19) 
2.02*** 
(.21) 
2.15*** 
(.28) 
2.40*** 
(.20) 
Years Since Last 
Sponsorship 
-.13*** 
(.02) 
-.09*** 
(.02) 
-.14*** 
(.01) 
-.12*** 
(.02) 
-.08*** 
(.02) 
-.14*** 
(.01) 
Constant 
 
-5.94*** 
(.44) 
-7.39*** 
(.72) 
-5.77*** 
(.41) 
-6.61*** 
(.45) 
-7.77*** 
(.58) 
-6.26*** 
(.32) 
Number of 
Observations 
924,377 924,377 924,377 985,735 985,735 985,735 
Wald Chi-squared 357.38 152.53 
 
515.76 325.98 148.39 513.41 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as coefficients, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= 
significant at .001 level 
 
Appendix Table 9 Alternative Geographic Controls 
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 Same Geographic Region Geographic Controls for Target 
Variable Name Unanimous Non-
unanimou
s 
Total Unanimous Non-
Unanimous 
Total 
Strategic 
Rivalry 
2.87*** 
(.29) 
2.85*** 
(.34) 
2.64*** 
(.23) 
3.52*** 
(.32) 
3.73*** 
(.36) 
3.29*** 
(.25) 
Difference in 
Capabilities 
-9.50*** 
(2.7) 
-1.75 
(6.76) 
-7.51** 
(2.90) 
-9.41*** 
(2.63) 
-1.78 
(6.33) 
-7.24** 
(2.77) 
Rivalry* 
Difference 
21.97*** 
(4.42) 
17.17** 
(8.10) 
20.70*** 
(4.49) 
17.93*** 
(4.92) 
14.98* 
(8.18) 
17.76*** 
(4.67) 
Targetedt-1 .41 
(.58) 
1.85** 
(.62) 
.68* 
(.40) 
.52 
(.59) 
1.73** 
(.63) 
.83** 
(.41) 
Executive 
Constraints 
-.19*** 
(.05) 
-.07 
(.06) 
-.15*** 
(.04) 
-.19*** 
(.05) 
-.08 
(.06) 
-.15*** 
(.04) 
Cold War 
 
-.41 
(.26) 
-.01 
(.30) 
-.31* 
(.17) 
-.43 
(.26) 
.01 
(.30) 
-.35* 
(.18) 
Same Region 
 
1.71*** 
(.21) 
1.71*** 
(.27) 
1.64*** 
(.17) 
   
N. America/ W. 
Europe 
   -.52 
(.45) 
-1.70** 
(.73) 
-.80** 
(.36) 
Latin America    -.32** 
(.31) 
-1.08** 
(.44) 
-.56** 
(.25) 
Africa 
 
   -.29** 
(.27) 
-.41 
(.30) 
-.31 
(.20) 
Middle East 
 
   -.38 
(.29) 
-.48 
(.37) 
.14 
(.22) 
E. Europe/ 
Central Asia 
   -1.38** 
(.54) 
-1.14** 
(.49) 
-1.13** 
(.36) 
Current War 
Involvement 
.83*** 
(.27) 
.12 
(.50) 
.55** 
(.23) 
.76** 
(.27) 
.15 
(.49) 
.52** 
(.23) 
Pre-existing 
Sponsorship 
1.95*** 
(.22) 
1.98*** 
(.27) 
2.21*** 
(.18) 
1.84*** 
(.23) 
1.90*** 
(.28) 
2.15*** 
(.19) 
Years Since 
Last 
Sponsorship 
-.09*** 
(.01) 
-.06*** 
(.02) 
-.10*** 
(.01) 
-.09*** 
(.01) 
-.06*** 
(.02) 
-.10*** 
(.01) 
Constant -8.23*** 
(.38) 
-9.56*** 
(.47) 
8.07*** 
(.27) 
-7.37*** 
(.41) 
-8.35*** 
(.47) 
-7.12*** 
(.28) 
Number of 
Observations 
923,039 923,736 922,722 923,039 923,736 922,722 
Wald Chi-
squared 
1483.95 644.87 1740.91 1566.72 640.09 1715.59 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as coefficients, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= 
significant at .001 level  
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Appendix Table 10 Models with Civil War Dyads / Non-Civil War Dyads  
 
Variable Name Civil War  
Dyads  
Non-Civil War  
Dyads 
All  
Dyads 
Strategic Rivalry 2.64*** 
(.28) 
3.02*** 
(.57) 
3.41*** 
(.22) 
Difference in Capabilities -10.74*** 
(3.21) 
5.87 
(5.97) 
-6.33** 
(3.07) 
Rivalry*Difference 43.78** 
(17.25) 
-8.52 
(6.14) 
16.16*** 
(4.41) 
Targetedt-1 .89* 
(.49) 
.61 
(1.24) 
.82* 
(.42) 
Executive Constraints -.10** 
(.05) 
-.30** 
(.11) 
-.13** 
(.04) 
Cold War -.18 
(.21) 
-.09 
(.84) 
-.55** 
(.21) 
N. America/ W. Europe -.28 
(.39) 
.88 
(.98) 
-.08 
(.35) 
Latin America -.95** 
(.45) 
.91 
(.58) 
-.45 
(.30) 
Africa -.22 
(.35) 
-1.08 
(.78) 
-.51* 
(.26) 
Middle East .44 
(.44) 
.05 
(.56) 
.17 
(.24) 
E. Europe/ Central Asia -1.23** 
(.56) 
-1.08 
(1.30) 
-1.48** 
(.50) 
Current War Involvement .42 
(.29) 
1.09** 
(.45) 
.54** 
(.24) 
Pre-existing Sponsorship 1.55*** 
(.24) 
1.99*** 
(.37) 
1.89*** 
(.20) 
Years Since Last Sponsorship -.07*** 
(.01) 
-.13*** 
(.03) 
-.10*** 
(.01) 
Constant -5.94*** 
(.43) 
-8.30*** 
(1.14) 
-6.87*** 
(.37) 
Number of Observations 
 
138,737 783,985 922,722 
Wald Chi-squared 1105.23 511.61 1710.14 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as coefficients, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= 
significant at .001 level 
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Appendix Table 11 Alternative Independent Variable (Military Support/Non-Military 
Support) 
 
Variable Name Military 
Sponsorship 
Non-Military 
Sponsorship 
All  
Sponsorship 
Strategic Rivalry 3.75*** 
(.31) 
2.85*** 
(.36) 
3.41*** 
(.22) 
Difference in Capabilities -9.05** 
(4.06) 
-2.27 
(5.72) 
-6.33** 
(3.07) 
Rivalry*Difference 19.28*** 
(5.93) 
9.52 
(8.56) 
16.16*** 
(4.41) 
Targetedt-1 1.08** 
(.47) 
-.25 
(1.11) 
.82* 
(.42) 
Executive Constraints -.08 
(.06) 
-.16* 
(.08) 
-.13** 
(.04) 
Cold War -.41 
(.29) 
-.97** 
(.34) 
-.55** 
(.21) 
N. America/ W. Europe -.31 
(.44) 
.33 
(.66) 
-.08 
(.35) 
Latin America -.93** 
(.45) 
.04 
(.46) 
-.45 
(.30) 
Africa -.16 
(.33) 
-1.58** 
(.62) 
-.51* 
(.26) 
Middle East .23 
(.33) 
.30 
(.40) 
.17 
(.24) 
E. Europe/ Central Asia -2.04** 
(.79) 
-2.30* 
(1.18) 
-1.48** 
(.50) 
Current War Involvement .18 
(.36) 
1.07** 
(.35) 
.54** 
(.24) 
Pre-existing Sponsorship 1.51*** 
(.26) 
2.07*** 
(.35) 
1.89*** 
(.20) 
Years Since Last Sponsorship -.08*** 
(.01) 
-.15*** 
(.02) 
-.10*** 
(.01) 
Constant -7.79*** 
(.50) 
-7.24*** 
(.65) 
-6.87*** 
(.37) 
Number of Observations 
 
922,722 922,722 922,722 
Wald Chi-squared 1195.08 649.81 1710.14 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as coefficients, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= 
significant at .001 level 
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Appendix Table 12 Simultaneous Equation Models for All Hypotheses 
 
Variable Name Unanimous Non-unanimous Variable Name 
First State    
Strategic Rivalry 1.395*** 
(.104) 
1.031*** 
(.178) 
1.348*** 
(.100) 
Difference in Capabilities -4.743*** 
(1.103) 
-3.797** 
(1.619) 
-4.698*** 
(1.024) 
Rivalry*Difference 11.677** 
(3.746) 
4.056 
(4.065) 
8.794** 
(3.025) 
Targetedt-1 -.038 
(.405) 
.270 
(.395) 
.354 
(.234) 
Executive Constraints -.039 
(.024) 
-.065** 
(.032) 
-.063** 
(.021) 
Cold War 
 
.290** 
(.097) 
.162 
(.109) 
.255*** 
(.078) 
N. America/ W. Europe -.492** 
(.205) 
-.182 
(.275) 
-.324* 
(.187) 
Latin America -.458*** 
(.136) 
-.190 
(.184) 
-.363*** 
(.114) 
Africa 
 
-.399*** 
(.105) 
-.237 
(.179) 
-.315*** 
(.098) 
Middle East 
 
-.050 
(.152) 
.166 
(.227) 
.032 
(.146) 
E. Europe/ Central Asia -.802*** 
(.248) 
-.152 
(.252) 
-.480** 
(.186) 
Current War Involvement .209 
(.136) 
.226 
(.210) 
.252** 
(.119) 
Pre-existing Sponsorship .310*** 
(.087) 
.411*** 
(.125) 
.414*** 
(.081) 
Constant -3.518*** 
(.139) 
-3.738*** 
(.186) 
-3.467*** 
(.126) 
Second State    
Strategic Rivalry 1.226*** 
(.147) 
1.035*** 
(.139) 
1.283*** 
(.113) 
Difference in Capabilities 1.580 
(1.825) 
4.163** 
(1.806) 
2.138 
(1.544) 
Rivalry*Difference .356 
(2.534) 
2.461 
(2.014) 
1.396 
(1.886) 
Targetedt-1 .326 
(.326) 
.474 
(.425) 
.013 
(.272) 
Executive Constraints -.100*** 
(.027) 
.003 
(.025) 
-.056** 
(.020) 
Cold War .154* .339*** .273*** 
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 (.089) (.025) (.074) 
N. America/ W. Europe -.260** 
(.092) 
-.622*** 
(.137) 
-.365*** 
(.076) 
Latin America -.008 
(.222) 
-.422 
(.297) 
-.104 
(.172) 
Africa 
 
-.238** 
(.119) 
-.364** 
(.165) 
-.302** 
(.103) 
Middle East 
 
-.123 
(.092) 
-.162 
(.123) 
-.185** 
(.082) 
E. Europe/ Central Asia -.122 
(.196) 
-3.876*** 
(.212) 
-.312 
(.196) 
Current War Involvement .258* 
(.154) 
-.316 
(.268) 
.146 
(.133) 
Pre-existing Sponsorship .321*** 
(.088) 
.307** 
(.098) 
.381*** 
(.071) 
Constant -3.474*** 
(.125) 
-3.782*** 
(.162) 
-3.501*** 
(.115) 
Number of Observations 376,310 376,979 376,028 
Wald Chi-Squared 1184.70 1817.19 1345.37 
Dependent Variables indicate the initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as coefficients, 
with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 level ***= 
significant at .001 level  
 
Paper 2 Appendix: The Best Terrorist for the Job: Selection Motivations in State 
Sponsorship of Terrorism 
 
Appendix Table 1 Model without Independent Variables 
 
Variable Name  Model without IVs 
Number of  
Attackst-1 
-.128** 
(.052) 
Number of  
Attackst 
.025*** 
(.007) 
Cold War .072 
(.186) 
Number of Groups -.135*** 
(.024) 
Breadth of Goals .323 
(.227) 
Criminal Organization .384* 
(.227) 
Constant .455 
(.493) 
Number of Observations 95,976 
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Number of Uncensored Observations 381 
Wald Chi2 46.62 
Dependent Variables indicate the group-level initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as 
coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 
level ***= significant at .001 level  
 
Appendix Table 2 Predicted Marginal Effects for Hypothesis 1 
 
 Ethnic Group = 1 
Similar Ideology = 0 
Ethnic Group = 1 
Similar Ideology = 
1 
 
Change 
Likelihood of 
Selection 
.161 
(.057) 
.287 
(.074) 
-.126 
Results are Adjusted Predictions, with robust standard errors in parentheses. All other variables in model 
set at mean. 
 
Appendix Table 3 Models with Unanimous Sponsorship 
 
Variable Name Unanimous Model Complete Model 
Ethnic Organization 
(H2) 
.575** 
(.206) 
.557** 
(.188) 
Similar Ideology (H3) .351* 
(.198) 
.427** 
(.171) 
Prior  
Sponsorship (H4a) 
5.515*** 
(.243) 
.144 
(.366) 
Duration of Sponsorship (H4b) -10.207*** 
(.499) 
-.218** 
(.104) 
Number of  
Attackst 
.015** 
(.005) 
.017*** 
(.005) 
Cold War -.001 
(.206) 
.090 
(.186) 
Number of Groups -.111*** 
(.026) 
-.132*** 
(.026) 
Breadth of Goals .283 
(.273) 
.362 
(.248) 
Criminal Organization -.379 
(.343) 
.043 
(.246) 
Constant .032 
(.613) 
-.391 
(.514) 
Number of Observations 95,982 95,976 
Number of Uncensored 
Observations 
319 381 
Wald Chi2 1864.94 52.37 
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Dependent Variables indicate the group-level initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are 
listed as coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= 
significant at .05 level ***= significant at .001 level 
 
Appendix Table 4 Alternative Measurements of Ideology and Pre-existing Sponsorship 
 
Variable Name Disaggregated 
Ideology 
Prior S.ship 
(1 Year Lag) 
Prior S.ship 
(2 Year Lag) 
Prior S.ship 
(US Sanctions) 
Ethnic Organization 
(H2) 
.623*** 
(.191) 
.559** 
(.385) 
.559** 
(.385) 
.586** 
(.187) 
Similar Ideology (H3)  .385** 
(.176) 
.385** 
(.176) 
.425** 
(.174) 
Perfectly Corresponding  
Ideology 
.727** 
(.283) 
   
Partially Corresponding 
Ideology 
.267 
(.191) 
   
Prior  
Sponsorship (H4a) 
.887* 
(.504) 
1.056** 
(.471) 
1.056** 
(.471) 
.874 
(.603) 
Duration of Sponsorship 
(H4b) 
-.336** 
(.116) 
-.355** 
(.114) 
-.355** 
(.114) 
-.302** 
(.098) 
Number of  
Attackst-1 
-.214** 
(.088) 
-.225** 
(.087) 
-.225** 
(.087) 
-.212** 
(.081) 
Number of  
Attackst 
.044*** 
(.013) 
.045*** 
(.013) 
.045*** 
(.013) 
.042*** 
(.012) 
Cold War .082 
(.193) 
.052 
(.196) 
.052 
(.196) 
.081 
(.193) 
Number of Groups -.122*** 
(.025) 
-.125*** 
(.025) 
-.125*** 
(.025) 
-.127*** 
(.026) 
Breadth of Goals .317 
(.277) 
.331 
(.272) 
.331 
(.272) 
.319 
(.281) 
Criminal Organization .148 
(.251) 
.148 
(.254) 
.148 
(.254) 
.124 
(.252) 
Constant -473 
(.516) 
-.426 
(.526) 
-.426 
(.526) 
-.421 
(.529) 
Number of 
Observations 
95,976 95,976 95,976 95,976 
Number of Uncensored 
Observations 
381 381 381 381 
Wald Chi2 53.24 51.92 51.92 50.74 
Dependent Variables indicate the group-level initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as 
coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 
level ***= significant at .001 level  
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Appendix Table 5 Additional Controls 
 
Variable Name Rebel Group Group Size Old Group Single 
Organization  
Ethnic Organization 
(H2) 
.397** 
(.197) 
.500** 
(.203) 
.652*** 
(.190) 
.604*** 
(.188) 
Similar Ideology (H3) .548** 
(.185) 
.377** 
(.176) 
.366** 
(.175) 
.437*** 
(.176) 
Prior  
Sponsorship (H4a) 
.081 
(.514) 
.878** 
(.488) 
.568 
(.428) 
.879* 
(.499) 
Duration of Sponsorship 
(H4b) 
-.314** 
(.109) 
-.339** 
(.120) 
-.255** 
(.106) 
-.363*** 
(.102) 
Number of  
Attackst-1 
-.221** 
(.077) 
-.226** 
(.088) 
-.145** 
(.074) 
-.202** 
(.085) 
Number of  
Attackst 
.032** 
(.011) 
.044*** 
(.013) 
.038*** 
(.012) 
.042*** 
(.013) 
Cold War .508** 
(.231) 
.038 
(.195) 
.046 
(.195) 
.002 
(.197) 
Number of Groups -.086*** 
(.025) 
-.118*** 
(.026) 
-.124*** 
(.026) 
-.099*** 
(.025) 
Breadth of Goals .081 
(.265) 
.280 
(.284) 
.394 
(.268) 
.289 
(.288) 
Criminal Organization -.207 
(.294) 
.090 
(.255) 
.127 
(.253) 
-.034 
(.287) 
Rebel Group  
(NSA Data) 
1.560*** 
(.232) 
   
Estimated Group  
Size 
 .106 
(.099) 
  
Old Group  
(5+ Years) 
  -.647** 
(.275) 
 
One Active  
Group 
   1.386** 
(.496) 
Constant -1.572** 
(.583) 
-.595 
(.556) 
-.409 
(.530) 
-.788 
(.537) 
Number of Observations 
 
95,976 95,976 95,976 95,976 
Number of Uncensored 
Observations 
381 381 381 381 
Wald Chi2 104.42 53.81 63.67 63.13 
Dependent Variables indicate the group-level initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as 
coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at 
.05 level ***= significant at .001 level  
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Appendix Table 6 Model excluding Non-Middle East States 
 
Variable Name  Model with 
Middle Eastern 
States 
Models with 
Contiguous States & 
Great Power Rivalries 
Models with 
Contiguous States, 
M.E. Rivalries & G.P. 
Rivalries 
Ethnic Organization 
(H2) 
.635** 
(.230) 
1.05** 
(.369) 
.791** 
(.266) 
Similar Ideology (H3) .346* 
(.208) 
.78** 
(.323) 
.562** 
(.259) 
Prior  
Sponsorship (H4a) 
.007 
(.422) 
.90 
(.743) 
.266 
(.500) 
Duration of 
Sponsorship (H4b) 
-.208** 
(.102) 
-.31** 
(.128) 
-.195* 
(.108) 
Number of  
Attackst-1 
-.153** 
(.078) 
-.11 
(.104) 
-.093 
(.075) 
Number of  
Attackst 
.028 
(.012) 
.04** 
(.017) 
.028** 
(.013) 
Cold War .397 
(.310) 
.09 
(.462) 
.241 
(.315) 
Number of Groups -.096*** 
(.025) 
-.192** 
(.065) 
-.135*** 
(.042) 
Breadth of Goals .194 
(.313) 
1.01** 
(.495) 
.334 
(.371) 
Criminal 
Organization 
.541 
(.405) 
.15 
(.517 
.230 
(.437) 
Constant -1.352** 
(.662) 
-1.22 
(1.26) 
1.610* 
(.855) 
Number of 
Observations 
24,705 5,552 7,036 
Number of 
Uncensored 
Observations 
261 125 195 
Wald Chi2 41.43 31.49 32.96 
Dependent Variables indicate the group-level initiation of terrorism sponsorship.  Results are listed as 
coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level **= significant at .05 
level ***= significant at .001 level  
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Paper 3 Appendix: Success or Shirking in Terror: Control Mechanisms in State 
Sponsorship of Terrorism 
 
Appendix Table 1 Random Sample of Sponsored Terrorist Organizations 
 
Group Name  Sponsor 
States 
Other 
Sponsors 
Target State Starting 
Year 
Ending 
Year 
Abu Nidal 
Organization 
Syria 
 
Libya;  
Iraq 
Israel 1976 1998 
Zimbabwe African 
Nationalist Union 
(ZANU) 
USSR Cuba; 
China 
Rhodesia 
 
1978 1979 
Supreme Council for 
Islamic Revolution in 
Iraq  
Iran None Iraq 1992 1996 
People's Liberation 
Army (India) 
Bangladesh Pakistan India 1984 1988 
Dev Sol Syria 
 
Greece Turkey 1991 1992 
Shanti Bahini - Peace 
Force 
India 
 
None Bangladesh 1986 1987 
Jundallah United 
States 
None Iran 2006 2009 
Turkish Islamic Jihad Iran 
 
None Turkey 1991 1991 
Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA) 
Sudan None Uganda 1994 2001 
Dnestr Republic 
Separatists 
Russia 
 
None Moldova 1992 1992 
Mozambique 
National Resistance 
Movement 
Rhodesia South 
Africa; 
Kenya 
Mozambique 
 
1979 1979 
Revolutionary Org of 
Socialist Muslims 
Syria 
 
Libya;  
Iraq 
United 
Kingdom 
1984 1985 
Moro National 
Liberation Front 
(MNLF) 
Iran Libya; 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
 
1975 2012 
African National 
Congress (South 
Africa) 
USSR None South Africa 1981 1988 
Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) 
Libya  
 
Iran Indonesia 
 
1977 2005 
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Appendix Table 2 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Name Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
% of Non-State 
Attacks (Non-
Diplomatic)   
.076 .225 0 1 
Total Number  
of Attacks 
16.095 45.962 0 505 
Number of Additional 
Sponsors 
1.851 1.854 0 8 
Military  
Support 
.579 .494 0 1 
Base in  
Sponsor State 
.088 .284 0 1 
Adjacency 
 
.442 .497 0 1 
Years  
Sponsored 
9.522 8.762 0 43 
Group  
Network Size 
.228 .866 0 12 
Broad Organizational 
Goals 
.298 .457 0 1 
Ideological  
Similarity 
.459 .498 0 1 
Number of Additional 
Sponsorships 
3.636 3.357 0 12 
State  
Created 
.106 .307 0 1 
 
Appendix Table 3 Model without Independent Variables 
 
Variable Name Model without Independent Variables 
Adjacency -.036* 
(.021) 
Years Sponsored -.002 
(.001) 
Group Network Size -.007 
(.006) 
Broad Organizational Goals -.039* 
(.022) 
Ideological Similarity .041** 
(.020) 
Number of Additional Sponsorships .002 
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(.004) 
State Created -.009 
(.037) 
Constant .104*** 
(.030) 
Number of Observations 2,451 
Wald Chi2 13.39 
Results are listed as coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level 
**= significant at .05 level ***= significant at .001 level
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Appendix Table 4 Correlations of Variables 
 
Variable  
Name 
Num 
Add’l 
Sponsors 
Military 
Support 
Base in 
Sponsor 
State 
Adjacency Years 
Sponsored 
Network 
Size 
Broad 
Goals 
Ideologica
l Similarity 
Num of Add’l 
Sponsorships 
State  
Created 
Num Add’l 
Sponsors  
1.000          
Military 
Support 
.281 1.000         
Base in 
Sponsor State 
-.147 -.297 1.000        
Adjacency 
 
-.091 .199 .068 1.000       
Years 
Sponsored 
-.081 -.109 .043 -.039 1.000      
Network Size 
 
-.161 -.067 -.009 .050 .274 1.000     
Broad  
Goals 
-.102 -.064 -.061 -.197 -.107 .013 1.000    
Ideological 
Similarity 
-.147 -.226 .199 -.135 .201 .123 -.082 1.000   
Num Add’l 
Sponsorships 
-.266 -.156 .168 -.137 .124 .006 -.097 .247 1.000  
State  
Created 
-.176 -.156 .202 -.017 .074 -.012 .058 .131 .143 1.000 
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Appendix Table 5 Data Excluding Single Year Cases 
 
Variable Name Linear Regression for Agency 
Loss: Excluding Single Year 
Cases 
Poisson Regression for Agent 
Success: Excluding Single Year 
Cases 
Number of 
Additional Sponsors  
.015*** 
(.004) 
-.328*** 
(.096) 
Military  
Support  
-.032 
(.019) 
1.190*** 
(.322) 
Base in  
Sponsor State 
.118** 
(.050) 
-2.016*** 
(.468) 
Adjacency 
 
-.009 
(.016) 
1.064* 
(.564) 
Years  
Sponsored 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.010) 
Group  
Network Size 
-.007 
(.005) 
.188** 
(.096) 
Broad  
Organizational Goals 
-.061*** 
(.017) 
1.317** 
(.420) 
Ideological  
Similarity 
.041** 
(.017) 
.296 
(.053) 
Number of 
Additional 
Sponsorships 
.003 
(.003) 
.093* 
(.053) 
State  
Created 
-.037 
(.025) 
-1.183** 
(.533) 
Constant 
 
.061** 
(.030) 
1.357** 
(.442) 
Num of 
Observations 
2,408 2,408 
Wald Chi2 23.43 376.76 
Results are listed as coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level 
**= significant at .05 level ***= significant at .001 level 
Appendix Table 6 Alternative Dependent Variables – External Attack Percentages 
 
Variable Name Alternative Dependent 
Variable: Excluding Rivals 
Alternative Dependent 
Variable: Excluding Rivals and 
Diplomats 
Number of 
Additional Sponsors 
(H1A) 
.014 
(.009) 
.010 
(.006) 
Military  
Support (H2A) 
-.036 
(.032) 
-.006 
(.026) 
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Base in  
Sponsor State (H3A) 
.105 
(.066) 
.078 
(.053) 
Adjacency 
 
-.052** 
(.023) 
-.034* 
(.020) 
Years  
Sponsored 
-.003* 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.001) 
Group  
Network Size 
.003 
(.010) 
-.005 
(.005) 
Broad  
Organizational Goals 
-.040 
(.030) 
-.040 
(.024) 
Ideological  
Similarity 
.047 
(.030) 
.035* 
(.020) 
Number of 
Additional 
Sponsorships 
.0001 
(.005) 
.003 
(.004) 
State  
Created 
-.007 
(.043) 
-.004 
(.038) 
Constant 
 
.132** 
(.049) 
.082** 
(.037) 
Num of 
Observations 
2,451 
 
2,451 
Wald Chi2 17.79 15.11 
Results are listed as coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level 
**= significant at .05 level ***= significant at .001 level 
Appendix Table 7 Alternative Dependent Variables – Targeting Sponsor State 
 
Variable Name Targeting 
Sponsor State 
(Logit) 
Targeting 
Sponsor Govt 
(Logit)  
Targeting 
Sponsor State 
(Relogit) 
Targeting 
Sponsor Govt 
(Relogit) 
Number of 
Add’l Sponsors 
(H1A) 
-.067 
(.142) 
-.069 
(.343) 
-.115 
(.103) 
-.185 
(.150) 
Military  
Support (H2A) 
.638 
(.801) 
.065 
(1.493) 
-.365 
(.341) 
-.684 
(.467) 
Base in  
Sponsor (H3A) 
1.428* 
(.841) 
.604 
(1.772) 
.541 
(.583) 
-.308 
(.903) 
Adjacency 
 
2.569** 
(.843) 
3.371* 
(1.731) 
2.274*** 
(.495) 
2.054** 
(.751) 
Years  
Sponsored 
.014 
(.026) 
.005 
(.024) 
.026 
(.020) 
.015 
(.014) 
Group  
Network Size 
-.216 
(.567) 
Omitted -.287 
(.489) 
Omitted 
Broad  .407 -.017 .154 -.427 
 173 
 
Goals (.557) (1.124) (.364) (.622) 
Ideological  
Similarity 
.623 
(.579) 
-1.043 
(1.532) 
.773** 
(.283) 
.397 
(.361) 
Number of 
Add’l 
Sponsorships 
-.192** 
(.094) 
-.145 
(.119) 
-.264*** 
(.056) 
-.319*** 
(.083) 
State  
Created 
.057 
(.881) 
Omitted -.883 
(.845) 
Omitted 
Constant 
 
-7.607*** 
(.950) 
-9.916*** 
(1.577) 
-4.762*** 
(.573) 
-4.470*** 
(.860) 
Num of 
Observations 
2,451 2,451 2,451 2,451 
Wald Chi2 32.64 26.43 --- --- 
Results are listed as coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level 
**= significant at .05 level ***= significant at .001 level 
Appendix Table 8 Alternative Independent Variables H1 
 
Variable Name Binary Additional Sponsors  
(Agency Loss) 
Binary Additional Sponsors  
(Agent Success)  
Additional Sponsors 
(H1) 
-.004 
(.033) 
.878* 
(.447) 
Military  
Support (H2) 
.004 
(.026) 
.899** 
(.345) 
Base in  
Sponsor State (H3) 
.099* 
(.054) 
1.984*** 
(.321) 
Adjacency 
 
-.036* 
(.020) 
.116 
(.235) 
Years  
Sponsored 
-.002 
(.001) 
.001 
(.010) 
Group  
Network Size 
-.007 
(.006) 
.193** 
(.097) 
Broad  
Organizational Goals 
-.038* 
(.022) 
.394 
(.288) 
Ideological  
Similarity 
.037* 
(.020) 
.288 
(.379) 
Number of 
Additional 
Sponsorships 
.002 
(.004) 
.094* 
(.053) 
State  
Created 
-.017 
(.039) 
-.604 
(.402) 
Constant 
 
.101** 
(.044) 
.929** 
(.422) 
Num of 2,451 2,451 
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Observations  
Wald Chi2 16.36 544.17 
Results are listed as coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level 
**= significant at .05 level ***= significant at .001 level 
Appendix Table 9 Alternative Independent Variables H3 
 
Variable Name Bases in Both 
States (AL) 
Base in Both 
States (AS) 
All Instances of 
Bases (AL) 
All Instances of 
Bases (AS) 
Number of 
Add’l Sponsors 
(H1) 
.011* 
(.006) 
-.328*** 
(.097) 
.011* 
(.006) 
-.328*** 
(.097) 
Military  
Support (H2) 
-.023 
(.027) 
.995** 
(.347) 
-.016 
(.027) 
.879** 
(.403) 
Bases in Both 
States 
-.021 
(.035) 
-1.268** 
(.468) 
  
All Instances of 
Sponsor Bases 
  .028 
(.034) 
-1.433*** 
(.333) 
Adjacency 
 
-.027 
(.022) 
1.166* 
(.693) 
-.034 
(.021) 
1.167* 
(.693) 
Years  
Sponsored 
-.002 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.010) 
-.002 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.010) 
Group  
Network Size 
-.006 
(.006) 
.187* 
(.096) 
-.006 
(.006) 
.187* 
(.096) 
Broad  
Goals 
-.045* 
(.024) 
1.133** 
(.399) 
-.046* 
(.024) 
1.059** 
(.395) 
Ideological  
Similarity 
.041** 
(.020) 
.299 
(.391) 
.040** 
(.020) 
.301 
(.391) 
Number of 
Add’l 
Sponsorships 
.002 
(.004) 
.092* 
(.053) 
.002 
(.004) 
.092* 
(.052) 
State  
Created 
-.002 
(.038) 
-1.161** 
(.499) 
-.008 
(.039) 
-1.128** 
(.495) 
Constant 
 
.098** 
(.035) 
1.457*** 
(.458) 
.093** 
(.036) 
1.595*** 
(.437) 
Num of 
Observations 
2,451 2,451 2,451 2,451 
Wald Chi2 14.53 382.33 14.07 409.30 
Results are listed as coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level 
**= significant at .05 level ***= significant at .001 level 
Appendix Table 10 Alternative Control Variables 
 
Variable Name Years Active 
(Agency Loss) 
Years Active 
(Agent Success) 
Alternative 
Network (AL) 
Alternative 
Network (AS) 
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Number of 
Add’l Sponsors 
(H1) 
.011* 
(.006) 
-.325*** 
(.097) 
.012* 
(.007) 
-.326*** 
(.095) 
Military  
Support (H2) 
-.006 
(.026) 
1.219*** 
(.301) 
-.007 
(.026) 
1.189*** 
(.280) 
Base in Target 
State (H3)  
.099* 
(.053) 
-1.872*** 
(.453) 
.093 
(.058) 
-1.732*** 
(.354) 
Adjacency 
 
-.030 
(.019) 
.999* 
(.578) 
-.031 
(.020) 
.990* 
(.579) 
Years 
Active 
-.002* 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.010) 
  
Years  
Sponsored 
  -.002* 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.010) 
Group  
Network Size 
-.006 
(.006) 
.187* 
(.096) 
  
Alternative 
Group 
Network Size 
  .003 
(.011) 
-.118** 
(.045) 
Broad  
Goals 
-.045* 
(.024) 
1.250** 
(.414) 
-.045* 
(.024) 
1.202** 
(.397) 
Ideological  
Similarity 
.037* 
(.020) 
-.298 
(.391) 
.035* 
(.019) 
.357 
(.423) 
Number of 
Add’l 
Sponsorships 
.002 
(.004) 
.093* 
(.052) 
.002 
(.004) 
.079 
(.049) 
State  
Created 
-.011 
(.038) 
-1.247** 
(.470) 
-.008 
(.038) 
-1.230** 
(.456) 
Constant 
 
.087** 
(.036) 
1.244*** 
(.390) 
.082** 
(.036) 
1.323*** 
(.382) 
Num of 
Observations 
2,451 2,451 2,451 2,451 
Wald Chi2 16.75 387.61 16.45 413.89 
Results are listed as coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  *= significant at .10 level 
**= significant at .05 level ***= significant at .001 level 
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